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Two Montana State University faculty members and a for
mer University student have worked together to produce the
comprehensive report on Montana’s reapportionment problems
which appears in this issue of the Quarterly.
Dr. Ellis Waldron, who has written all but two parts of the
discussion, has taught political science at Montana State Uni
versity since 1950, except for last year which he spent at the
Harvard Law School as a Fellow in Law and Political Science.
He was Graduate Dean at Montana State University from 1957
to 1961. He has an A.B. degree from Ohio State University and
M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in political science from the University
of Wisconsin.
His particular interests are American constitutional law and
legislative problems which he first studied at the University
of Wisconsin under Dr. E. E. Witte, an early head of the famed
Wisconsin Legislative Reference Service. As a United Press
Staff Correspondent, Dr. Waldron reported on Ohio govern
mental affairs and its legislature from 1941 to 1944. His semi
nar in legislative problems has made field trips to the Montana
Legislative Assembly since 1953, and a research grant from
the Montana Historical Society enabled him to spend much
time in Helena during the 1957 session. In that year he pre
pared a Legislative Handbook for distribution by the Montana
Legislative Council. His Montana Politics Since 1864—An
Atlas oj Elections was published by the Montana State Univer
sity Press in 1958; and in 1961 he compiled a survey of Munici
pal Facilities and Services in Montana. He participated in
the urban planning studies of the Upper Midwest Economic
Study and contributed to its 1963 report, The Why and How oj
Community Planning.
Mr. Douglas C. Chaffey received his B.A. degree in political
science from Montana State University in 1963 and his M.A.
degree in political science from the University of Wisconsin in
1964. He currently is working toward his doctorate at Wiscon
sin, and is also employed as a project assistant in that Univer-
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sity’s Institute of Governmental Affairs. Mr. Chaffey’s dis
cussion of the effects of malapportionment in the Montana
Legislative Assembly is taken from his Master’s thesis. An
earlier article by him, “Legislative Apportionment in Mon
tana,” appeared in the Fall 1963 Quarterly.
Dr. Howard E. Reinhardt, author of the section on the effects
of reapportionment on party strength in the legislature, is as
sociate professor of mathematics at Montana State University.
He has studied at the University of Idaho (B.S. in mathe
matics), Washington State University (M.A. in mathematics),
and the University of Michigan, where he received his Ph.D.
degree. In addition to Montana State University, Professor
Reinhardt has taught at Washington State University, the Uni
versity of Michigan, the University of Washington, and at the
Mathematics Research Center, U. S. Army, University of Wis
consin. He has served as a statistical consultant to the U. S.
Forest Service for a number of years, and has contributed
articles to various professional journals.
Dr. Reinhardt will deliver an invited address on current
trends in the teaching of calculus before the National Council
of Teachers of Mathematics in April 1965.
Dr. Gene L. Erion, author of the article on bank notes and
the Federal Reserve, is professor of business administration at
Montana State University. He received his A.B. degree in
economics from Doane College and his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees
in economics from the University of Wisconsin. Before coming
to Montana State University in 1960, he taught at the Univer
sity of Arkansas, Syracuse University, Western State College
of Colorado, and Texas Western College. He has also served
as an economist and statistician for the Wisconsin Taxpayers’
Alliance and as a wage analyst for the Chicago War Labor
Board.
Dr. Erion is the author of Employment in Eleven Western
Montana Counties, 1950, 1954-1960: A Case Study in the Use of
Employment Data, published by the Bureau of Business and
Economic Research in 1962, and of articles in several profes
sional journals.
Mrs. Maxine C. Johnson is assistant director of the Bureau
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With January comes the season of the crystal ball expert.
Like lemmings, who must satisfy their compulsion by marching
periodically to the sea, economic forecasters each year must
vie for public attention with ponderous predictions of the level
of business activity for the coming year. What particularly
interests me about this ritual is not that some individuals ig
nore and others scrupulously follow the gnp sooth-sayers, nor
that the estimates are diverse and even contradictory, but
rather that the aggregate figures which are derived are ir
relevant for most business decisions. Obscured by the totals
or averages are the pertinent variables and magnitudes that
an individual executive would find useful. The typical busi
ness planner in the United States is concerned with a local mar
ket (most retailers) or a state-wide market (many wholesalers
and retail chains, banks, and the like) or a regional market
(most manufacturers, transportation service companies, and
financial institutions). Few firms can employ directly the ag
gregate data of national forecasts in their own planning de
cisions even when there is no question of confidence about the
estimates.
For this reason, regional and state studies are of considerable
importance to individual business decision-makers, and this, of
course, is a major justification for the Montana Business Quar
terly. For example, whether the implications of reapportion
ment for the political, economic and social life of Montanans
are either sinister or auspicious to the reader, this issue of
the Quarterly will give detailed facts and analyses which few
Montanans could amass for themselves. Whatever their feel
ings, it is vital that as many Montanans as possible possess suf
ficient information on which either to reach a decision or to
assess the consequences of a position already taken. Gen
eralized discussions of reapportionment pour in from other
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sources but few media could justify a study of the Montana
situation such as that prepared by Dr. Waldron, Mr. Chaffey,
and Dr. Reinhardt for the Quarterly.
Similarly, Maxine Johnson’s semi-annual discussion of the
business outlook comes closer to providing operational data for
Montana business and political executives than can the most
learned treatise by any pundit interpreting the “big picture”
of the whole economy.
The Spring publication will more than compensate for the
unusual concentration of this issue. The manuscripts that we
are currently editing deal with the special risks of small busi
ness, the coal resources of Montana, the new Uniform Com
mercial Code, the forest industries in Montana’s economy, the
pros and cons of sales taxes, the development of the state’s
tourist attractions, and the increased rate of change to which
all enterprises must adjust more quickly and accurately than
ever before.
We are mindful of the interests and needs of our readers and
request your tolerance should the contents of this issue appear
to be a departure from established editorial policy.

fllosunati £ . *Jcufiosi
Associate Director
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The Business Outlook
MAXINE C. JOHNSON
Assistant Director
Bureau of Business and Economic Research
Montana State University, Missoula

The Nation
The American economy’s longest period of business expan
sion since World War II, which began in February 1961 and
is still underway, will continue through all or most of 1965.
This is the consensus of the experts, although some of the less
confident foresee a possible slowing down or falling off of
business activity toward the end of the year. The question,
as the economists see it, is not whether 1965 as a whole will be
a good business year, but whether this happy situation can
continue into 1966.
Among the reasons for the current optimism is the moder
ation which has characterized recent economic activity. Con
sumers responded rather cautiously to last year’s tax cut, in
creasing their purchases in a prudent manner; businessmen
have used discretion in accumulating inventory; and so far
labor costs have remained relatively stable as increased pro
duction has largely offset wage raises. As a result, our pre
sent economic position is remarkably free of the type of dis
tortion which frequently brings about “readjustment” in the
form of a general business slowdown. Also, partly because of
this moderation, very little inflation has occurred during this
expansion period. Consumer prices last year averaged less
than 4 percent higher than they were in 1961.
Because 1964 was a year of abundance for most Americans,
it was easy to forget that the unemployed and the povertystricken still constitute a national problem. Unemployment
did decline during the year; in November it was estimated
at 5 percent of the labor force. The goal of an unemployment
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rate of 4 percent or less remains some distance away. In fact,
the rate of unemployment may increase in 1965 as an es
pecially large number of 18-year-olds, many lacking the skills
necessary to land jobs, enters the labor market. Special ap
proaches to the unemployment problem will be necessary to
eliminate the incongruous combination of the greatest pros
perity in history and excessive unemployment.
The total value of goods and services produced in 1964 (the
gross national product) was in the neighborhood of $624 bil
lion, about 7 percent above the $583.9 billion gross national
product in 1963. Spending by consumers (whose purchases
account for nearly two-thirds of gnp) plus business and state
and local government spending was responsible for most of
the increase.1 The same three segments of the economy—con
sumers, business, and government—are expected to promote
a gain of some $30-35 billion, or 5 to 6 percent in the gross
national product in 1965. Most forecasters who expect a
growth of this size assume that a further tax reduction (prob
ably the elimination of excise taxes) around midyear will
stimulate consumer spending.
A gross national product of $650-660 billion in 1965 will
represent a gain of around 30 percent since 1960, a much more
satisfactory increase for the first half of the decade than was
anticipated only a couple of years ago. Much of the credit
for this record should go to those responsible for last year’s
tax cut.
In addition to the greater spending by consumers, forecasters
predict that business expenditures for capital investment and
purchases by state and local government will increase in 1965,
'The following breakdown may help readers recall the makeup of gross
national product:
Personal consumption expenditures
Durables
Nondurables
Gross private domestic investment
Business fixed investment
Nonfarm residential construction
Inventory accumulation
Net exports
Government purchases of goods and services
Federal
State and local
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and that these parts of the economy will continue to be largely
responsible for the growth of total gross national product.
There are a number of reasons why business capital expendi
tures are expected to rise. A good many industries need ad
ditional productive capacity; others need to modernize, to im
prove efficiency and cut costs; and many firms currently
have internal funds to carry out expansion programs. The
growing demand for state and local government services in
sures that expenditures by those governments will continue
their steady rise. Although federal spending probably will
increase slightly in 1965, it is almost certain that state and
local government spending this year will equal or exceed fed
eral expenditures for the first time.
What may happen to the three other smaller components of
gnp—inventory accumulation by business, foreign trade, and
housing—is more difficult to predict. The possibility of a steel
strike this spring is causing some stockpiling of steel. Once
the steel issue is settled, inventory accumulation will prob
ably decline; this is one of the reasons some economists an
ticipate a slowdown in overall business growth toward the
end of the year. In the foreign trade area, exports are likely
to exceed imports by about the same amount as last year. Per
haps the biggest question mark is housing, which this year
probably will do no more than hold its own. The longer-run
outlook for the industry, of course, is much better: within a
few years the large numbers of young people born immedi
ately after World War II will begin to marry and create an
increased demand for housing.
To summarize, the American economy, in spite of some prob
lems, can look forward to continued progress in 1965. This,
of course, is good news for all U. S. citizens; but because most
of our readers are concerned particularly with developments
in Montana, let us consider the prospects for the state’s econ
omy in the light of these national expectations.

The State
Like most of the United States, Montana bustled with eco
nomic activity in 1964—although at a somewhat slower pace
than in many other parts of the country. It is true that Mon-
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tana has been enjoying unusually good business conditions
during the past couple of years and that these favorable cir
cumstances will probably continue through 1965. But it is
also true that growth in the state still lags behind that of the
country as a whole.
Montana’s record for 1964 suffers in comparison with 1963
and 1962 for two reasons: the heavy federal spending for
Minutemen missile installation and the unusually high farm
income which characterized the two earlier years. With farm
income down from 1962 and 1963 and the missile projects
(which had employed several thousand persons) completed,
it was not surprising that the state economy in 1964 lacked
the vitality which was evident at the national level. Also,
two natural disasters of major proportions struck the state
last year: the floods in June and the extreme blizzard con
ditions of December. Both these events caused heavy eco
nomic losses in the areas affected, in addition to the suffer
ing and loss of human life which occurred.
Although not all the data for the year are available, the
indications are that economic activity in the state in 1964 was
very little different from 1963. Some of the optimistic esti
mates publicized earlier in the year recently have been re
vised downward. The latest estimates of both Business Week
magazine and the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis show
only modest gains in total personal income, considerably less
than the increases at the national level. Business Week’s esti
mate of personal income for 1964 credits Montana with a 3.0
percent increase over 1963, compared to 5.5 percent for the
United States.2 Recent figures from the Montana Unemploy
ment Compensation Commission indicate that total employ
ment for the year will average slightly below 1963, and other
indicators of state business activity reflect the lack of any
significant growth.
But the contrast between economic expansion in Montana
and the United States since early 1961 (when the current up
turn began) is more significant than year-to-year compari
sons. Figures measuring the exact period are not available
for Montana; however, between 1960 and 1964, total civilian
-Business W eek, January 2, 1965, p. 36.
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employment grew approximately 5.4 percent in the nation
and 3.0 percent in the state.3 Department of Commerce in
come figures for the year 1964 are not yet compiled, but be
tween 1960 and 1963 total personal income increased 15.7 per
cent in the United States and 13.9 percent in Montana while
per capita income grew 10.5 and 9.6 percent respectively.4
According to all the available evidence (as noted above),
when the 1964 figures are released, the income gap will have
widened. Thus the state continues to be faced with a basic
problem of economic growth.
As 1965 begins, the most promising source of improvement in
Montana’s growth rate is the federal government. Increased
defense expenditures in the state this year—as another 50
Minutemen missiles are installed—will provide a temporary
boost in the Great Falls area. Yellowtail Dam construction
will continue through the year, although employment will
decline in the fall as the project nears completion. Expendi
tures for highway construction will continue to increase and
will probably be the highest ever in 1965. The following year
(1966) preliminary contracts will be let for the $350 million
Libby Dam in northwestern Montana. Its projected construc
tion already has begun to inspire new private development in
that area. On the other hand, the announced closure of Glas
gow Air Force Base by June 30, 1968, will have a depressing
effect upon the Glasgow area. If nothing else, the Glasgow
situation illustrates again the danger of community depen
dence upon one industry, whether private or public. A simi
lar moral, of course, can be applied to the larger economic
area; in recent years Montana as a whole has been excessively
dependent upon federal expenditures for its growth.
‘Total civilian employment includes all persons at work in nonmilitary
occupations—wage and salary workers and the self-employed. United
States figures are Department of Labor estimates and appear on page
10 of Economic Indicators, prepared for the Joint Economic Committee
by the Council of Economic Advisers, November 1964. State data are
from the Unemployment Compensation Commission of Montana, mime
ographed report dated November 11, 1964 and undated report dis
tributed in June 1964. The 1964 figures used in computing the percent
increase were estimates based on the first ten months.
4U. S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics, Survey
of Current Business , August 1964, p. 16.
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In the private economy, what may happen to agriculture,
largest of the state’s basic industries, is always difficult to
predict. It is unlikely, however, that agriculture will be a
growth factor this year. Although official estimates are not
yet available, the net income of farmers and ranchers almost
certainly declined in 1964, mostly because of lower prices re
ceived for cattle and for wheat. At this time, little improve
ment in cattle prices is foreseen during the next twelve months,
and crop prices will probably fall further. Declines in grain
prices will be at least partially offset by increased government
payments, but the over-all prospects in agriculture do not
point to a significant gain in the income-of farmers and ranch
ers. Employment in agriculture is expected to continue its
steady decline.
The outlook for the state’s nonagricultural industries this
year is generally good. The construction industry, of course,
will benefit, as it did in 1964, from the large volume of public
construction discussed above. Construction employment should
increase this year and may again provide a boost to the whole
state economy.
The wood products industry, so important to western Mon
tana, continues to produce predominantly lumber, a product
which, of course, is strongly influenced by the ups and downs
of the housing market. Since housing is not one of the strong
spots in today’s national economy, some uncertainty faces
state producers this year. But any decline in housing con
struction probably will not be large, and the continuing ex
pansion of the area’s industry into other wood products may
offset any loss in total employment or value of production
which results from curtailed lumber output. In the meantime,
lumbermen can look to the latter part of the decade when, as
noted above, the housing market is almost sure to expand.
Last year’s completion of the new concentrator at Butte
coincided nicely with a strong demand for copper and output
from Montana’s metal mines increased substantially. Copper
production in 1964 was the largest since 1956; lead and zinc
output were about the same as in 1963. Between late 1963 and
mid-1964 the number of men at work in the mines increased
from 4,000 to 5,000. The chances are that production and em
ployment will remain near this new, higher level in 1965.
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It is interesting to note that in 1956 it took almost 9,000
miners to produce about the same amount of ore that was pro
duced by 5,000 workers last year, and that over the same period
smelter employment has fallen from about 5,000 to 3,200. All
of this is in line with The Anaconda Company’s attempts to
make its Montana properties competitive with other producing
areas through utilization of technological advances.
Travel and recreation will undoubtedly bring increased rev
enue to the state in 1965, partly because most Americans will
have more money available for such purposes and partly be
cause, for some important recreational areas of the state, 1964
was a year of financial disappointment. Vacation travel in
northwestern Montana was curtailed during early summer
by floods which inundated large areas of Glacier National Park
and Flathead County (as well as many acres east of the Con
tinental Divide) and by fears of travelers. Later in the year,
as vacationers were reassured about the condition of highways
and the availability of accommodations, a more normal travel
pattern was established in the area. Southwestern Montana,
on the other hand, benefited as Yellowstone National Park re
ceived a record number of visitors in 1964—3 percent more
than in 1963, and other parts of the state reported a good year.
Expectations for the industries discussed above, plus the
generally optimistic outlook for the national economy, point
to a good business year in 1965 in Montana. The construction
industry and businesses serving travelers and vacationers in
particular should find it a better year than 1964. It is well
to remember, however, that the state economy will chiefly
benefit from an unusually large number of projects financially
supported by the federal government, and that we must give
continued attention to ways of expanding the private sector
of our economy if we are to assure sound, long-term growth.

Bank Notes and the Federal Reserve
GENE L. ERION
Professor of Business Administration
Montana State University, Missoula

Bank notes—the promissory notes of commercial banks,
specifically—are not new in the United States. Recently, how
ever, a new type of commercial bank promissory note has
appeared on the scene. The new type are unsecured promis
sory notes payable at a specified date in the future and issued
for sale to the nonbank public.1 How does this new type of
commercial bank promissory note fit into the functioning of
the commercial banking system in the United States? Will it
weaken Federal Reserve control over the supply of money in
the nation?
The following discussion seeks to answer these questions and
to provide some historical perspective in viewing the role of
the most recent type of commercial bank note. It seeks to do
so by first presenting a very simplified explanation of the
commercial banking system and some of its operations as those
operations affect the supply of money in the United States.
Next, the new type of commercial bank promissory note is
compared to, and contrasted with, two types of commercial
bank promissory notes preceding it in the history of United
States banking. Then, the purpose of the commercial banks in
using the most recent kind of promissory note is examined.
An analysis is presented of the probable effects of the new
notes on the control of the commercial banking system by the
Federal Reserve. Finally, an appraisal is made of whether the
latest innovation in commercial bank notes is likely to prove
socially desirable.
'This development followed a ruling by the Comptroller of the Cur
rency “. . . that it is within the corporate powers of a national bank
to borrow money for general banking purposes by means of issuing
unsecured promissory notes.” Office of Comptroller, United States
Treasury, Years of Reform: Prelude to Progress (Washington, D. C.:
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 22.
See also, “Boon or Bugaboo?,” Forbes, October 15, 1964, p. 34.
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The Commercial Banking System
There are all sorts of banks, and various types will be re
ferred to at various times in this article; so it may be useful
at the start to establish some categories, and to indicate the
relative importance of some of those categories. A commercial
bank is defined as a bank whose liabilities include demand
deposits—checking accounts—and whose customers are pre
dominantly the general public. (A central bank—the Federal
Reserve in the United States—deals predominantly with com
mercial banks, the Treasury, and the central banks of other
nations.) In earlier days, the liabilities of commercial banks
also included bank notes payable on demand. The distinctive
feature of a commercial bank—past and present—is that its
liabilities have included promises to pay on demand which
have been generally acceptable as money in the settling of
obligations.
In the United States, a commercial bank may receive its
corporate charter from the federal government or a state gov
ernment. In the former case, it is a national bank; in the
latter, a state bank. A national bank must be a member of the
Federal Reserve System (established by federal law); a state
bank may be a member of the Federal Reserve System.
Reflected in the data in Table 1, and pertinent to the follow
ing analysis, are these facts. 1) Most of the commercial bank
ing business in the United States is handled by banks which
are members of the Federal Reserve System. 2) National banks
are predominant both as to number and amount of business
TABLE 1
NUMBER AND ASSETS OF VARIOUS TYPES OF COMMERCIAL
BANKS IN THE UNITED STATES, JUNE 30, 1964
T ype of B ank

N um b er

P e rc e n t
of T otal

A m ount
of A ssets
(^billions)

Banks belonging to
Federal Reserve System
National
4,702
34.4
175.2
State
1,478
10.8
94.2
State banks not belonging
to Federal Reserve System
7,489
54.8
52.5
Total
13,669
100.0
321.9
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, October, 1964, p. 1290.

P e rc e n t
of Total

54.4

29.3
16.3
10o!o
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done within the Federal Reserve System. 3) State banks which
are not members of the Federal Reserve System are the most
numerous, but handle a very minor fraction of the total of
commercial banking business.
As already indicated, the supply of money in the United
States includes demand deposits at commercial banks. In fact,
as can be seen in Table 2, demand deposits comprise the bulk
of the money in circulation in the United States.
TABLE 2
KINDS OF MONEY IN CIRCULATION IN THE UNITED STATES,
BY AMOUNTS AND PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL, JUNE 30, 1964
K ind of M oney

Coins
Paper money
Federal reserve notes
Other
Demand deposits adjusted
Total

A m ount
(^billions)

P e rc e n t
of T otal

3.2

2.0

32.3
2.2
120.3
158.0

20.5
1.4
76.1
100.0

Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, August 1964, p. 1033; November
1964, p. 1439.

Next consider a simplified balance sheet for all of the com
mercial banks in the United States, as shown in Table 3.
TABLE 3
ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL ACCOUNTS OF
COMMERCAL BANKS IN THE UNITED STATES,
JUNE 30, 1964
(in billions of dollars)
L iabilities

A ssets

Cash and due from banks
Loans and discounts
U. S. Government and
other securities
Other assets
Total

53.2
164.5
95.7
8.5

Demand deposits
Time deposits
Other liabilities
Capital accounts

321.9

Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, October 1964, p. 1288.

164.7
120.3
10.1

26.8
321.9
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Some of the items on the simplified balance sheet may need
some explanation. The item “cash and due from banks” in
cludes the deposits at Federal Reserve Banks owned by the
commercial banks which are members of the Federal Reserve
System. These deposits, plus member banks’ cash in their
vaults, comprise legal reserve for the members of the Federal
Reserve System. The significance of this fact will be consid
ered shortly.
“Loans and discounts” includes such assets as personal loans
which involve a customer’s promise to repay a loan at a speci
fied date in the future plus the interest charged on the loan.
The loan might be for $10,000, and the customer’s note prom
ising repayment would have a face value of $10,000. If interest
charged were a simple six percent per year, the borrower
would pay the bank $10,600 at the end of the year. An alter
native approach would be for the bank to discount the cus
tomer’s $10,000 note, to be paid in one year, at six percent. The
customer then would receive $9,400 when the bank bought the
note, and would pay the bank $10,000 at the end of the year.
“Time deposits” includes such items as savings accounts and
certificates of deposit. Ownership of this type of commercial
bank liability has both an advantage and a disadvantage for
the customer as compared with the ownership of a demand
deposit. The owner of a time deposit is paid interest if he
retains ownership for a specified minimum period of time. On
the other hand, of course, he is not able to write a check against
a time deposit. His time deposit is not money.

How Commercial Banks Create Money
Because demand deposits are money, it is important to un
derstand how the supply of this type of money is increased, or
decreased. Briefly, then, if the demand deposit liabilities of
commercial banks change, there, of course, must be a change
in some other item of the commercial banks’ balance sheet
shown in Table 3. If demand deposits are increased, there
must be an increase in assets; or a decrease in other liabilities,
or in capital accounts. Principally, commercial banks create
demand deposits when they purchase earning assets, chiefly
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the debts of others on which the commercial banks are paid
interest.
Thus if commercial banks increased their loans to customers
by a billion dollars, the initial changes in Table 3 might be:
Loans and discounts

+1.0

Demand deposits

+1.0

Similarly, if commercial banks bought one billion dollars
worth of United States Government, or other, securities on
the open market, the initial changes might be:
U. S. Government and
othersecurities

+1.0

Demand deposits

+1.0

If customers of commercial banks decided to own one billion
dollars less time deposits, one billion more of demand deposits,
the changes in Table 3 would be:
Demand deposits
Time deposits

+1.0
—1.0

The reverse of the first case, if customers reduced their
borrowings from commercial banks, the initial effect in terms
of Table 3 might be:
Loans anddiscounts

—1.0

Demand deposits

—1.0

Or, if customers decided to own more time deposits, less
demand deposits, Table 3 would be changed:
Demand deposits
Time deposits

—1.0
+1.0

If commercial banks are able to buy more debt, on which
they are paid interest, by increasing their demand deposit lia
bilities, what limit is there to the increase in demand deposits,
in the supply of money? This is where legal reserves, men
tioned earlier, enter the picture. Commercial banks are re
quired to maintain certain ratios between their deposit lia
bilities and their legal reserves.2 Thus, if the reserve requireThere is a great variety in the ratios required between reserves and
deposits. For banks which are members of the Federal Reserve Sys
tem, the ratios are determined by the Board of Governors of that
System, within limits provided by federal law. The ratios are higher
for demand deposits than for time deposits; and are higher for “reserve
city” member banks than for “country” member banks. For commer-
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ment for commercial banks belonging to the Federal Reserve
System were 15 percent for demand deposits, a member bank
would need $15 worth of deposit with its Federal Reserve Bank
and/or $15 cash in vault for every $100 worth of demand de
posits. Given $1 million of demand deposits, the required re
serve would be $150,000. If the bank’s legal reserve were
greater than its required reserve, it would have excess reserve.
The greater the excess reserves of commercial banks, the
greater is their unused earning capacity, other things being
equal. Given excess reserves, commercial banks are in a posi
tion to create more demand deposits by the process of making
more loans or investments, thereby increasing the supply of
money.
If the legal reserves of commercial banks are deficient in
comparison with required reserves, they must obtain additional
reserves by borrowing some reserves or by liquidating some
assets, either of which alternatives may be costly; or by re
ducing their deposit liabilities by failing to replace loans or
investments as they mature, thereby decreasing the supply of
money.
Commercial banks, then, create money in buying earning
assets. Reserve requirements plus the availability of legal
reserves limit the commercial banks in their creating of money.

Two Older Types of Commercial Bank Notes
To repeat, commercial bank notes are not a new phenomenon
in the United States. In fact, throughout most of the years
since the beginning of the United States, the promissory notes
of commercial banks have played an important, although often
very controversial, role in the economy of the nation. In the
earlier decades of the United States commercial bank notes
comprised the major part of the money supply.8 These were
cial banks which do not belong to the Federal Reserve System, reserve
requirements are established by the laws of the fifty states. It is
because of the great variety that the ratios actually required, and the
percentages that legal reserves currently comprise of deposit lia
bilities, are not given in the explanation of the function of reserve
requirements.
8Cf. Davis Rich Dewey, Financial History of the United States (12th
edition, New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1934), pp. 224-227,
259-262.
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commercial bank notes that were payable on sight or demand.
Any time an owner presented such a note to the bank of issue,
the bank was obligated to pay for the note immediately and in
full with legal tender. It was because of the promise to redeem
with legal tender that this type of commercial bank note cir
culated as money, as a generally accepted means of payment.
At times prior to the Civil War the notes of some of the
commercial banks chartered by some of the states circulated
only at a more or less severe discount; that is, the value of a
note in exchange was less than the value stated on the face
of the note. Such discounting reflected the fear that the issuing
bank would not redeem fully all notes presented to it. The
National Banking Acts of 1863 and 1865 provided for federal
chartering of national banks, whose notes were added to the
money supply, and eliminated state commercial bank notes
from circulation in the period following the Civil War.4 In
1935 the United States Government bonds eligible as collateral
for national bank notes were retired and the Treasury assumed
liability for the national bank notes in circulation. By that
time the promissory notes of the Federal Reserve System,
established 1913-1914, had become the principal component
of the nation’s supply of paper money. Today, then, commer
cial banks’ promises-to-pay-on-demand are no longer a part
of the supply of paper money in the United States.5
Another type of a promise-to-pay by a commercial bank ap
peared during World War I and resumed importance during
and following World War II. During World War II (as well
as in the latter part of the 1930’s), the ownership of United
States Government securities by banks increased greatly. And
'Cf. Harold Barger, Money, Banking, and Public Policy (Chicago: Rand
McNally and Co., 1962), pp. 46-47.
•7bid., pp. 531-532. As a commercial bank liability, the bank note pay
able on demand was comparable to a demand deposit. Except for
differences in the laws pertaining to legal reserve requirements, the
same analysis that was made of demand deposits in terms of Table 3
may be applied to the bank notes that were payable on demand. They,
too, were commercial bank liabilities created for the purpose of buying
earning assets.
Whereas the bank note may have required somewhat less literacy
than the check written on a demand deposit, it generally was less con
venient where large amounts were involved, as is true of checks and
“folding money” today. That a bank note is a promise to pay while
a check is an order to pay is of no significance in the economic analysis.
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while commercial banks had large excess reserves going into
World War II, and hence had no need to borrow additional
reserves from the Federal Reserve,0 by the end of World War II
their excess reserves had dropped to only a small fraction of
their prewar maximum.*7 During World War II, banks greatly
increased their loans and, particularly, their investments. In
doing so, they also greatly increased their deposit liabilities
against which reserves are required. When demand for bank
loans and investments continued to be strong following World
War II, the banks had need for additional reserves. This need
they filled chiefly in two ways: 1) by selling United States
Government securities, some of the sales going, directly or in
directly, to the Federal Reserve; or 2) by borrowing from the
Federal Reserve through promissory notes secured by United
States Government securities pledged as collateral. In the
latter case, the banks paid interest on the loan (promissory
note), and the loan (promissory note) was to be repaid by the
bank after a specified period of time. Borrowings of this type
are known as advances, and continue in use as a means for
member banks to obtain credit from their Federal Reserve
Banks.
Summarizing the history of commercial bank promissory
notes to the recent past, then, it can be said that they chiefly
have taken two different forms. 1) There were the bank notes
so familiar in the 19th century and the early decades of the
20th century as a prominent part of the money supply. Re
deemable by the issuing bank in legal tender on demand, some
bank notes—those issued by state banks prior to the Civil War
—were subject to discounts, but they did circulate as money.
2) The second form, the promise of a member bank to repay
a loan obtained from a Federal Reserve Bank, continues as a
feature of United States banking. It is a time note, providing
for repayment by the borrowing bank after a specified short
period of time, not on demand; and it carries explicit interest
"At the end of June, 1940, member banks’ required reserves were $6,924
billion, while their excess reserves were $6,857 billion. Annual Report
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System , for the Year
1940, p. 52.

7At the end of September, 1945, member banks’ required reserves were
$14,261 billion, while excess reserves were $1,153 billion. Federal
Reserve Bulletin, January, 1947, p. 281.
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charges, is not discounted. While this type of promissory note
is used by banks to obtain additional reserves, it obviously
does not circulate as money as the earlier type of bank note
did.
Both these first two types of bank promissory notes have
been required by law to be “secured,” meaning generally that
banks must provide as collateral for their notes some type of
asset such as securities of the United States Government.

The New Unsecured Promissory Note
The most recent type of commercial bank promissory note
that has appeared on the scene in the .economy of the United
States is the unsecured promissory note payable at a specified
date in the future—not on demand. This latest type of com
mercial bank promise-to-pay is issued for sale to the nonbank
public. The interest charge is implicit, not explicit; that is, it
sells at whatever discount is necessary to induce its purchase.
The new type is intended to obtain additional reserves for the
issuing commercial bank by borrowing money from the non
bank public, rather than borrowing directly from the Federal
Reserve. On the other hand, it is not money to the nonbank
public because it is not payable on demand.
As a means of obtaining additional reserves from the non
bank public, the unsecured time promissory notes of commer
cial banks are considered to be alternatives to time deposits,
including certificates of deposit, with certain apparent advan
tages for the banks in comparison to time deposits. 1) No re
serve is required against the promissory notes, while time
deposits of commercial banks are subject to reserve require
ments. That is, banks must maintain a certain ratio between
deposits with Federal Reserve Banks and cash in vault on the
one hand and, on the other, their time deposits. Deposits with
Federal Reserve Banks and vault cash are assets from which
commercial banks receive no direct income; and the banks
generally try to avoid nonearning assets as much as possible,
preferring assets from which they do receive income. No re
serve is required against the unsecured time promissory notes
of banks because the Board of Governors of the Federal
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Reserve System has ruled that such promissory notes are not
liabilities of the deposit type, and hence are not subject to
reserve requirements.8
2) The discount on promissory notes is determined by the
market, while the rate of interest paid on time deposits by
commercial banks is subject to a ceiling imposed by the Fed
eral Reserve’s Board of Governors. Such a ceiling might
appear to be to the advantage of commercial banks, and origi
nally it was intended to be so. When banks are limited in what
they may pay as interest on time deposits, “cutthroat” compe
tition for time deposits is restrained. If banks agreed with
each other to so limit competition, they might well be accused
of illegal collusion; but when the restraint is imposed by an
agency of the United States Government, the limitation is not
subject to such a charge. The maximum legally allowable rate
of interest was imposed in the mid-1930’s to lower the costs of
commercial banks by preventing price (interest) competition.
That sort of rivalry appeared to benefit an aggressive individ
ual bank, but was judged to raise the costs of all banks with
little lasting benefit to any bank. In the mid-1930’s, the non
bank public’s desire for liquidity was high, and its demand for
loanable funds was quite weak. Under such circumstances,
the payment of much more than a nominal rate of interest on
time deposits could well be argued to be an unnecessary and
undesirable cost to commercial banks.

Competition for Funds
Following World War II, and especially during and since the
1950’s, however, the competition for funds of the type that
might enter the time deposits of commercial banks has been
greatly intensified by the growth and proliferation of nonbank
financial institutions. While the ceiling on the rate of interest
paid on time deposits by commercial banks has restrained
““Issuance of Unsecured Negotiable Notes by Member Banks,” Federal
Reserve Bulletin, September, 1964, p. 1137. It is there ruled that
neither the Board’s Regulation D (Reserves of Member Banks) nor
Regulation Q (Payment of Interest on Deposits) is applicable to un
secured negotiable notes. Earlier the Comptroller of the Currency
had so ruled with respect to national banks. (See footnote 1.)
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competition between those banks themselves, it also has re
stricted commercial banks in competing for funds with other
financial institutions such as savings and loan associations, life
insurance companies, credit unions, and mutual savings banks.
Also, in distinct contrast to the 1930’s have been the oppor
tunities for lending and investing. There has been no serious
depression in the postwar period. Nor has there been any
drastic decline in the demand for loans on the downswing of
any postwar business cycle. When the growth in the demand
for loans has tapered off, the banks have moved into securities,
especially those of the United States Government, rather than
permit any substantial increase in their excess reserves (their
unused potential earning capacity).
With the conditions prevailing in the postwar period, then,
commercial banks have been increasingly willing to compete
for the funds that would provide additional reserves. When
the Federal Reserve has increased the maximum rate of in
terest payable on time deposits, most commercial banks have
been quick to raise the rate they offer to the new ceiling. And
there have been expressions of dissatisfaction with the situa
tion that requires commercial banks to meet legal reserve re
quirements against time deposits, while there are no compar
able legal reserve requirements (nor ceilings on interest rates)
on savings accounts with such competitors as savings and loan
associations.9
It is therefore quite understandable that commercial banks
should find unsecured promissory notes payable in the future
highly attractive, especially when viewed against the historical
background and the present institutional setting. The use of
promissory notes by commercial banks is nothing novel, al
though the most recent type is a new variation on the old
theme. Furthermore, it should not be surprising that many
commercial banks chafe at what they consider to be discrimin
atory restraints upon their competing for funds to finance the
purchase of income-earning assets.
*Cf. Money and Credit: The Report of the Commission on Money and
Credit (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961), pp.
167-169.
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Federal Reserve Control Weakened?
The question has been raised, however, whether the use by
banks of unsecured time promissory notes might not be un
desirable from the viewpoint of the general economic welfare.
Does it unduly loosen the control of the Federal Reserve over
member bank reserves, and consequently over the capacity of
commercial banks to increase their loans and investments by
increasing their demand deposit liabilities? Has control of
the supply of money by the Federal Reserve been unduly
loosened?10
Quite to the contrary, the entry of the commercial banks
into the short-term capital market should prove to be desir
able from the viewpoint of the Federal Reserve. As explained
earlier, control by the Federal Reserve over the supplying
of money by the commercial banks takes two general forms:
1) control over the reserve ratios required of member banks;
and 2) the availability of reserves to commercial banks. The
reserves of commercial banks consist chiefly of Federal Re
serve liabilities: a) deposits of member banks with Federal
Reserve Banks; and b) the vault cash of commercial banks,
the chief component of which is Federal Reserve notes. The
availability of Federal Reserve liabilities to commercial banks,
therefore, depends upon the extent to which the Federal Re
serve Banks extend credit by buying assets with their own
liabilities, and the extent to which those liabiliites reach the
commercial banks to serve them as reserves.
There are competing uses for Federal Reserve Bank liabili
ties. The chief of these competing uses is currency in circula
tion, currency in the hands of the public. To the extent the
public is willing to buy bank promissory notes with currency,
banks will enlarge their share of existing potential reserve.
10Forbes, loc. cit., states that Gabriel T. Kerekes of Goodbody & Com
pany and Professor Marcus Nadler of New York University are two
who have suggested such a possibility. The question also has been
raised by Walter A. Schlechte, president of the American Bankers
Association’s National Bank Division in an address to a convention
of that organization as reported by Am erican Banker, October 27, 1964,
pp. 16, 85, 90.
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However, in most transactions, especially the larger ones, pay
ment is by check, not by currency. As the new type of promis
sory note is issued in large denominations, the direct effect on
currency owned by the public should be negligible. With the
promissory notes paid for by check, individual banks may gain
reserve at the expense of other banks. Taking all banks to
gether, though, the effect would not be a gain in total reserves:
one bank’s gain would be offset by the reserve lost by one or
more other banks.
Even so, taking commercial banks as a whole, their capacity
to lend and invest would be increased—for their deposits
would be reduced, lowering their required reserves and in
creasing their potential for a subsequent expansion of deposits
in buying earning assets. In other words, the buyers of the
notes would be exchanging one type of bank liability (deposits
against which reserves are required) for another type (promis
sory notes against which reserves are not required). Banks
would gain excess reserves. The extensive use of the un
secured, time promissory note by banks, then, might secure
to them a slightly larger share of the potential reserve out
standing, but chiefly would economize on the use of reserves
owned by them. So long as the Federal Reserve maintains
control over the total of Federal Reserve credit outstanding,
however, it can offset the effects of the use of such notes by
banks.
Perhaps this can best be explained by asking a couple of
questions. How does the Federal Reserve extend credit in the
first place? How does it happen that banks, the nonbank pub
lic, the U. S. treasury, and others come to own any liabilities of
the Federal Reserve? When the matter is put this way, the
immediate, offhand reaction might well cut to the heart of the
matter, if it is Federal Reserve credit that is involved, surely
the Federal Reserve may control how much of that credit is
outstanding, how much it is to increase or decrease.
By and large, such an answer to the problem is a correct
one, but it is subject to some reservations and perhaps deserves
some elaboration. First, the Federal Reserve Banks them
selves, by law, are subject to reserve requirements. The re-
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serve requirements are established by Congress, and may be,
and have been, changed by Congress. The legal reserves of
the Federal Reserve Banks vary with the monetary gold stock
of the United States. The required reserves of the Federal
Reserve Banks vary according to the reserve requirements
established by Congress on the one hand, and the size of the
liabilities of the Federal Reserve Banks against which reserves
are required (deposits and Federal Reserve notes) on the other
hand. The difference between legal reserves (gold certificates)
owned by the Federal Reserve Banks and required reserves
is, of course, excess reserves. At times, the Federal Reserve
has been quite concerned about the possibility of its not having
enough legal reserves, because of a decrease in the monetary
gold stock or an increase in its liabilities against which reserves
were required.
In such a situation, several alternative courses of action
would be possible. 1) The price of gold, in terms of dollars,
might be raised. 2) Legal reserve requirements for Federal
Reserve Banks might be lowered. 3) The Federal Reserve
might slow down, stop, or reverse the increase in its liabilities
against which reserves are required. That is, it might slow
down, stop, or reverse the increase in potential legal reserves
for commercial banks.
If the first two alternatives are ruled out, for whatever
reasons, then the Federal Reserve may be subject to some
restraint in its providing of potential reserves for commercial
banks by the size, and changes in the size, of the monetary
gold stock.
Historically, the Federal Reserve also has been subject to
another, opposite type of restraint on its freedom of decision
as to its providing of reserves to commercial banks. In both
World War I and World War II, the Federal Reserve felt con
strained—and the consensus is that it properly felt so—to ex
tend Federal Reserve credit to support the financing of the
war effort. To the considerable extent that it provided Federal
Reserve credit to support war finance, the Federal Reserve
also provided additional potential reserve to the commercial
banks.
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Federal Reserve Controls
How does the Federal Reserve extend its credit? How does
it increase or decrease the volume of Federal Reserve credit
outstanding? There are several methods available to it, but
the most important one by far is known as the Federal Re
serve’s “open market operations” in United States Government
securities. What this amounts to is that the Federal Reserve
buys and sells United States Government securities in compe
tition with other buyers and sellers. But the Federal Reserve
is no ordinary buyer and seller of such securities. When the
Federal Reserve buys on the open market, it pays with checks
drawn against the Federal Reserve. Whether the checks are
paid to commercial banks or to customers of commercial banks
makes little difference in this context. Most checks get de
posited with commercial banks, so either way commercial
banks obtain ownership of orders-to-pay which the Federal
Reserve has written against itself. The commercial banks may
exchange the checks for Federal Reserve notes or, much more
likely, for increases in their deposits with the Federal Reserve
Banks. In either case, there has been an increase in the legal
reserve of the commercial banks, increasing their potential to
lend and invest by increasing their deposit liabilities against
which reserves are required.
If the Federal Reserve wants to reduce the potential reserves
of commercial banks it sells securities on the open market.
Receiving checks in payment for the securities, it collects on
the checks by reducing the deposits with the Federal Reserve
Banks of the commercial banks against which the checks were
drawn.
It might be noted here that the open market operations of
the Federal Reserve may not only affect the potential reserves
of commercial banks, they can also have a direct effect on
interest rates. If the Federal Reserve buys large amounts of
short-term securities, the prices of those securities will tend
to rise with the increase in the demand for them, lowering the
yield on them and tending to lower short-term interest rates
generally. The lowering of interest rates may then, with the
passing of time, spread to other parts of the interest-rate struc-

B A N K NOTES AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE

31

ture; but the immediate impact is on the short-term interest
rates.
During and following World War II, until 1951, the Federal
Reserve was committed to the policy of “pegging”—holding
up—the prices of United States Government securities, which
largely confined it to the buying side in its open market oper
ations.11 For most of the decade following 1951, the Federal
Reserve’s open market operations were under a different, selfimposed type of restraint known as the “bills-only” (or “billspreferably” or “bills-usually”) policy. The key feature of this
policy, obviously responsible for its name, was that the Federal
Reserve usually limited its open market operations to Treasury
bills, which mature in ninety days, and other Treasury obliga
tions maturing in no more than a year. Another part of its
policy was to refrain from “swapping”: buying issues of one
maturity while selling issues of another maturity.12
The Federal Reserve had its stated reasons for its “billsonly” policy of the 1950’s. They were largely technical in the
sense that they pertained to the developing of a market for
Government securities that would not be dominated by the
Federal Reserve in the way that the market had been domi
nated during and following World War II. Some critics of the
policy, on the other hand, stated that the Federal Reserve,
while it concentrated its open market operations at the short
end of the market, was not doing all it might to stabilize the
economy at a high level of employment and to increase the
rate of economic growth. They reasoned that long-term in
terest rates are more significant than short-term rates in affect
ing the demand for funds to finance the construction of plants
and other buildings, including homes, and the purchase of
durable production equipment. They also reasoned: 1) that
such expenditures are particularly susceptible to wide varia
tion as compared with total expenditures, and hence their
stimulation needs particular emphasis if employment is to be
maintained at a high level; and 2) that such expenditures,
"For the official demise of the support policy see “Treasury and Federal
Reserve Statements,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, March, 1951, p. 267.
VJAnnual Report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys
tem, for the Year 1953, pp. 86-105.

32

MONTANA BUSINESS QUARTERLY

especially those on plant and durable production equipment,
contribute to a higher rate of economic growth.13

Concern Over Monetary Gold Stock
In 1960-1961 the Federal Reserve announced that it was
abandoning the “bills-only” policy, partly in answer to the
criticism noted above, but probably even more to defend the
United States’ monetary gold stock.14 From at least as early
as 1958 to date, concern has been expressed over the decrease
of the monetary gold stock of the United States and the in
crease in the volume of short-term debt of the United States
owned outside the United States. Presumably the owners of
such short-term debt, ii they so desired, could demand pay
ment in gold, directly or indirectly, immediately if the debt
was of the demand type, otherwise as soon as the debt matured.
,!The Commission on Money and Credit, op. cit., pp. 62-64; Joseph
Ascheim, Techniques of Monetary Control (Baltimore: The Johns Hop
kins Press, 1961), pp. 53-82.
William McC. Martin, Jr., “Federal Reserve Operations in Perspective ”
Federal Reserve Bulletin, March, 1961, pp. 272-281; Annual Report of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System , for the Year
1961, pp. 37-43, 94-99.
That the Federal Reserve chiefly moved from short-term to intermediate-term, rather than long-term, securities is indicated by the
following table.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS’ OWNERSHIP OF UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT MARKETABLE SECURITIES,
BY MATURITY CLASS
(A m ounts a re p a r value in m illions of dollars)

Maturing:
Within one year
1- 5 years
5-10 years
Over 10 years
Total

Ju n e 30, 1960
A m ount
P e rcen t

19,385
5,689

73.1
21.5

271
26,523

1.0
100.0

1,179

4.4

J u n e 30, 1964
A m ount
P e rc e n t
i 8,029

14,691

i,836
239
34,794

51.8
42.2
5.3
0.7
100.0

S01964,:pF1177.al Reserve Bulletin>September, 1960, p. 1039; September,
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Whether they so desired would depend upon many factors,
including the rates of interest offered on short-term debt in
the United States as compared with short-term interest rates
in other countries.
The developments described above combined to put the Fed
eral Reserve in a bit of a bind. If the Federal Reserve wanted
to provide more money for an expanding, or a slumping, economy, it would want to buy United States Government securi
ties on the open market to provide more potential reserves for
the commercial banks. At the same time it would want to
avoid further outflow of gold. Yet, if it limited itself to the
short end of the market, it would provide more potential re
serve only by measures that might lower short-term interest
rates and, consequently, increase the risk of a greater outflow
of gold. At the same time, it would directly affect the interest
rates its critics have contended to be the least significant in
terms of employment and economic growth.

Federal Reserve Defensive Actions
How is all of this relevant to the new use of promissory
notes by commercial banks? If the Federal Reserve believed
the banks were obtaining too great an increase in their excess
reserves by their borrowings in the short-term market, the
Federal Reserve could offset that effect by reducing its credit
outstanding. Particularly appropriate would be a reduction
of its buying of securities on the short-term market.
Banks offering promissory notes on the short-term market
would increase the supply of short-term paper or, alterna
tively, increase the demand for short-term credit. The result
of an increase in demand, there being no offsetting increase in
supply, generally is an increase in price, price in this case
referring to short-term interest rates. If the Federal Reserve
reduced its buying of short-term securities it would thereby
reduce the supply of short-term credit. The result of a decrease
in supply, there being no offsetting decrease in demand, gen
erally is also an increase in price, again an increase in short
term interest rates in this case.
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Thus the greater the extent to which banks increased their
excess reserves by the use of short-term promissory notes, the
more might the Federal Reserve want to restrict its credit.
Furthermore, both the increase in the demand for short-term
credit and the decrease in the supply of it would tend to raise
short-term interest rates. The increase in short-term interest
rates, in turn, should reduce the outflow of gold, assuming no
offsetting developments. It would appear, then, that the Fed
eral Reserve should welcome the use of short-term promissory
notes by commercial banks, so long as the Federal Reserve is
in a position to take offsetting action. An expanding economy
needs an expanding supply of money and credit; the Federal
Reserve probably could simply reduce the rate at which it
increases Federal Reserve credit to offset the excess reserves
banks might obtain by using short-term promissory notes.15
If necessary, however, the Federal Reserve could stop the
expansion of its credit entirely, or even reduce the amount of
its credit outstanding. Reducing Federal Reserve credit out
standing would be accomplished chiefly by the Federal Re
serve’s selling of securities of the United States Government.
As of June 30, 1964, the Federal Reserve had $34.8 billion of
such securities, representing its potential for selling, as com
pared with member banks’ excess reserves of $0.4 billion and
total reserves of $20.8 billion.10
In addition to selling securities on the open market, the
,0Cf. Robert F. Wallace, “What Everybody Wants to Know About Defi
cit Spending,” Montana Business Quarterly, Summer, 1963, pp. 60-103.
1,1Federal Reserve Bulletin, September, 1964, pp. 1148, 1177. Strictly
speaking, the member bank data are averages of daily figures for the
week ending July 1, 1964. Free reserves—excess reserves minus the
borrowings of member banks from Federal Reserve Banks—were only
$181 million that week.
The citing of these data is by no means meant to imply that the
Federal Reserve might dump on the market all of its holdings of United
States Government securities to offset the use of unsecured negotiable
notes by commercial banks—or to offset any other commercial bank
actions, for that matter. To do so would be comparable to the United
States Government’s using an H-bomb on rioters in the Canal Zone
to prevent seizure of the Panama Canal. Rather, it should be clear,
the intention is to emphasize the tremendous potential for counter
measures available to the Federal Reserve. The extent of that potential
is a measure of the extent to which commercial banks may not weaken
Federal Reserve control under existing institutional conditions, or any
institutional conditions likely to prevail in the foreseeable future.
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Federal Reserve also could increase the interest rate it charges
on loans to member banks. If banks were busy obtaining ex
cess reserves on the short-term market, however, raising the
rate on advances might have little effect. Another alternative
available, mentioned earlier, is that of raising reserve require
ments for member banks. This is a much more powerful in
strument of control for the Federal Reserve. If the reserve
requirements are doubled, the effect is much the same as re
ducing the reserves of member banks by half.
If the banks’ use of short-term promissory notes came at a
time when there was a large inflow of gold into the United
States, the problems of the Federal Reserve in maintaining
control would be greater; but even then it is likely that all
that would be required would be that the Federal Reserve
actions of the type described above would have to assume
greater proportions. If such an approach were not successful,
or if the Federal Reserve for any reason felt it needed rein
forcing, perhaps to permit a more delicate touch, various fur
ther defensive measures could be taken with the cooperation
of other central banks and the Treasury. At present, however,
an outflow of gold, rather than an inflow, is the prevailing
situation confronting the United States, so there is little need
to consider those further possible measures at this time.

Conclusions
To return to the question posed earlier, does the use of short
term promissory notes by the banks threaten the control of
the Federal Reserve over the reserves of member banks, over
the expansion of bank credit, and over the supply of money?
Such a threat might seem more likely under conditions quite
different from those of today. With circumstances as they are,
however, especially considering the problem of the gold out
flow, the Federal Reserve should welcome the commercial
banks’ turning to the short-term market as a means of in
creasing their excess reserves. By so doing, commercial banks:
1) reduce the need for a further expansion of Federal Reserve
credit; and 2) increase the demand for short-term loans, tend
ing thereby to raise short-term interest rates. The rise in
short-term interest rates should tend, in turn, to induce those
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owning short-term debt of the United States abroad to continue
owning such debt, rather than to liquidate that debt and reduce
still further the monetary gold stock of the United States. Thus,
the use of the newest type of commercial bank promissory note
should prove advantageous not only to the issuing banks, but
also to the Federal Reserve as it seeks to meet the nation’s
monetary problems.

Background and Priorities
For Legislative
Reapportionment in Montana
I.

Introduction and Summary
ELLIS L. WALDRON
Professor of Political Science
Montana State University, Missoula

The current nationwide interest in legislative apportionment
is “an episode in the urbanization of the American com
munity.”1 Towns may have dominated colonial American po
litical life, but revolutions in transportation and in the culti
vation of food and fibre enabled a restless people to subject
a continent to wheel and plow during the 19th century. The
balance of political power shifted to a dispersed agricultural
population.
Yet the relentless onrush of technology liberated man from
tilling the soil and sent him to the city to produce, distribute
and consume the products of a burgeoning industrial economy.
In the migration to the city the newly urbanized American
left a disproportionate share of his political representation
back on the ranch.
Farm population declined relatively, then absolutely—by
more than half since 1930—from 30 million to 14 million. It is*72
'Professor E. E. Schattschneider’s characterization of Baker v. Carr, 369
U. S. 186 (1962), the Supreme Court decision which broke open the
apportionment question for consideration in the federal courts; see his
article, “Urbanization and Reapportionment,” Yale Law Journal, Vol.
72, p. 7 (1962).
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estimated that 70 percent of the American people now live on
about one percent of the nation’s land. Montana’s population
has reflected these national trends; though lacking massive
concentrations of people, the effects have been scarcely less
dramatic in their local impact.
Montana has had her own century of experience with mo
bility of population, from the heartbreaks of boom-to-bust
mining camps through the disasters of open range cattle oper
ations and tarpaper-to-dust small farming, to modern large
scale commercial agriculture. About three-fourths of the
reasure State s population now lives in or immediately around
incorporated cities and towns. Meanwhile a legislative appor
tionment system which dates from 1889 has become as anachro
nistic as the 160-acre homestead against which Major John
Wesley Powell had warned in the 1870’s.
This is a good place to define some terms. The United States
Supreme Court ruled in June 1964 that a constitutionally
apportioned state legislature is one in which representative
districts as nearly of equal population as is practicable” are
given substantially” equal representation in each of its houses.
A malapportioned legislature, then, is one in which one or
f ° j- P^S6S ePar^ from the standard of equal representation
for districts of equal population. Not one of the 50 state legis
latures is perfectly apportioned, of course; and perhaps no
more than four or five of them met the Supreme Court’s con
stitutional standard in both of their houses when that standard
was decreed in June 1964.
The technical literature on legislatures often distinguishes
ween the establishment of the representation units, called
districting and the assignment of one or more representatives
t each of these districts, called apportionment. In most states
the legislature or some other official body is required to make
a.SSi gnT ent 1or reapportionment of representatives at
some stated interval, usually after the decennial federal census.
In this study as m most current popular discussion, the term
apportionment is used for both districting and the assignment
of represen atives to districts, unless otherwise indicated.
Malapportionment of state legislatures is common, but it has
come about in a variety of ways. In some states whose legis
latures have wide discretion to reapportion, there has been a
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reluctance to respond to constitutional or statutory obligation.
And until recently, judicial pressure was not available to com
pel legislatures to respond to this obligation. In other states
the pattern of representation is embedded in the constitution,
leaving little discretion or capacity in the legislature to keep
itself well apportioned. Sharp partisan cleavages between re
gions have affected the willingness to reapportion in some
states, while in others great concentration of population in one
or two great urban centers is a primary dimension of the ap
portionment problem.
The Montana pattern of representation has its own pecu
liarities which are explored in Part II, How the Montana
Legislative Assembly Became Malapportioned (page 51).
1. In Montana’s Territorial Legislative Assembly, represen
tation in both houses rested upon enumeration of qualified
voters in a fashion which would “fairly represent the people
of the several districts in both houses.”
2. Counties with small populations dominated the 1889 Con
stitutional Convention, and after a sharp power struggle be
tween these counties and the more urban counties, population
was abandoned as the basis of representation in the state Sen
ate; counties would be represented as counties with one senator
each regardless of population—a constitutional requirement.
3. Yet the 1889 Constitutional Convention evidently intended
the House of Representatives to represent population rather
accurately. The Constitution required a census every five
years, and reapportionment of the House after each census.
Apportionment of House seats was to be made according to a
population ratio.
4. The first apportionment assigned several joint representa
tives to pairs of counties which thus had some half-seat rep
resentation.
5. But the 1895 Legislative Assembly decided to grant each
county a representative regardless of its population. There
after, the population ratio was employed only for assignment
of representatives beyond the first one, to counties with suffi
cient population.
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6. A reasonably even distribution of population and of
growth kept legislative malapportionment within modest
bounds until 1910.
7. But in the “county-busting” era between 1910 and 1925,
the number of counties doubled from 28 to 56; and constitu
tional requirements for the Senate and statutory policy for
the House gave a senator and a representative to each new
county regardless of its population.
8. Agricultural depression and the advent of automobiles
and mechanized farming conspired to blight the growth of
many of these newer counties, while several of the historic
mining counties also were losing population.
9. Larger urban centers made substantial population gains,
and the total state population grew at a moderate rate during
the generation from 1930 to the present.
10. In combination, the factors mentioned created ever
greater disproportion between population and legislative rep
resentation; Montana, by 1960, had one of the most malapportioned senates among the states, and its House of Representa
tives was less representative of population than the houses in
many other states.
11. Underrepresentation of urban areas and overrepresenta
tion of rural areas became greater with each decennial reap
portionment because constitutional and statutory provisions
gave three-fourths of the legislative seats to counties without
regard to their population.
12. A curious effect of legal restriction and legislative policy
was to put smaller cities at even greater disadvantage than
the larger cities, in relation to rural counties.
Part III, Statistical Measures of Apportionment, explores the
lack of any universally accepted yardstick for measuring the
fairness of apportionment (page 62).
1. The Montana Senate is one of the most malapportioned
state senates by whatever measure is employed.
The Montana House of Representatives is in about average
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or median position among the houses of the states, in its rep
resentation of population.
3. A “maximum population-variance ratio” was employed by
the Supreme Court in its June 1964 decisions. While no maxi
mum allowable variance ratio has been fixed, congressional
districts with a variance of somewhat more than two-to-one
have been held to deny equal representation.
4. The variance ratio between largest and smallest popula
tion districts in the Montana Senate is 88-to-l; and in the
Montana House of Representatives, 14-to-l.
5. A “minimum-proportion-to-control” ratio also was em
ployed by the Supreme Court. This test, in a fairly apportioned
legislature, would require votes of representatives of approxi
mately 50 percent of the state’s population to control 51 percent
of the votes in a legislative chamber.
6. Senators representing 16.1 percent of Montana’s popula
tion could muster 51 percent of the votes in the Senate. This
is a smaller proportion than that in at least 13 of the 15 states
whose senates were held to be invalid by the Supreme Court
in June 1964.
7. Representatives of 36.6 percent of the state’s population
could muster 51 percent of the votes in the Montana House of
Representatives. This was a smaller proportion than that in
nearly half of the 15 states whose houses were challenged by
the Supreme Court in June 1964.
8. These tests have been criticized for lack of political and
statistical sophistication. But two more complex and statis
tically refined tests confirm the major findings of the simpler
tests as to the relative position of the Montana Legislative
Assembly, compared to the legislatures held to be unconsti
tutional by the Supreme Court.
9. Two more complex tests, the David-Eisenberg index and
the Schubert-Press “inverse coefficient of variation” give a
more distributive measurement of the kind and degree of
malapportionment.
10. All tests seem to suggest that neither house of the Mon
party; while rurally based Democrats were more apt than their

42

M ONTANA BUSINESS QU ARTERLY

tana Legislative Assembly could be sustained as fairly appor
tioned if a valid judicial challenge is brought against them.
Part IV, The Effects of Malapportionment in the Montana
Legislative Assembly, examines the theory that disproportion
between population and representation makes a difference in
the response of a state legislature to the problems brought
before it. This is usually believed to take shape as urban-rural
conflict in which urban popular majorities lose out in conflicts
of interest with rurally oriented legislative majorities (page
74).
An extensive questionnaire to members of the 1963 Montana
Legislative Assembly was paired with an examination of legis
lative histories of a number of bills voted upon in that session.
Findings indicated that legislators recognized the existence
of urban-rural conflict, and that it made some difference in
the legislative product.
1. Rural legislators in each party tended to be more conser
vative than their urban brethren of the same party—in outlook
towards fiscal matters and towards reform of legislative struc
ture and procedures. Thus rural overrepresentation accentu
ated the conservative disposition of the legislature in both
houses regardless of party.
2. Urban representatives were more responsive to urban
problems, and rural representatives to rural problems; neither
understood the problems of the other kind of constituency as
well as they understood the problems of their own constituents.
Thus rural overrepresentation gave considerable relative ad
vantage to the access and appeal of spokesmen for rural in
terests, particularly in the Senate.
3. Many rural legislators did show understanding of urban
problems, although with greater difficulty; such understanding
seemed to be related to legislative experience, and this tended
to offset the factor of rural overrepresentation in the Senate.
4. Rural overrepresentation diminished party discipline.
Partisan affiliation sometimes overrode urban or rural attach
ments, but urban Republicans were more apt than rural Re
publicans to break from fiscally conservative positions of their
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party; while rurally based Democrats were more apt than their
urban brethren to abandon more liberal fiscal positions of
their party.
5. Urban-rural cleavages appeared most prominently in bills
which would divert funds from counties or the state to cities;
on special problems of larger cities; on recreational and con
servation measures which involved use of rural land by urban
folk; and on property taxation which would be borne by rural
districts.
6. In the 1963 session, rural overrepresentation accentuated
both the Democratic majority in the Senate and the Republi
can majority in the House.
A malapportioned legislature poses what might be called the
“Dilemma of the Unrepresentative Legislator.” The standard
expectation in the legislative process is that the representative
will further the interests of his constituency as these interests
are made known; only occasionally will he support the larger,
or public, interest to the felt disadvantage of local constituents.
In another view, the representative votes as he thinks the bet
ter informed opinion among his constituents would have him
vote.
But in a malapportioned legislature, the representative of
an overrepresented minority frequently is put in the position
of having to vote against the interests of his own constituents,
if the legislature is to respond adequately to problems of an
underrepresented majority of the people. This appears to be
an unreasonably heroic expectation; and the more likely re
sult is an inadequate response, if not positive frustration, of
the legislature toward problems which confront it.
Seen in this context, the opposition of some self-proclaimed
“states righters” to fair legislative representation seems curi
ously shortsighted. Defense of malapportionment may amount
to nothing more than protection of the most local and parochial
interests as against recognition of the larger interest in an
adequate state government within the federal system.
Shallow declamation of states rights which adds up to frus
tration rather than assumption of proper state responsibilities
is the surest guarantee that disadvantaged interests will turn
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to the national government for the help denied to them at the
state level of government.
Part V, The Political Effects of an Equitable Apportionment,
explores by statistical probabilities what party balances would
have occurred in the 1963 and 1965 Legislative Assemblies if
they had been equitably apportioned (page 90).
1. In 1963, Republicans controlled the House; in a fairly ap
portioned House their strength might have been as little as 50
percent or as strong as 64.6 percent maximum. Democrats con
trolled the Senate in 1963; in an equitably apportioned Senate
their strength might have ranged from 59.5 percent minimum
to 76.7 percent maximum. In other words party control would
have balanced out as it actually did.
2. In 1965, Democrats controlled both houses; their mini
mum strength in a fairly apportioned House would have been
53.4 percent and their minimum statistical strength in a fairly
apportioned Senate would have been 50.4 percent. The maxi
mum Democratic strengths would have been 69.7 percent in
the House and 69.5 percent in the Senate. In other words,
party control would have been what it actually is.
3. The problem was computed using a ten-year average or
index of partisan preference for each county, derived from
votes for six offices—state and national legislators, President
and Governor—for the years 1952-1962. Assuming that the balance of strength would be the same in each house, Republican
strength would have ranged from 43.2 percent minimum to
49.6 maximum, while Democratic strength would have ranged
from 50.4 percent minimum to 56.8 percent maximum. Since
qL
y+6ar 3Ver?ge amounted t0 a Prediction of strength in
1964, party control would have been what it actually is.
4 In a fairly apportioned legislature actual party balances
will depend as they do now primarily upon how people vote
from election to election, rather than upon the factor of reapportionment.
F
Part VI, The Constitutional Obligation to Reapportion has
been imminent since the United States Supreme Court re
versed a tradition of noninterference in legislative apportion-
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ment, to hold that state legislative malapportionment deprives
voters of the “equal protection of the laws” which the 14th
Amendment guarantees to them against state encroachment
(page 96).
On the heels of this precedent-breaking decision (Baker v.
Carr) which held that the Tennessee General Assembly was
illegally malapportioned, suits to challenge state legislative
apportionments soon were prosecuted in about three-fourths
of the states. Suits from 15 states reached the United States
Supreme Court in the 1963 term, and decisions in these cases
were announced in June 1964. The Court had developed its
“one man, one vote” criterion in Georgia congressional district
ing cases and now applied this standard to both houses of state
legislatures in the 15 states. Briefly, the Supreme Court de
clared:
1. “As a basic constitutional standard, the Equal Protec
tion Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a
bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a
population basis.”
2. While “mathematical exactness . . . is hardly a workable
constitutional requirement” a state must “make an
honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in
both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal popu
lation as is practicable.”
3. Considerations of regional identity, geography, area,
political subdivisions such as counties, or explicit at
tempts to balance urban against rural political power
will not justify any “substantial” departure from equal
representation of population in either legislative cham
ber.
4. The “federal plan” found in a small minority of states
including Montana, which gives representation in one
house to political subdivisions, was specifically repudi
ated as “inapposite and irrelevant to state legislative
districting schemes” amounting to “little more than
after-the-fact rationalization” of malapportionment.
5. While the Supreme Court had invalidated congressional
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districts within a state which varied more than 2-to-l
in population, it refused to be limited by a lower court
decision that a population variance of more than 1.5 to 1
between state legislative districts might violate the one
man, one vote test. It referred detailed determination
of fair apportionment back to trial courts and other local
apportionment agencies in the particular states.
Comments (obiter dicta) in several of the opinions recog
nized problems which also occur in Montana. These included
expressions of concern about the fairness of representation in
large multimember legislative districts; and recognition of
the “rotten borough” potential which lurks in overrepresentation of declining population districts. •
Implementation of the Supreme Court one man, one vote
requirement as the “supreme law of the land” is a clear con
stitutional obligation of state legislators, state executive offi
cers and judges of state courts “anything in the constitution
or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding” when
ever the issue confronts them as a m atter of official duty.
(United States Constitution, Article VI, clause 2).
The concluding portions of this study raise questions and ex
plore alternatives; a program of action was proposed as a real
istic framework for inquiry, not as a prescription for legislative
action.
P art VII, What Kind of Legislature?, analyzes the various
reapportionment possibilities open to Montanans (page 106).
1. Imputed advantages of unicameral versus bicameral legis
latures are examined in the Montana context; it is concluded
that the new legislature probably will be bicameral because of
abiding belief in the value of the delays and double exposures
which bicameralism puts in the way of legislation.
2. Smaller chambers probably would be desirable. But sev
eral considerations, including the great range of difference be
tween sparsely populated and urbanized counties, suggest that
the two houses will remain at about their present size—the
House perhaps around 100, and the Senate from one-third to
one-half that size.
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3. Under any circumstances the least populous counties will
be grouped for representation in both houses while more popu
lous counties will receive more than one senator and represen
tative.
4. The one man, one vote standard permits substantial dif
ferences in the constituencies for election to the two houses.
The most important creative choice to be made will be the
choice of kinds of districts for election of senators and repre
sentatives from the more populous counties.
5. Multimember districts for the Senate and single member
districts for the House would permit important differences in
the constituencies; single member House districts would reduce
the costs of campaigning and permit more direct communica
tion and accountability between constituents and their repre
sentative.
6. Some practical and legal complexities which might hinder
establishment of single member House districts are explored.
Decisions about kind of legislature, size of legislature, and
kinds of districts claim the highest priority of importance, both
in logic and in strategy. Decisions on these matters will dis
charge the most significant part of the Legislative Assembly’s
policy responsibilities with respect to reapportionment, because
they virtually determine the nature and character of the new
legislature; only a second order of detailed decisions is left to
the apportioning authority—whether the Legislative Assembly,
an apportionment commission, or ultimately the courts.
Part VIII, Getting the Job Done, explores several priorities
and approaches open to the 1965 legislature (page 124).
1. Political considerations may not be as unfavorable as they
might seem, although urban-rural differences furnish the back
bone of possible conflict; but fair reapportionment will not de
liver legislative control to one or two great cities, as in some
states; nor will either major party be put in serious or perma
nent disadvantage as happens in some states. In fact, the bal
ances betwen a Democratically-controlled Legislative Assem
bly, a Republican Governor, and courts may turn out to be
favorable toward reapportionment.
2. The constitutional obligation to get on with reapportion-
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ment became immediate and direct for members of the 39th
Legislative Assembly when they convened January 4, 1965,
under their oath to support the United States Constitution (in
cluding its 14th Amendment equal protection of the laws clause
as construed by the Supreme Court).
3. Provisions of the Montana Constitution and statutes which
conflict with the one man, one vote standard of the 14th
Amendment are deprivation by the state of equal protection
of the laws guaranteed by the 14th Amendment; under the
principle of supremacy of valid and relevant national law,
(United States Constitution, Article VI, section 2) these in
compatible provisions of the state constitution and laws are
simply words which no longer impose legal obligation.
4. Thus the first constitutional obligation of the 39th Legis
lative Assembly is to reapportion itself for elections to be held
November 1966.
5. Adoption of a general apportionment statute to fix stand
ards for kind of legislature, size of legislature, and kinds of
districts seems desirable for several reasons; it would set the
framework for detailed decisions by whatever apportioning
agency might ultimately finish the job. Such a general appor
tionment statute would make the most significant policy de
cisions. If itself constitutionally valid, such a statute could
limit the field of skirmish for political and judicial maneuver.
6. Creation of an apportionment commission to complete de
tailed definition of districts and apportionments may become
increasingly attractive by the 55th day of the regular session.
Extension of the reapportionment work into an interim may be
a desirable alternative to an expensive special session of un
known duration, or to judicial reapportionment. One possi
bility would be to extend into the interim the special reappor
tionment committees which served during the regular session.
7. The apportionment commission should report its program
back to a special session of the Legislative Assembly within
some fixed time such as 90 days or perhaps 120 days. Should
a court have taken jurisdiction of the reapportionment, it is
not unreasonable to suppose that it would await results of in
terim legislative action for some reasonable term.
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8. The joint resolution establishing the commission might
provide for implementation of the commission’s apportionment
plan in one or another of several ways. Upon being reported
to the special Assembly session the plan could become effec
tive if enacted by the Assembly and approved by the Governor
in the usual way. Or, upon its report, the plan might become ef
fective as presented unless changed or amended by agreement
of the Assembly and the Governor. Failing such agreement
upon changes, the plan then would go into effect as originally
presented.
9. Details of appointment of the interim commission, its
terms of reference, and the Governor’s pledge to call the special
session should be provided by joint resolution late in the regu
lar session.
10. Whatever reapportionment is developed by the Legisla
tive Assembly or interim apportionment commission will be
tested in the courts well in advance of November 1966.
11. It will also be necessary, though less important, to “tidy
up” the Montana Constitution by an amendment to remove
language incompatible with the one man, one vote standard of
reapportionment; in the process certain archaic provisions and
other objectionable provisions might be removed. But the ad
dition of new constitutional limitations is probably inadvisable;
some terms of a general apportionment statute might ulti
mately be made constitutional but some assessment of experi
ence with the new legislature is suggested prior to proposal of
such amendments.
A program confined to deletion of incompatible constitu
tional limitations might be worked out by the regular standing
committees on constitutional amendments while special com
mittees develop the general statute and its implementation.
12. Hopefully, Montana voters will elect a reapportioned
40th Legislative Assembly, and ratify constitutional amend
ments to accord with that reapportionment in the same election,
November 1966.
In large perspective, the reapportionment movement appears
as an invitation from the Supreme Court to the states to re
fashion their legislative assemblies into responsible instru-
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merits of public authority. This may be a last-best chance for
state governments to make effective responses within the fed
eral system, or see that system shift to one of centralized power
through atrophy of local response to local problems.

II. How the Montana Legislative
Assembly Became Malapportioned
ELLIS L. WALDRON

The founding fathers of 1787 may still have remembered the
revolutionary battlecry of taxation without representation
when they had to resolve a dispute over representation in the
Congress before they could construct the rest of a new national
government. The famed “Connecticut Compromise” provided
that the Senate would represent states as states, equally—the
peculiar price of national union among states which had al
ready been in business for more than a decade. But the na
tional House of Representatives would be based upon popula
tion; and so vital was this principle that a great national census
would be taken every tenth year so that House representation
could be readjusted to people in a growing, expanding nation.
In this same year, the Confederation Congress established a
pattern for government in the “Old West.” The Northwest
Ordinance of 1787 declared that “inhabitants of the said terri
tory shall always be entitled to the benefits of . . . a propor
tionate representation of the people in the legislature.” This
pattern in turn must have influenced the Congress which cre
ated the Montana Territory in 1864.
The Montana Territorial Legislative Assembly would be bi
cameral with both houses to be increased from time to time
“in proportion to the increase of qualified voters” based upon
an apportionment “as nearly equal as practicable, among the
several counties or districts for the election of the council and
representatives, giving to each section of the territory repre
sentation in the ratio of its qualified voters as nearly as may
be.”1
’Organic Act of the Territory of Montana, Sec. 4 (May 26, 1864), re
printed in Revised Codes of Montana 1947, Vol. 1, Part 1, pp. 57, 58.
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A century later, in June 1964, the United States Supreme
Court summoned all states (including Montana) which had
strayed from this standard of equal representation of popula
tion to return to it, as a matter of constitutional obligation.
The Supreme Court noted that “The original constitutions of
36 of our States provided that representation in both houses of
the state legislatures would be based completely, or predomi
nantly, on population.”2
When the first Montana territorial government encountered
political difficulties, Congress, in 1867, directed the territorial
governor to district the territory for new legislative elections.
Members were to be apportioned to districts “upon an enumer
ation of the qualified electors of the . . . districts” in a fashion
“which shall fairly represent the people of the several districts
in both houses.”3
If the Montana Constitution of 1884 (Art. IV, secs. 4, 45-49)
had been adopted, it would have perpetuated a pattern of
legislative representation according to population in both
houses into the period of statehood. Voters of the Territory
approved this Constitution, but Congress was not ready to
grant statehood.
When the present state Constitution was drafted in 1889,
Montana departed from the population principle to embrace
the so-called federal analogy” for its Senate. Amidst bitter
sectional arguments, the Convention in which less populous
counties held disproportionate representation decided to rep
resent counties as counties in the Senate regardless of their
population.4 Thus Montana joined a small company of states
(in 1964 there were fewer than ten) which rejected repre
sentation of population in both houses of the state legislature,
for Senate representation of counties.
VI hatevei the reasons for representation of counties as counm eynolds v. Sim s, 377 U. S. 533, 12 L. Ed 2d 506, 534, (1964), citing
Report of Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations Ap
portionment of State Legislatures (1962).
’
*Act of March 2, 1867, reprinted Revised Codes of Montana 1947 Vol 1
Part 1, p. 65.
T w elve less populous counties with 35 percent of the population (1890
census) had 36 delegates, two short of a majority in the Convention:
three populous counties with 44 percent of the population had 33 dele
gates; Missoula County with six delegates was in “swing” position.
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ties in a state legislature, the reason for creation of the United
States Senate was not one of them.
Advocates of such a Senate invoked the “federal” analogy—
erroneously—in 1889; and critics—correctly—then pointed out
that no federal relationship existed between a state and its
subordinate local governments. Montana counties had no re
served powers then, or now; and their lack of independent
legislative authority endures as a problem of effective local
government.
Yet the 1889 Constitutional Convention paid peculiar tribute
to the importance of accurate representation of population,
when the House of Representatives was projected on a popu
lation basis. It decreed that legislative reapportionment should
occur every five years:
The legislative assembly shall provide by law for an enumera
tion of the inhabitants of the state in the year 1895, and every
tenth year thereafter; and at the session next following such
enumeration, and also at the session next following an enum
eration made by the authority of the United States, shall revise
and adjust the apportionment for representatives on the basis
of such enumeration according to ratios to be fixed by law.
(Montana Constitution, Article VI, section 2)

This has always been the “law of the land” in Montana; but
the requirement of a state census midway between the national
census has simply been ignored.

Constitutional Provision for the Montana Senate

The 1889 Constitution bears the marks of the struggle over
legislative representation.5 Several scattered sections appear,
when read together, to establish that each county shall be a
separate senatorial district to be represented by neither more
nor less than one senator. Legislative responsibility for com
position of the Senate was limited to establishing the staggered
terms of senators (Article V, section 4) and to granting a sen
ator to each new county which might be created (Article VI,
section 4).
The Fourth Legislative Assembly in 1895 dutifully enacted
the constitutional provisions of Article VI for the Senate. The
statute now reads:
'Detail of the provisions is examined below, Part VIII.

54

MONTANA BUSINESS QUARTERLY
Each county of the state of Montana shall constitute a senato
rial district and each senatorial district is entitled to one
senator.

This provision is 43-101, Revised Codes of Montana 1947. The
next section (43-102) enacts verbatim the constitutional lan
guage of Article VI, section 4 respecting assignment of senators
to newly formed counties.
These constitutional provisions are squarely incompatible
with the United States Supreme Court decisions of June 1964.
Unless the United States Supreme Court abruptly reverses
its own growing line of decisions on this point, any federal or
state court in Montana which held otherwise would be re
versed on appeal by the United States Supreme Court.

Constitutional Provision for the Montana House of
Representatives
Constitutional provisions for the Montana House of Repre
sentatives may be compatible with Supreme Court require
ments. The Constitution of 1889 required the Legislative As
sembly to reapportion the House after each census (strictly,
every five years, if the state census were taken); but redistrict
ing might occur “from time to time as public convenience may
require” (Article VI, sections 2 and 3).
The Montana constitutional requirement that apportionment
of members to districts must be “according to ratios to be fixed
by law (Article VI, section 2) neither requires nor impedes
establishment of districts which are equal in population.
There may be no clear constitutional impediment to estab
lishment of House districts which would give equal representa
tion to districts of equal population '.G
To create districts with anything closer than approximate
equality of population may be complicated by the constitutional
prohibition against dividing counties to make representative
®This matter is explored in greater detail below, Part VIII. An appor
tionment scheme which allocated additional representatives on some
rismg scale of population (a regressive scale) would not violate the
Montana Constitution, but probably would not be compatible with
upreme Court requirements of equality. Roughly speaking, the pres
ent system of apportionment in the House is regressively related to
population.
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districts (Article VI, section 3). But Article VI, section 6,
which made the initial apportionment in 1889 met this problem
by creating several joint districts. In addition to the repre
sentatives assigned to individual counties, each of three pairs
of contiguous counties was represented in addition by a joint
representative. These joint-county districts persisted until the
reapportionment of 1895.7
While such joint districts do raise political problems of their
own, they have the sanction of both Constitution and precedent
in Montana. Use of this system during the early years of state
hood continued a practice common throughout the territorial
period. Certainly the joint district deserves to be considered
alongside such exotic and untried devices as weighted voting,
in any practical approach to equalizing population of repre
sentative districts.

Statutory Apportionment for the House of Represntatives
The Montana House of Representatives fails to represent
population equitably enough to meet Supreme Court standards
because of a legislative policy initiated in 1895, which gives
each county one representative regardless of population.8 It
might have been argued that this was an unconstitutional de
parture from the requirement that representatives be appor
tioned according to a population ratio. At any rate, the Legis
lative Assembly did not construe the ratio requirement this
strictly, and statutory allocation of one representative to each
county regardless of population has persisted since 1895.
The ratio of population apportionment was not expressly
stated in the earlier apportionment statutes, but it can be re
constructed from the actual allocations of representatives to
the counties.9 As might be expected, the ratio of representa7Dawson County shared its only representative with Cascade County in
a joint district, until the Fifth Legislative Assembly in 1897. Joint dis
tricts were abandoned in elections to that Assembly.
8Montana Political Code (1895), secs. 112, 113 (Approved Mar. 14, 1895).
'Douglas Chaffey attempted this in his article, “Legislative Apportion
ment in Montana,” Montana Business Quarterly, Fall 1963, pp. 70-71.
Detail of each apportionment since 1889 is set forth there.
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tives to population has been changed from time to time to keep
the size of the House within reasonable limits. The ratio was
1/3,500 in 1901; 1/4,800 in 1911; 1/6,000 in 1921 and 1931; 1/7,000
in 1941 and 1951; and 1/8,500 in 1961. The object seems to have
been to keep the House smaller than 100 members. At the end
of the “county-busting” era in the 1920’s it had reached a mem
bership of 110.
A strict application of the ratio principle would assign a first
representative to a county only if it had a major fraction (one
more than one-half) of the population required by the ratio.
Nineteen counties currently (1960 census) lack the 4,251 popu
lation which would entitle them to a first representative under
the 1/8,500 ratio enacted in 1961. Their combined population
would entitle them to six representatives under the ratio.
Legislative practice has employed the ratio only to assign
representatives beyond the first one. Thus, to secure a second
representative, a county must have 1.5 the population ratio,
plus one person—or, at present, 12,751 population. A third
representative is assigned to a county with 2.5 the population
ratio plus one person, and thus upward until the largest-population county has received its apportionment. Yellowstone
County, with 79,016 population, received nine representatives
in 1961, a tenth representative would have required 9.5 X 8,500
plus 1 = 80,751 population.
Failure to require the half-ratio (4,251 population) for as
signment of a first representative has the following effects in
the present House of Representatives:
1. Nineteen smallest counties, each lacking the half
ratio, are overrepresented 3.25 times, on the aver
age.
2. All counties with more than the half-ratio—that is,
the other 37—are underrepresented both in relation
to smaller counties and in relation to a statewide
average of fair representation.
3. The nine largest counties have only 82 percent of
the representation to which they would be entitled
on a strict population basis.4
4. The greatest disadvantage is experienced by the
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seven counties which have almost enough popula
tion for a second representative: they have only 62
percent of the representation to which they would
be entitled on a strict population basis.
Every time the ratio is increased, the larger and growing
counties lose representation relative to the smallest and de
clining-population counties, so long as each county receives one
representative regardless of its population.
Specifically, increase of the ratio from 1/7,000 to 1/8,500 in
1961 meant that six counties with 1960 population between
10,501 and 12,751 failed to get, or to retain, a second representa
tive to which they would have been entitled under the former
ratio. Meanwhile Daniels and Fallon counties joined the list
of smallest counties who lacked half a ratio for entitlement to
a representative. Their population was between 3,501 and
4,251—the new major fraction or half-ratio. And Yellowstone
County received nine representatives where it would have
had eleven under the former ratio.
Indeed, raising the ratio from 1/7,000 to 1/8,500 deprived 15
counties of either one or two additional representatives to
which they would have been entitled under the former ratio.
The number of Montana counties doubled in the fifteen years
following 1910. Twenty-eight counties became 56, and each
received a senator and a representative regardless of popula
tion.
Many of these newer counties did not grow. A startling fact
has been that many of them have lost population—in some
instances almost from the moment of creation. From 1920 on,
agricultural depression and the automobile combined to frus
trate both growth and equitable legislative apportionment.
Of 19 counties which today lack the 4,251 population that
would entitle them to a first representative under the 1961
legislative apportionment ratio, 15 were formed after 1910, and
two more are remnants of counties so formed. Of these 19
smallest counties, only one, Mineral County, is larger today
than it was in 1920. Four of the new counties (Daniels, Judith
Basin, Golden Valley, and Petroleum, formed either in 1919 or
1925) lost population within ten years of their formation. Sev
eral retain only minor fractions of their 1920 population. Yet
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each of these counties, and indeed one-third of all Montana
counties, enjoy a senator and a representative regardless of
population.
Statutory policy and population trends have combined to
make the Montana Legislative Assembly substantially less
representative of population than it was in 1890, or 1910, or
1930.
Statistical norms employed by the Supreme Court to meas
ure apportionment in 1964 have been applied to past Montana
legislative apportionments. The following table speaks for
itself:
DETERIORATION IN THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THE
MONTANA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, 1870-196010

Y ear

L east P ro p o rtio n (% )
of P opulation Whose
R epresen tativ es Could
TT ,
.
Control 51% of V otes
X
<51% w ould be a
i® , ®*a te
_ P erfect score)
P o p u latio n
Senate
House

15.1
inoi o
Jo?n"

}9JJ
192°
}93S
1962

3

oi l

35.5
31.3
I 3. !
46 3

M axim um P o p u latio n V ariance B etw een Sm allest and
L arg est R ep resen tatio n Distric t ( l- t o - l w ould m ean
eq u al rep resen tatio n )
Senate
House

41.0
39-3

42.0
493

1 to 3.9
1 to 2

37.7
21.0
23 5
16-1

49.5
46.0
49.0
36.6

1 to 19.3
1 to 30
1 to 35
1 to 88

3 5

0

5 0

0

1

to

1 1

5

1 to 2
1 to 8.5
to

1 to 2
1

2

3

1 to 5.2
1 to 14

It is clear from this table that there has been a shift of con
trol in the Senate to the group of counties which would have
no separate representation if population were the basis for
apportionment; and the soaring variance-ratio for the Senate
reflects depopulation of some counties and concentration of
urban population in others. The population of the state is
simply much less evenly distributed today than it was a generation ago, or two generations ago.
Representation of counties as counties in 1889 created only
modest disparities in representation of population by contrast
to its effect today.
M fiQ drn!iiablh^ °f t^6Se indexes is considered in some detail
at pp. 63-69 Computations of indexes of representation were based
upon nearest preceding census, applied to the reapportioned Assembly.
Urban percentages were derived from the 1960 census.
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The rising variance ratio for the House reflects growing
disparity between small counties of absolutely declining popu
lation, and statewide growth which has increased the ratio of
population required to secure a second representative.
Specific indexes of representativeness were computed for
each Montana county in each house, for the years 1910, 1930,
1950 and 1960, in a nation-wide study of state legislative appor
tionment. These indexes show that 31 counties which were
overrepresented in 1930 were even more heavily overrepre
sented in 1960. Meanwhile the eight principal urban counties,
all underrepresented in 1930, were even more seriously under
represented in I960.11
Montana’s deepening malapportionment is not unique, but
part of a national trend of the present century—a trend which
has finally precipitated the crisis over equitable representation
in nearly every state.
This nationwide trend developed in one of two primary
patterns:
1. In states whose constitutional or statutory scheme of ap
portionment would maintain equitable representation, the
representatives of declining-area districts refused to re
apportion, sometimes for as long as 50 years, despite clear
legal obligations to do so. This was the situation in states
like Illinois and Tennessee, whose troubles were so sig
nificant in breaking open judicial consideration of appor
tionment. This is the situation in many states where one
or two very large metropolitan centers dominate the state.
2. In states like Montana whose constitutional and statutory
provisions for apportionment tend to produce inequitable
representation of a growing population, the legislative
assemblies have rather faithfully reapportioned decade
after decade; each reapportionment has increased the en
trenched overrepresentation of declining population dis
tricts.
"See Paul David and Ralph Eisenberg, Devaluation of the Urban and
Suburban Vote, Vol. 2, pp. 96-98 (1962), noted in greater detail at p. 69.

III.

Statistical Measures
of Apportionment
ELLIS L. WALDRON

It has been much easier to agree upon the existence of mal
apportionment in American state legislatures than to accept
a common yardstick for its measurement.
Population” usually refers to the number of human beings
counted in the legislative district in the most recent decennial
national census. Patterns of population distribution differ
markedly both in kind and in magnitude among the states.
Representation districts are created in a considerable variety
of ways; and representatives are assigned to these districts in
diverse ways.
Statistical devices which may adequately represent the pat
tern of apportionment in one state may give distorted images
when applied in another state with a different pattern of popu
lation and apportionment. Statistical approaches which are
acceptable for measuring apportionment within states may
give distorted images when employed to compare apportion
ments among states.
The majority of the United States Supreme Court employed
two statistical indexes of apportionment when it ruled upon
state legislative apportionment in June 1964. Both of these
indexes are relatively simple to comprehend and to apply. We
will analyze them and apply them to the Montana Legislative
Assembly for purposes of comparison. But these tests have
been sharply criticized for resting upon oversimple political
and statistical assumptions. So we will explore several of the
more sophisticated statistical measures of apportionment which
have been applied during recent years, and note their applica
bility to the Montana Legislative Assembly.
AH of the statistical measuring sticks give readings of “sub-
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stantial,” “considerable” or “excessive” malapportionment for
the Montana Senate, and at least average or median malappor
tionment for the Montana House of Representatives.
The Montana Senate is less representative of population than
the Senate in at least fourteen of the fifteen states whose legis
latures have been held by the United States Supreme Court
to deny equal protection of the laws.
The Montana House of Representatives is less well appor
tioned to population than the House in at least four of these
fifteen states, and not materially more representative than
many of the other eleven whose apportionments were invali
dated in June 1964.
Brief consideration of several methods for measuring the
apportionment of legislatures to population follows.

The Maximum Population-Variance Ratio
The simplest and least indicative measure of apportionment
employed by the United States Supreme Court in June 1964
was an “extremity” ratio which divided the population of the
largest population district (dividend) by the population of the
smallest population district (divisor) and treated the resulting
quotient (called the Variance Ratio) as a ratio or index of the
amount of malapportionment between the two districts of ex
tremely divergent size within a state.
The smaller this index number, the more equitable the ap
portionment. A quotient of 1 would represent perfectly equita
ble apportionment. Because the quotient is a fraction, not a
percentage, the upper range of this index was limited only by
the divergence in size between districts to be compared. The
variance ratio was found to be 422.5 between two California
districts in 1960.
This measure dramatizes the extreme cases of overrepre
sentation and underrepresentation within a state, but tells us
nothing about representation of the other districts within the
state.
Thus the variance ratio of 88.4 for the Montana Senate since
1961 tells us only that the senator from Yellowstone County
represented a population (79,016 in 1960) nearly 90 times as
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large as the number of people (894 in 1960) represented by the
senator from Petroleum County. This ratio tells us nothing
about the 54 other county-districts which contained about 88
percent of the state’s population in 1960. These other districts
might be either well-apportioned on balance, or grossly malapportioned.
The Montana House of Representatives, as in many state
legislatures, contains some multi-member districts. The vari
ance ratio is made applicable to multi-member districts by
dividing the population of such a district by the number of its
representatives, and treating each equal portion as if it were a
single-member district for comparison with other districts.
The maximum variance ratio in the Montana House of Rep
resentatives was 14.0 in 1961. This expressed the divergence
between Petroleum County’s 894 population with one repre
sentative, and Ravalli County’s 12,537 population with one rep
resentative. But it does not show that Lake County, with 13,104
population (only 567 more), was granted a second representa
tive.1
While the maximum variance ratio dramatizes the extreme
cases within a single state, comparisons of such ratios from
one state with those of another state are not particularly
meaningful because of great differences in the size of popula
tion districts from state to state.2*4
With this warning about comparability of these ratios be
tween states, the ratios for the 15 states involved in the June
Sr
°f
temrS. g.lven historical application to Montana in
ta^le aJ)ove» P- 60- This index gives no clue to the fact that several
Moi?tana countlfs had only slightly larger population than Pe4 09 ^ity; no1
r .t.hat 19 of the 56 counties in the state had less
than the 4,251 population which would entitle them to their first repesentative if the population principle were strictly followed. Each of
they6are counties. * 3 representative and a senator simply because
limited significance to compare variance ratios for Montana
Wlth , h(°Se °* New Jersey whose smallest Senate disT
popula,tlon/M ontana’s average Senate district would
P^lftl0Ki and whose largest Senate district had 923,545
Gus Tv er «r "frt
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the total P^ulation of Montana).
Gus Tyler, Court versus Legislature: The Socio-Politics of Malappor
tionment, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 27, p 402 (1962)
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1964 decisions and for Montana are tabulated, because they
occur so frequently in current discussion of these cases.
MAXIMUM POPULATION-VARIANCE RATIOS
Alabama
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Idaho
Illinois
Iowa

Senate
41:1
3.6:1
8:1
15:1
26.4:1
102:1
10.5:1
9:1

House
16:1
1.7:1
424:1
12:1
23:1
11:1
4.6:1
16.8:1

Maryland
Michigan
New York
Ohio
Oklahoma
Virginia
Washington
MONTANA

Senate
32:1
4:1
2.6:1
1.9:1
26.4:1
2.65:1
7.2:1
88:1

House
12:1
2:1
12.7:1
15:1
5.4:1
4.36:1
4.7:1
14:1

The Minimum-Pro portion-Necessary-to-Control”
Index
The second measure of apportionment employed by the Su
preme Court majority in 1964 might be called a “minimum pro
portion of population necessary to control the House” index.
It has been called the “Dauer-Kelsay” index after two scholars
who employed it a decade ago in a statistical pattern which
the National Municipal League has since kept up to date and
widely distributed.3
In this test legislative districts (and equal shares of multi
member districts) of a state are arranged in rank order from
smallest population to largest population districts (or the other
way around). Smaller population districts are then added to
gether to secure a number of districts whose representatives
could muster 51 percent of the votes in the legislative chamber.
The total population of these smaller districts (whose repre
sentatives could control a majority of votes) is then expressed
as a percentage of the total state population. This gives an
^Manning J. Dauer and Robert G. Kelsay, “Unrepresentative States,”
National M unicipal R eview , Vol. 44, pp. 571-575 (1955). Revisions and
refinements of this index are widely disseminated. A 1962 revision
was employed by Arthur L. Goldberg, “The Statistics of Malapportion
ment,” 72 Yale Law Journal 90, 100 (1962). A 1964 revision, current
with the 1964 Supreme Court apportionment decisions, appeared in
Congressional Quarterly W eekly Report for June 19, 1964, p. 1219. This
test was given historical application to Montana in the table above,
p. 60.
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index number, which might range from 1 (least representa
tive) to 51 (perfectly representative) percent of the population
whose representatives could control a majority of the votes
in the legislative chamber.
This Dauer-Kelsay, or minimum-proportion-to-control, index
has several attractive features:
1. It is simple to understand and to compute. Anyone who
can work percentages and add sums can calculate the indexes
with a pencil, sliderule or desk calculator.
2. It gives some distributive measure of the general preva
lence of inequities in apportionment; it may be particularly
appropriate for an apportionment system which produces large
numbers of small population districts.
3. It is not distorted by peculiarities of politics, geography
or population distribution which can produce extreme but un
typical variance ratios.
4. Raw data of widely divergent range are reduced to a
common statistical norm, the percentage, so that some com
parisons are allowable between chambers of a single state, and
among states.
A 1964 Congressional Quarterly computation of these indexes
for the 50 states illustrates several points of interest for Mon
tana. These indexes are set forth below for the fifteen states
whose legislatures were held to be unconstitutionally appor
tioned m June 1964; comparable indexes cited by the Supreme
Court are shown; and the indexes for Montana are furnished
for purposes of comparison.4 (See following page.)
Whether Supreme Court or Congressional Quarterly figures
are used, by this test the Montana Senate is more malapporloned than the Senate in thirteen of the fifteen states whose
legislatures were held to be unconstitutional in June 1964. And
T her narm ednftat h re f —

th e W e e k ly R ep o rt fo r J u n e 19’

each of
t h e PrmciPal Supreme Court decision for
eacn oi tn e 15 states is given. Discrepancies between S u n rem p P o n rt
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MINIMUM-PROPORTION-TO-CONTROL INDEXES
SEN ATE

S tate

A la b a m a _____ ___________
(Reynolds v. Sim s)
Colorado _________________
(Lucas v. A ssem bly)
Connecticut .... .................. ..
(Pinney v. B utterw orth)
Delaware ______________ __
(Rom an v. Sincock)
F lo r id a _____________ ____
(Sw ann v. Adam s)
Idaho ......................................
(Hearne v. Sm ylie)
I ll in o i s ___________________
(Germano v. K erner)
Iowa
........... .......................
(Hill v. Davis)
Maryland _________________
(Md. Com m ittee v. Tawes)
Michigan .............................. .
(Marshall v. Hare)
New York _______ ________
( W M C A v. Lomenzo)
Ohio ......................................
(Nolan v. Rhodes)
Oklahoma ...........................
(W illiams v. Moss)
Virginia ............. ................. .
(Davis v. Mann)
Washington ..................... ........
(M eyers v. Thigpen)
Montana (1962) ..... ................

HOUSE
C on g ressio n al
C on g ressio n al
Q u arS u p rem e
Q u a rS u p rem e
te rly
C o u rt
te rly
C o u rt

25.1

27.6

25.7

37.9

33.2

29.8

45.1

32.1
12.0

32.0
21.0

14.1

29.9

28.0

15.2

26.9

16.6

44.0

28.7

39.9

35.2

26.9

14.2

24.7

36.9

42.3
44.0

29.0
38.1

27.6

37.5

34.7

46.0

28.4

24.5

29.5

41.1

41.1

40.5

40.5

35.6

33.9

38.0

35.3

16.1

36.6

the Montana House of Representatives is less representative
under these tests than at least six of the fifteen legislatures
whose apportionment was invalidated by the Supreme Court.
Comparing Montana with the other 49 states, on this minimum-proportion-to-control index, only five Senates were con
trollable by smaller percentages of population: Arizona (12.8),
California (10.7), Florida (15.2), Maryland (14.2), and Nevada
(8.0). The Montana Senate, in other words, ranked 45th among
50, in representativeness. The Montana House was less repre
sentative than those of 27 other states among 49 (Nebraska
excluded because it is unicameral). The Montana House, a
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body at least roughly representative of population, was near
median position—that is, about midway in the rank order.
A variant of this Dauer-Kelsey index was employed in a
widely recognized 1955 study by Russell Baker which focused
attention upon the representation of principal urban areas with
in each state.*’ Treating the five largest urban counties in Mon
tana as indicative of its principal urban areas, Baker found
that these counties, with 37 percent of the 1950 population,
controlled 32 percent of the votes in the House of Representa
tives, but only 9 percent of the votes in the Senate. This led
Baker to place Montana among a group of states in which he
regarded malapportionment to be “substantial ” “Principal
urban areas controlled smaller Senate representation in only
seven other states (Georgia, Kansas, Oklahoma, New Mexico,
Arizona, South Carolina, and Mississippi).
This minimum-proportion-to-control index has been criti
cized for making an unrealistic political assumption that rep
resentatives of smaller-population districts will in fact com
bine, upon that principle alone, to block the will of representa
tives of majorities living in urbanized districts. These critics
point out that legislative blocs form in the real world around
such considerations as party, region, and economic and cultural
interests which have little relationship to formal patterns of
representation.
One may concede the validity of this criticism for most legis
lative behavior, most of the time, and still retain belief that
this index suggests realities of political alignment in some im
portant kinds of matters, some of the time. The effort to de
velop a simple, distributive measure of malapportionment like
this Dauer-Kelsay index for a representation pattern which
has large numbers of small population districts does not imply
the expectation that the representatives of such districts will
frequently or habitually combine on the population principle.
Nor does it suggest that when such combinations develop in
some areas of legislative action that they will occur with sta
tistical perfection. However, it would be difficult indeed to
persuade many an observer of Montana legislative politics that
combinations of smaller-district votes do not occur.
P™ er' Rand° m

Studies in
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The minimum-proportion-to-control index also has been crit
icized for lack of statistical sophistication. It does not reflect
the frequency or degree of departures from a statistical mean
or average of population, expressed by a statistical coefficient
of variation. Nor does it measure the effect of untypical dis
tributions of data or events, for which statistical measurements
of “skew” and “kurtosis” have been developed. We will turn
to two more elaborate statistical treatments which meet some
of these criticisms of the simpler indexes. The major effect of
these refined measurements is to confirm, rather than to de
stroy, the findings of the simpler measurements already noted.

The David-Eisenberg Index
In 1961-62 Professors Paul David and Ralph Eisenberg of the
University of Virginia published Devaluation of the Urban and
Suburban Vote. Two volumes of statistics gave “index values
of the right to vote” for state legislators for every county in
the United States, stated as percentages of a statewide average
or norm.0 These David-Eisenberg indexes meet the statistical
requirements of a distributive representation of individual in
stances for any chamber of any state legislature.
The index computed an average, or mean, of ideal repre
sentation for each legislative chamber (state population di
vided by the number of legislative districts with equal shares
allocated to representatives from multi-member districts). This
average or norm was expressed as 100 (100 percent of an equi
table representation district). The extent to which each legis
lative district or representation unit deviated from this state
wide norm was then expressed as a percentage of the norm.
Thus an index below 100 indicated underrepresentation as a
percentage; an index higher than 100 indicated overrepresenta
tion as a percentage of the norm.7
“Published by the Bureau of Public Administration, University of Vir
ginia; Vol. I in November 1961; Vol. II in June 1962. An additional
value of this major study was its compilation of indexes for the years
1910, 1930, 1950, and 1960, to allow historical comparisons.
’In the David-Eisenberg Index, a statistical model with 10,000 popula
tion divided among ten districts would have a statewide average or
norm of 1,000 population per district. An actual district with 1,000
population would have perfect representativeness—100 percent of the
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In 1960, Petroleum County, to consider a Montana example,
had a David-Eisenberg index of 1348 (13.5 times the statewide
Senate norm) in the Senate, and 803 (eight times the statewide
House norm) in the House. Yellowstone County, with an index
of 15 (15/100ths of statewide norm) in the Senate and 73
(73/100ths of statewide norm) in the House was underrepre
sented by the gap between those indexes and the norm of 100.
Comparable indexes were computed for each Montana county.
David and Eisenberg then grouped counties into population
ranges in order to show broader patterns of representation
among states. In these groupings, the 49 Montana counties
each with less than 25,000 population enjoyed a grouped Senate
representation index of 172 (1.7 times the norm) while each
of the seven counties with more than 25,000 population had a
grouped Senate representation index of only 26 (26/100ths of
the norm). In the Montana House of Representatives, the 49
less populous counties had a grouped representation index of
119 (overrepresentation) and the seven populous counties an
index of 80 (underrepresentation).
David and Eisenberg finally sought to compare malappor
tionment among states. To accomplish this, they averaged the
indexes for each house in each state (treating the houses as of
equal weight). Montana’s 49 smaller-population counties had
an overall, both-house index of 146 (overrepresentation) and
t e seven populous counties an index of 53 (underrepresenta
tion) .
In comparisons of population groups among the 50 states,
Montana’s 49 smaller-population counties ranked 15th in de
parture from representativeness; but the seven larger-population Montana counties ranked 35th in departure from repre
sentativeness among comparable counties of other states.
ese David-Eisenberg indexes have been accepted as reas
onably adequate measures of malapportionment within any
particular state.8
nnrtyJ:
,dlstrict .™ith 5°0 population would have 50 percent of the
norm* Tht
population would have 250 percent of the
norm The percentage figures are treated as indexes.
rS etterY ard sh V k ”S^ H g L! girs lative Malapportionment: In Search of
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 7, pp.
P ys a variant form of the David-Eisenberg indexes.
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The Schubert-Press Indexes
In 1964, Professors Glendon Schubert and Charles Press of
Michigan State University challenged the political and statis
tical foundations of the David-Eisenberg comparisons among
states, and presented their own fairly elaborate statistical anal
ysis of apportionment in the 50 state legislatures and the
United States Congress as of 1962.9
They considered the David-Eisenberg assignment of equal
statistical weights to upper and lower houses of American
legislatures to be unrealistic, in view of observed factors of
seniority, longer term, and special functions vested in the
senates. To correct for this inequality, Schubert and Press
assigned arbitrary weights of 60 percent to Senate data, and
40 percent to House data, when they combined their indexes
for over-all interstate comparisons.
The Michigan State analysts objected to use of what they
called “ad hoc” statistical yardsticks to measure apportionment
when quite acceptable “standard” statistical measures were at
hand. They computed the following data for each house of
each state legislature and for the United States Congress:
mean, standard deviation, inverse coefficient of variation,
skewness, and kurtosis. Of these measures, the inverse co
efficient of variation is the single most indicative yardstick,
and the only one to be considered here.10
Measured by the inverse coefficient of variation only the
senates of Florida, New Mexico, Arizona, and California were
"The ensuing discussion and data are derived from their article, “Meas
uring Malapportionment,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 58,
pp. 302-327 (June 1964). Several points of criticism in the foregoing
discussion of other measurements were made in this provocative article.
'"The Schubert-Press indexes for Montana were as follows:
M ean

S tandard
D eviation

Inverse C oefficient
of V ariation
Skew ness

K urtosis

Senate
21,049
15,652
.4349
2.8133
8.0989
House
6,183
3,112
.6651
0.1302
-0.9580
Summarizing significance of their data, they declared: “the affirmative
ideal [equitable apportionment] is a legislative chamber for which the
distribution of representational units is characterized by zero variance,
zero skewness, and maximal positive kurtosis: ICV -> + 1, gi -> 0, g 2
infinity. The negative ideal [extreme malapportionment] is charac
terized by maximal variance, extreme positive skewness, and extreme
positive kurtosis: ICV
0, gi
+ infinity, gu -» + infinity.” Loc. cit.
321, 316.
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worse apportioned than the Montana Senate. The Montana
Senate was worse apportioned than 14 of the 15 senates found
to be invalid in the June Supreme Court decisions.
The Montana House of Representatives was somewhat better
apportioned than those in a majority of states, but no better
than at least four of the 15 houses involved in the June Supreme Court decisions.
Montana variance coefficients are presented with those of
the 15 states involved in the June 1964 Supreme Court decisions:11
SCHUBERT-PRESS INVERSE COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION

Senate
House
Senate
House

Ala.

Colo.

.467
.594
Md.

.472
.538

Conn.

Dela.

Fla.

Ida.

ill.

Iowa

.588
.605

.630
.381

.552
.486

.427
.416

.458
.616

615
.758

581
.574

Mich.

N.Y.

Ohio

Okla.

Va.

Wash.

MONT.

.739

!665

.608
.680

.762

.688

.770
.624

.452
.608

.686

.661

685

435

„ Schubert and Press worked their data into one summary
apportionment score” for each state, weighting Senate data
at 60 percent and House data at 40 percent of the total. The
resulting apportionment scores ranged from -4 .3 for Indiana,
t V qr 1? aPP°rti°ned of the 50 state legislatures and Congress,
to +96.3 for Massachusetts, the best apportioned. On this 100v°1tt S l f ^ ontana’s apportionment score was 44.7, and its
rank (25th place) was the median position among the 51 legisw a s ^ 5 6 1311 SCOre was
and the average (mean) score
t h ^ J ) f r r Wf “
red t0 be “a typ ical” because of
Sace and r f Clef
variance in its Senate; Michigan, in 27th
yp“car- ' “ ^ Pla°e' were ac“ Pted “ being more
„ J here. 1S sr H reaSOn for complacency about Montana because of such statistical midposition. Both the Michigan and
the score,
a
“best” with a score of RfiS

®
™ent’

*°
+ L0- Thehigher
Massachusetts Senate rated
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Colorado legislatures were held to be unconstitutionally malapportioned in June 1964; and to occupy a median or average
position in this regard really indicates only that virtually all
state legislatures fail in some features to meet the Supreme
Court’s constitutional tests of fair representation.
Indeed, on the basis of their data, Schubert and Press sug
gested in advance of the June Supreme Court decisions that
not more than three or four state legislatures as constituted
in 1962 might meet the constitutional tests of the Supreme
Court.
It is further worth notice that these observers placed Mon
tana (along with the United States Congress) in a group of
nine states considered to be “misapportioned” because struc
tural requirements of constitution or statute made malappor
tionment unavoidable; malapportionment of the Senate (in
Montana) tended to block the effectiveness of representation
in a better apportioned House of Representatives.12
Concluding this survey of measurements of apportionment,
it may be observed that simpler figures and more sophisticated
statistics agree that Montana’s Senate is among the least rep
resentative or most malapportioned; and that its House of
Representatives is no worse but scarcely better than a national
median or norm. Both houses stand considerably outside the
limits of fair representation which were demanded by the
Supreme Court.
Neither house would be sustained by a federal court or a
state court which recognized its obligation to apply relevant
national law as declared by the United States Supreme Court
in June 1964.
“Other states in this group were New Jersey, South Carolina, New Mex
ico, Arizona, Hawaii, Alaska, and California. The first four along with
Montana account for five of the seven states whose Senates represent
counties regardless of population, on the so-called “federal analogy.”
The other two states in this group, Idaho and Nevada, turned up in a
group called “malapportioned” because both their legislative houses
were less representative than the all-state median.

IV.

Effects of Malapportionment in the
Montana Legislative Assembly
DOUGLAS C. CHAFFEY
Project Assistant
Institute of Governmental Affairs
University of Wisconsin

Charges that a state’s legislative apportionment has its
6
f °u the ,bllls passed and buried by the state legislature
need to be analyzed—proved or disproved. This writer set out
several months ago to investigate the extent to which Monana s legislative apportionment did or did not affect a session
l a t i v e S e m b T ” 6’ SPed“ Cally the 1963 Montana
, ■3'^le ll;eory belund much of the present writing on apportonment seems to be this: apportionment, the division of legisor “mnbT S a^non^,)egislative districts, becomes “inequitable”
renresents>°r 1-°ne ,|W? n tlle number of people each legislator
I*1m o T s t a t T W,
y lrom county to county within a state.
f a r T e it
JcMlftaresj sparsely inhabited districts have a
tan the r ^ reP? S,entati0n in °ne or both legislative houses
l e i T h e ^ r pul(au ns warrant' and populous districts much
a house a l o n e ?
f that When an issue a™es which divides
disWcts often m 2 °fc o f “ ‘““ cy interests, the less populous
fate of t he hm?
°ver the Populous districts, and the
ment) restrictions i & !u° aPPortionment (or malapportiontha" SerVin® “ » “ ‘- e s t s of the state
ch S ctere? „ d °Z l0US f StriCts are often rural and agrarian in
ar^s t h i ™ ,
P°PUl0US districts contain major urban
S and % £ % £ ? T ta ldea
? “ lsT that
tf^ “
”
«*
city dwellers and f -i
rural groups distrust
city dwellers and fa.l to understand urban problems. When
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rural representatives control one or both legislative houses,
urban legislation often suffers defeat at the hands of rural
indifference, even when a majority of state citizens are city
dwellers.
Of course, it should be considered as a necessary corollary
that reapportionment bills should be drawn carefully so as to
avoid the opposite peril: rural citizens need representation,
too.
Apportionment is also said to affect possible legislation by
providing easy access to the legislature by various state in
terest groups. Groups wishing to block urban legislation are
believed to have a significantly greater appeal to a rurally
dominated legislature than do the groups favoring urban
legislation.1 In addition, rural over-representation may give
an inherent advantage to the political party which tends to be
strong in rural areas, and may prevent an urban-based party
from gaining legislative control.2 Where a legislature divides
into two political parties (as in Montana), both parties seem
to strive for a more rural image than their statewide member
ship would indicate.
In this study specific points taken from this existing “appor
tionment theory” were applied to the 1963 Montana Legislative
Assembly to test their reliability. The theory was tested in
two major ways. First, each 1963 legislator was sent a ques
tionnaire designed to measure his attitudes and outlooks to
ward urban and rural problems and interest pressures. The
idea was to see whether measurable differences between
urban and rural legislators do exist in Montana, and to assess
what importance these differences have in the state legislature
in terms of the state’s apportionment system. Secondly, the
roll call voting in the 1963 session was analyzed to see whether
any urban-rural splits developed during the session, and, if so,
over what types of legislation. Again the idea was to discover
the importance of such splits in terms of the state’s apportion
ment system.3
’Gordon Baker argues this point strongly in Rural Versus Urban Politi
cal Power (New York: Random House, 1955) p. 23.
2See on this point V. O. Key, Jr., American State Politics: An Introduc
tion (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), p. 65.
^ h e methods used in this study are discussed at greater length in the
original version of this study, a Master’s thesis recently completed at
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The responses of each legislator, and his votes on the bills
selected for analysis, were coded and punched onto data cards.
The legislators were classified by party and by the “urbanness”
of their county, and their responses and votes were tabulated
against these two factors. The fifty-six Montana counties were
sorted into “urbanness” categories in terms of their 1960 popu
lations. In Montana particularly, this is a reliable way of
classifying since the most populous counties are also the most
urban, and the least populous counties are also the most rural.
Those counties with more than 25,000 residents are termed
larger urban,” counties with 12,000 to 25,000 “smaller urban ”
counties with 7,000 to 12,000 “mixed,” counties with 5,000 to
7,000 “larger rural,” and counties with less than 5,000 residents
were classified as “smaller rural.”
The legislative apportionment system presently in existence
in Montana is discussed elsewhere in this issue, and was noted
earlier m the Fall 1963 issue of this journal;4 therefore little
need be said about it here. But it would be well to note, before
the findings of this study are discussed, that Montana presents
a clear example of inequitable state legislative apportionment.
hus, if malapportionment has any effect on any legislature,
it should have this effect in Montana.

The Attitudes and Interests of 1963 Legislators
The 1963 Legislative Assembly was split in party control;
Democrats held a 35-21 majority of Senate seats and Repubicans had a 57-37 majority of House seats. The distribution
of party strength between counties was as follows:
d is t r ib u t io n

C ounty
L arger urb an
Sm aller urban
Mixed
L arger ru ral

o f

pa r t y

st r eng t h

B o th H ouse of R ep resen tativ es
H ouses f S tU ----- d ¥5T-------R»n,lh •
45
38
14 (37<r)
24, ~ ‘
27
17
10(59%)
^
24
12
“ g™
7 «%
12
6
3(50%)
llv u tl

pfc ™: « 21 »!«! S

S r m tr
= r - n -------------------otal
Dem‘
Repub.
7
4(57%)
3(43%)
10
7(70%)
3(30%)
12
6 <5°%)
6(50%)

A

.JSKJ ?!S!

U b ra T k ^ M ln ta n a t'o r fro S 'th e 'P o m ic a T sc ” ' aV" la“ ' in sev‘
Montana State University.
Political Science Department of
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Thus, in the House of Representatives, Republican strength
appears to be greatest in the larger urban and in the smaller
rural counties. Democratic strength is greatest in the smaller
urban counties, especially in the “high-line” area. Democratic
strength is weakest in the smaller rural counties.
The Senate presents a very different picture, however. Sen
ate Democrats were elected not only from the smaller urban
counties but also from the smaller rural counties. Since there
are equal numbers of legislators from the smaller rural coun
ties in both houses, the difference in party strength between
houses in the smaller rural counties cannot be a result entirely
of apportionment. Obviously, many of these smaller counties
elected a Republican to the House and a Democrat to the
Senate in 1963. Since there are 38 “apportioned” seats assigned
to larger urban counties in the House, while these same coun
ties have but seven seats in the Senate, the comparative weak
ness of the Republican representation from these counties in
the Senate might in some measure be attributable to the effects
of malapportionment of the Senate.
In the questionnaire sent to the legislators, they were asked
whether they considered themselves liberals, moderates, or
conservatives.’’ Responses indicated that the great majority of
liberal Democrats of both houses came from the larger and
smaller urban counties, and that Democrats from the more
rural counties considered themselves as more moderate or
conservative. As for the Republicans, those from the larger and
smaller urban counties tended to consider themselves as mod
erates to a greater degree than did those from the rural coun
ties, who were more strongly conservative in outlook.0
Legislators were asked about their own occupations as well
as the occupations of their constituents. There were major
differences between urban and rural members in terms of
"Of the 150 legislators in the 1963 session, 101 (68 percent) responded
to the questionnaire. Responses were about evenly divided proportion
ately between House and Senate members, Republicans and Democrats,
and urban and rural constituencies. Because the distribution was so
fortunate, we can probably generalize from these 101 members to all
150 legislators.
"The numerical distribution of responses to each question and votes on
the selected bills is to be found in the thesis from which this article is
drawn.
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personal and constituency occupations. Occupations of rural
legislators of both parties and/or their constituents centered
on farming, ranching, and to a lesser extent on business. Demo
cratic legislators from the larger urban counties tended to be
labor people or professional people, while urban Republicans
tended to be businessmen or professional people. Urban legis
lators perceived their constituents to be engaged in urbanrelated occupations such as industry, business, government
employment, services, and labor. There is, then, some basis
tor saying that rural legislators of both parties tended to be
more alike m their occupations than their urban brethren; that
rural legislators think of their counties as rural; and that urban
egislators perceive their counties to have nonagricultural
economies.
Legislators were asked what sorts of bills they were inter
ested m. Here again, some significant differences were evident
between urban and rural legislators. Urban legislators were
more interested in legislation dealing with cities, business,
lghways and welfare than were rural legislators. Curiously
enough, the urban desire for easy access to fish and game made
is egis a ion a divisive subject. Rural members seemed
mainly in stockgrowing and farming legislation;
gis a ors were equally interested in taxation, appropria
tions, and education. It appears that urban and rural legisShare SOme interests but divide on issues
° ,, e1^ ° ^ n type of county. Legislators were asked
U
e eSlslative interests of their constituents, and
esponses were very similar to what has been said above.
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lators felt urban-rural conflict was present at times in the
1963 session. Legislators themselves provided numerous in
stances of urban-rural conflict in the 1963 session in the ques
tionnaire responses, and substantially agreed upon the follow
ing breakdown of issues provoking urban-rural conflict:7
ISSUES PROVOKING URBAN-RURAL CONFLICT

L egislative Issues

1. Auto license fee split between cities and counties
2. Fish and game and recreation legislation .....
3. Gas tax split between state and cities ......-....
4. Grazing fees on state la n d s ..................
5. Sunday closing law ....
6 . Property reclassification ........
7. Air and water p o llu tio n .............
8 . Salaries of city employees .....................................
9. Taxation of cooperatives..............................
...
10. City-county planning and zoning ..........
11. Labor and welfare _____________________
12. Schools and school consolidation ____
13. Permissive 60-mill levy to cities ..........................
14. All urban legislation .......
15. Agriculture _______________________________
16. Other issues ......

N u m b er of
Tim es M entioned
H ouse
Senate
M em bers M em bers

20
7
5
13
1
11
2
0
4
0

19
3

4
0

2
1
2
5

8

8

5
10

8

4
0
4
0
1
3
2
6

6

Legislators were asked a series of questions concerning cer
tain interest groups in the state, some of which are strong in
rural areas (Farm Bureau, Farmer’s Union, and cattlemen’s
associations), some in urban areas (the Municipal League, The
Anaconda Company, the Chamber of Commerce, and labor
unions), and others in both types of counties (oil, lumber,
schools, and The Montana Power Company). Legislators were
asked to indicate the three groups most influential in the state
generally, then in their county, and finally in the legislature
itself. For the urban legislator, labor unions and the Chamber
of Commerce were groups which were influential in their
county and in the state generally, but not in the legislature
itself. Rural legislators stressed the importance of the Farm
Bureau, the Farmer’s Union, and cattlemen’s associations in
7In the second half of this study, these questionnaire findings are tallied
against roll call votes in the 1963 session, to see the extent to which
these mentioned urban-rural splits actually appeared in voting.
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their home counties. Both urban and rural legislators agreed
that The Anaconda Company and The Montana Power Com
pany were even more influential in the state and in the legis
lature than in their own counties.
Obviously, urban legislators are more aware of urban-based
pressure groups than are rural legislators, and rural legislators
more perceptive of rurally-based pressure groups. From this
one might tentatively say that it is true that the rurally-based
interest groups would have greater access to the more rurallybased Senate than to the more representative House. Findings
also point out that urban legislators feel that urban interests
are less than successful in the legislature, and rural legislators
seem to agree with this conclusion.
Two further questions tested urban and rural legislative
perceptions of city and farm problems. Legislators were first
asked to comment on the major problems facing Montana’s
arger cities. All respondents perceived finance and taxation
to be major problems of cities. However, urban legislators
tended to see air and water pollution, legislative representa
tion .planning-zoning, and industrial development as more
13
problems than did rural legislators. Rural
mSnPv Sv,C
education, law enforcement, juvenile delinl i t y’ S+h°PP1u? centers’ and lack of parking facilities as
greater city problems.
!‘ “ e” s that urban legislators are relatively more
aware of
snbstantaland long term urban problems than are
T
legislators tend to see city needs in terms
of their own needs and fears.
ruralW ^r/tn
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A final question concerned legislative changes which the
legislator would like to see made. Urban legislators generally
seemed more favorable to legislative changes than did rural
legislators. Urban legislators showed greater enthusiasm for
an annual session, a longer session, different apportionment,
and several other changes than did rural members. A substan
tial percentage of all rural legislators desired no changes in
present structure and procedure.
In summary, tabulations of the responses to the questionnaire
reveal these differences between the attitudes of urban and
rural legislators:
1. The interest and outlooks of rural legislators tend to differ
in some respects from those of their urban counterparts.
Legislators tend to reflect their constituency in occupation
and interests.
2. Rural legislators of both parties tend to be more conserva
tive than their urban brethren, both ideologically and in
their interest in procedural and structural changes in the
legislature itself.
3. There is a greater disparity in occupation, interests, and
outlook between legislators from urban counties than those
from rural counties, regardless of party affiliation.
4. Urban legislators are less aware of farm problems than are
rural legislators; rural legislators are less well aware of city
problems than are urban legislators.
5. There is evidence that interest groups influential in rural
areas have more appeal to rural legislators than to urban
legislators, and that urban interest groups have more appeal
to urban legislators than to rural legislators. Therefore,
rural interest groups may have more access to the Senate,
which has a preponderance of rural members, and relatively
less to the more representative House..

Urban-Rural Splits in Voting in the 1963 Session
Here is how rural-urban attitudes affected voting in the
1963 session. For this study, 39 bills were selected from the

82

MONTANA BUSINESS QUARTERLY

279 Senate and 535 House bills introduced in the session; these
were the bills producing the greatest splits in voting during
the session. Fourteen of these bills produced deviations of an
urban-rural nature from party lines in one or both parties and
houses. These bills were checked against the issues mentioned
by legislators in the questionnaires as producing urban-rural
conflict in the session.
House Bill 66: An act to authorize, in certain instances, the

boards of county commissioners to levy an additional tax of not
to exceed fourteen mills for the county poor funds. . . *

In questionnaire responses, eight House members and six
senators mentioned labor and welfare legislation as provoking
urban-rural conflict. House Bill 66 passed the House 64-24 and
the Senate 51-4. On this measure, an urban-rural split was
evident between urban and rural House Democrats, with rural
Democrats more favorable toward the Republican measure
than were urban Democrats. Three urban Republicans broke
from their party’s position to vote against the measure. No
split appeared in the Senate on this issue.
House Bill 105: An act . . . to provide that dividends paid on

capital stock of cooperative organizations and amounts allo
cated as patronage dividends or otherwise to patrons of co
operative organizations shall not be deductible in the calcula
tion of gross income for Montana corporation license tax pur
poses. . . .*

Four representatives and three senators mentioned taxation
of cooperatives as provoking urban-rural conflict in the session.
House Bill 105 passed the House 63-27 and the Senate 30-24.
A rural-urban split was evident between House Democrats;
Democrats from the most urban counties voted in favor of the
bill, and nearly all other House Democrats opposed the meas
ure. House Republicans, and all senators, voted on almost
straight party lines.
House Journal of the Thirty-Eighth Legislative Assembly of the State
of Montana (1963), p. 186. Senate Journal of the Thirty-Eighth Legis
lative Assembly of the State of Montana (1963), p. 429.
0House Journal, p. 388.
Senate Journal, p. 562.
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Home Bill 302: An act to clarify the advisory functions and
jurisdiction of city planning boards and city-county planning
boards.10

Two senators mentioned city-county planning boards as pro
voking urban-rural conflict. House Bill 302, introduced by
urban representatives on behalf of the Municipal League,
passed the House 81-7 and the Senate 40-10. The bill was a
routine correction of an error in earlier legislation. Neverthe
less rural Senate Democrats and Republicans, and rural House
Republicans seemed less enthusiastic about the measure than
did urban legislators.
Home Bill 313: An act . . . relating to distribution and use of
proceeds of gasoline license tax by providing that one percent
age of all receipts shall be deposited and credited to the state
park fund, and the balance shall be deposited and credited
seventy-five per centum to state highway fund and twenty-five
per centum to the gasoline license drawback fund, and provid
ing that the one per centum deposited and credited to the state
park fund shall be used for creation, improvement, and mainte
nance of state parks which are used for motor boating .11

Seven representatives and three senators mentioned fish
and game and recreation legislation as provoking urban-rural
conflict. House Bill 313, introduced by urban representatives,
passed the House 54-35 and the Senate 34-19. In this instance,
a rural-urban split developed between urban and rural Repub
licans of both houses. Urban Republicans departed from a
fiscally conservative position to vote in favor of a bill drawing
money away from state funds for parks of benefit to city
dwellers; rural Republicans were opposed to this reallocation.
Senate Substitute for Senate Bill 45: An act to establish the
policy of the state of Montana on protection of fishing streams;
providing for submission of plans for construction and hy
draulic projects affecting such streams to the Montana Fish and
Game Commission and for review of such plans. . . .VJ

This bill passed the Senate 32-21 and the House 53-33. A clear
10Home Journal, p. 355.
Senate Journal, p. 551.
11Home Journal, p. 428.
Senate Journal, p. 552.
VJHome Journal, p. 601.
Senate Journal, p. 380.
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split developed between urban and rural House Republicans on
the issue. As indicated earlier in the study, urban legislators
tended to be more interested in fish and game legislation than
were rural legislators.
Senate Bill 193: An act relating to registration fees of motor
vehicles and the disposition thereof; providing that the funds
in the county motor vehicle fund shall be equitably dispersed
under a unit plan; providing the method and procedure of de
termining “city-units” and “rural-units .”13

Twenty representatives and nineteen senators mentioned the
auto license fee split as provoking urban-rural conflict; this
type of legislation topped the list of conflict “mentions” in
responses to the questionnaire. Senate Bill 193 passed the
Senate 31-24 and was defeated in the House 46-46. An urbanrural split on this urban-benefit measure was clear in the
roll-call voting in both houses and in both parties. The meas
ure was strongly supported by urban legislators and moder
ately to strongly opposed by rural legislators.
House Bill 92: An act relating to registration fees of motor
^ cle/ r d the dlsposition thereof by providing for the divi+h f nse ?r reglstration fees between cities and towns
within the county in a pro rata manner. . »

This measure was a second “auto license fee split” bill, de
signed as a compromise measure to attract enough rural sup
port to pass. It passed the House 65-24 and the Senate 45-8.
Rural-urban clash was still evident in voting on the Republi
can side in both houses. In this case, urban legislators were
orced to settle for less than they wanted of the auto license
tax funds for cities It should be noted that five urban Democrats (four from Silver Bow County) refused to accept the bill
since Silver Bow already shared license tax funds with Butte.
Had there been fewer rural legislators in the House the
OnTlf*^ +? en^ e
probably have Passed the House.
______ otherhand, had all urban members supported SB 193,

W
f Uld

'aSenate Journal, p. 393.
House Journal, p. 586.
uHouse Journal, p. 437.
Senate Journal, p. 556.
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it would have passed the House anyway, rural overrepresenta
tion and opposition notwithstanding.
An urban-rural split in voting developed in the Senate over
Senate Bill 19, which would have exempted state-chartered
banks from Montana corporation license tax laws to the same
extent that national banks were exempt.15* Urban Senate Dem
ocrats opposed the measure; rural Democrats looked on it more
favorably. Senate Bill 19, defeated in the Senate 22-31, rep
resents the only bill voted on in the Senate only which pro
duced fairly clear urban-rural conflict. It should be noted that
the Senate passed and sent to the House several bills of major
benefit to urban areas. These measures included a bill to
permit incorporated cities and towns to allocate their own
expenditures up to sixty mills,10 and two bills increasing un
employment compensation.17 This legislation was rejected in
House committees.
House Bill 165: An act known as the Montana Air Pollution
Control Act. . . .“

Air pollution legislation was mentioned by two representa
tives as provoking urban-rural conflict. House Bill 165 was
defeated 36-54 on a motion to segregate the bill from the Com
mittee of the Whole report. It was apparent from the voting
that while urban Republicans were divided about equally on
the need for the measure, and urban Democrats approved the
measure, rural members of both parties stood against it sub
stantially and contributed to its defeat.
House Joint Resolution 10: . . . requesting that Montana landowners and leasees when posting private property to prohibit
hunting, place the name of the owner upon the notice of post
ing. . . ."

Fish and game legislation was mentioned by seven repre
sentatives and three senators as provoking urban-rural conflict.
15Senate Journal, p. 175.
’“Senate Bill 124, Senate Journal, p. 242.
’’Senate Bill 139, Senate Journal, p. 390.
Senate Bill 175, Senate Journal, p. 362.
'"House Journal, p. 393.
"‘Ibid., p. 222.
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This measure, introduced by two urban Republicans, was de
feated in the House 40-52. Vote distribution showed that urban
Democrats and Republicans supported the measure to a much
higher degree than did rural members.
The last four bills to be mentioned here, House Bills 407,-°
409,21 410,22 and House Substitute for House Bill 411,23 all con
cerned property reclassification, and all were voted upon on
the same day. They were in a group of bills introduced by the
Special Committee on Classification and Appraisal, and were
designed to complete property reclassification in the less popu
lous counties of the state, as ordered by a previous legislature
for the whole state. Four of these measures received strong
opposition in House voting, and all received “do not pass” rec
ommendations in the Senate Committee on Taxation. While
all these bills passed the House (with margins of 61-30, 49-42,
51-40, and 46-45, respectively), rural-urban conflict was evi
dent in both parties on all votes. The measures were supported
to a greater degree by Republicans than by Democrats. But
urban Democrats supported the bills to a much higher degree
than did rural Democrats. A Republican urban-rural split is
clear on all votes. Fourteen representatives and eight senators
mentioned this legislation as provoking urban-rural conflict.
While these measures never came to a vote in the Senate, we
may assume that they were defeated by rural opposition.
It is possible to make some concluding remarks about this
analysis of roll call voting in the 1963 session:
1. Urban-rural conflict does occur in the Montana Legisla
tive Assembly; on some issues rural legislators tend to vote
against urban legislators.
2. These urban-rural differences are evident both in the
attitudes expressed by legislators and by their actions upon
certain bills.
3. The most evident splits in the 1963 session occurred over
legislation desired by cities which involved drawing away
20Ibid., p. 425.
*Ibid.
xIbid., p. 426.
38I b i d p. 422.
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funds from counties or from the state; on special problems
peculiar to larger cities; on fish, game, and recreation measures
where urban residents make use of rural lands; and finally
over property taxation legislation aimed at rural counties.
4. Party differences very often override potential urbanrural differences, but not at all times. Republicans who deviate
most often from a conservative fiscal position are from urban
areas; Democrats who deviate most often from a liberal fiscal
position come from rural areas.
These conclusions tend to support the points made at the
beginning of this paper. Some modifications are necessary,
however, in view of other findings:
1. Many rural legislators understand urban problems quite
well, and support urban legislation; it is probably more diffi
cult for a rural legislator to gain knowledge of city problems,
however, than it is for an urban legislator to understand them.
2. Urban legislators do not always support urban legislation.
In many instances in 1963, legislators of one city opposed legis
lators of another city, especially when one area’s urban prob
lems were not shared by another area, or when party differ
ences were more important.
3. On balance, the rurally-dominated Senate was more favor
able to urban legislation in 1963 than was the population-based
House. This is probably true for several reasons. First, sena
tors generally have a longer term of legislative service than
do representatives; therefore, rural senators have greater op
portunity to become familiar with urban needs than do rural
representatives. Secondly, the Democrats controlled the Sen
ate, and were probably more disposed to support urban welfare
and financial legislation than was the House Republican ma
jority. Curiously, urban underrepresentation itself probably
contributed to the success of urban legislation; the large urban
House bloc, divided in party control and feuding within itself
as often as not, was not present in the Senate, and agreement
was more readily possible.
Of what importance, finally, was the overrepresentation of
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rural areas in the 1963 Montana Legislative Assembly? Judg
ments drawn from analysis of one session must be limited.
Nevertheless, the following may be advanced as “cautious
conclusions”:
1. Overrepresentation of rural counties in both houses in
creased the difficulty of passing certain types of legislation,
including measures dealing with urban problems and finances,
fish and game and recreation measures, and any measures
which might adversely affect farming and ranching areas
(such as increased property tax assessments). In some cases,
rural opposition and overrepresentation may have killed legis
lation such as, for example, the more extensive auto-license
fee split and the property reclassification bills in the 1963
session.
2. Rural overrepresentation gave to the legislative parties a
more conservative cast than they would have in a more equi
table apportionment, and contributed to lack of party cohesion.
3. Rural overrepresentation made it more difficult for urban
interest groups to approach the legislature; this same imbal
ance facilitated the ease with which interest groups could bring
pressure, especially in the state Senate.
4 . **ural overrepresentation in the 1963 legislature accentu
ated both the Republican House majority and the Senate Democratic majority.
5. Rural overrepresentation increased the difficulty of adopt
ing any changes in legislative structure and procedure which
might have been proposed.
We might expect then that a reapportionment of both legis
lative houses along lines of population equality would alleviate
,S°m? °f the problems caused by rural overrepresentation in
the 1963 session. However, these problems will persist if urban
senators and representatives are not ready to assert leadership
if and when legislative power passes to them. Increased party
r ? y 'n a reaPP°rtloned legislature could render more diffi
cult the passage of urban legislation. Thus, there remains a
serious question to be considered by groups desiring reappor
tionment, with a radical reapportionment of both houses, de-
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creased rural representation will tend to leave a leadership
void—a void which must be filled by someone—if not urban
legislators, someone else.
The rural legislators who have held the balance of power in
Montana for so long have obviously made significant efforts
to think of the state and its needs as a whole—unlike the more
cynical rural legislators of some states (Illinois, for example).
Urban counties, under any reapportionment arrangement, will
have a great responsibility to elect the best possible legislators
and to make sure that these legislators learn to understand
rural needs.

V.

The Political Effects of An
Equitable Apportionment
HOWARD E. REINHARDT
Associate Professor of Mathematics
Montana State University, Missoula

In this section we consider two mathematical questions
derived from two questions about legislative reapportionment:
“What would happen if apportionment were exactly equit
able?” and “What would be likely to happen in reapportion
ment consistent with recent Supreme Court decisions?”

A Note on Method
Confronted with a question about the real world, a mathe
matician extracts from that world some apparently pertinent
facts and adds to them some more or less plausible assump
tions. The result he calls a model; it is a simplified picture of
the world he wishes to consider. He translates the question
asked about the real world into a question about the model;
the question may then be attacked with the mathematical tools
available to him—notably, logical thinking. The answer—an
answer about the model—may then be retranslated to a state
ment about the real world.
The strength of the method lies in the fact that reasonable
men will all agree as to the correctness of the solution within
the model. An obvious weakness is the fact that the model
may not be an adequate representation of the real world so
that the answer obtained may be useless or worse to the de
cision-maker of that real world.

Exactly Equitable Apportionment
Since Supreme Court decisions do not distinguish between
upper and lower houses, we restrict our attention to a legis-
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lative chamber which might be either house. We assume that
in a perfectly apportioned legislative chamber, a legislative
district with, say 5.2 percent of the state’s population would
have 5.2 percent of the votes of the chamber. (Another pos
sible assumption would replace “population” with “registered
voters.”) Column 1 of Table 1 gives each county’s percentage
of total state population which would be equitably represented
in a perfectly apportioned legislature. Thus Beaverhead
County would have 1.07 percent of the votes. The percentages,
which could be obtained from census figures, were actually
computed from the related David-Eisenberg indexes described
in Part III.
This is simple arithmetic. The question of how this 1.07 per
cent might be divided between Republicans and Democrats is
a more complicated problem and the answer requires one of
the more or less plausible assumptions mentioned in the pre
vious section. Several possibilities are considered and the re
sults are tabulated in the remaining columns of Table 1.
Column 2 was computed assuming the delegation to the per
fectly apportioned legislature would divide into political par
ties as did the actual delegation to the House convening in
January 1963.1 Column 3 assumes division as the 1963 Senate,
Column 4 as the 1965 House, and Column 5 as the 1965 Senate.
These figures all reflect voting behavior in a single election;
it seems desirable also to consider an apportionment which
would reflect a longer term of voting behavior—the political
expectation—in the county. Simmons and Waldron- have pro
posed such a measure—their Index of Partisan Political Pref
ence (PPI). We suppose (and here the simplification afforded
by such a supposition is apparent) that a PPI of .6 Republican
means that a Republican strength of about 60 percent may be
expected in that county. Column 6 of Table 1 indicates the
party division of the perfectly apportioned chamber if allo
cated according to the 10-year PPI.
‘This would be the situation in a chamber if legislators were assigned
fractional votes.
“Lee Simmons and Ellis Waldron, “County Indices of Partisan Political
Preference in Montana, 1952-1962,” mimeographed.

92

MONTANA BUSINESS QUARTERLY

THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF APPORTIONMENT

93

94

MONTANA BUSINESS QUARTERLY

Extremes in Acceptable Reapportionment

Perfect apportionment would be a sort of demographic mira
cle. Acceptable apportionments will have legislators represent
ing different numbers of people. According to David and
Eisenberg,3 drafters of model plans of representation have
suggested that the ratio of largest population per member to
smallest population per member should not exceed 1.3. These
authors suggest that 1.5 is politically more feasible. We will
assume that a ratio of 1.5 or less is acceptable and that any
thing larger is not. (It should be emphasized that this is an
assumption made for the purposes of getting on with the math
ematics, and does not represent an opinion about the Supreme
Court.) For each of the methods of division used in compiling
Table 1, we seek the largest fraction of the chamber member
ship which each of the parties could control in an acceptable
apportionment. The answers to these questions are given in
Table 2.
5
TABLE 2
P A R T v ^ T ^ T n STABLISHED UPPER AND LOWER LIMITS OF
rm iNTV^s 4rT?i4T w h i c h MIGHT HAVE OCCURRED IF EACH
COUNTYS ACTUAL VOTE HAD BEEN CAST FOR AN EQUITABLE
SHARE OF A FAIRLY APPORTIONED LEGISLATURE
(Percent)
t

_

. T,

...

,

Lowest Republican share
Highest Republican share
mOCratfC shuare
Highest Democratic share

w/vrio
House

50—
64.6
35.4
50+

01963
Senate

23.3
40.5
59.5
76.7

1965
House

31.3

44 6

53!4
69.7

1965
Senate

30.5
49 6
50.4
69.5

ppi

(E ith er
C ham ber)

43 2
49 6

50A
56.8

The computations for 1963 and 1965 are just one step removed from the actual or real world legislatures of those
years. They adjust the party strength actually elected from
each county in those years to what its share of the entire
chamber would have been in an equitably apportioned cham
ber, and then make a statistical conclusion about the total
strength which each party would have held in such a chamber.
TfJJ 1
^1 9 6 1

a£ d Ralph Eisenberg, Devaluation of the Urban and
' BUreaU °f PUbliC ^ n i s t r a t i o n , Un/vershy of v J -
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Computations based on the Party Preference Index are one
more step removed from the real world. They substitute an
average of votes cast in each county for 6 different offices in
6 elections over a 10-year period (1952-1962) for the actual
strength in a particular legislature and then adjust this
strength, based on the 10-year average, to an equitable chamber
as in the paragraph above.
It is noteworthy that exactly apportioned legislatures would
have differed little in their composition from the actual ones
and that the extreme figures arrived at vary greatly from one
method of division to another. It seems apparent, even to a
casual observer, that the political composition of a reappor
tioned chamber is going to depend heavily on patterns of voting
behavior from election to election, rather than on the fact of
reapportionment.

VI.

The Constitutional Obligation
To Reapportion
ELLIS L. WALDRON

In 1962 the United States Supreme Court broke its own
tradition of judicial abstention in legislative apportionment
matters to declare that state legislative malapportionment
could deprive voters of the equal protection of the laws guar
anteed to all persons against state abuse by the 14th Amend
ment, and deprive them in a way which the courts would
review as a “justiciable” question.
The case in point was Baker v. Carr, involving the Tennessee
General Assembly. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan dissented
vigorously from the majority opinion, insisting that the ques
tions involved were not amenable to judicial treatment. The
courts, they said, should not enter what Frankfurter had tren
chantly described as a “political thicket” in an earlier appor
tionment case.1
The Baker case has been called the most significant exercise
of judicial review since the oracular statement of that doctrine
by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison (1803).
Few Supreme Court decisions have triggered such massive and
instantaneous response throughout the land and few have provoked noisier argument among contending schools of “acti
vists and abstainers within the legal profession and the law
schools.
'Baker v. Carr 369 U S. 186 (1962). The “thicket” reference was in
th° e®f°ve
reen> 328 U. S. 549 (1946). A significant precursor of
v 6
deci slon ma^ have been the article by Anthony Lewis, New
7*??? Supreme iCourt Correspondent, “Legislative ApportionTHQft1 f?Q*Q^e Fu ? lral CouT} s’ ’ Harvard Law Review , Vol. 71, pp. 1057i 2 i Y
hl ch fargued for judicial intervention in problems of
legislative malapportionment.
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Tennessee’s problem was sent back to the federal trial court
for further process, and within a year apportionment suits
were in process in 36 states. A number of these suits worked
their way to the Supreme Court docket and were heard during
the 1963-1964 term.
On June 15, 1964 the Supreme Court announced its decisions
that malapportioned state legislatures in six states deprived
voters of the equal protection of the laws when such malappor
tionment occurred in either house of a state legislature.
The Court majority recalled its formulation of the “one per
son, one vote” principle in a 1963 case involving the Georgia
county-unit system of voting in primary elections. There Jus
tice Douglas had declared that “once the class of voters is
chosen and their specifications specified, we see no constitu
tional way by which equality of voting power may be evaded.
• • . The conception of political equality from the Declaration
of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the Fif
teenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean
only one thing—one person, one vote.”2
Then, in February 1964, the Supreme Court held that “as
nearly as practicable” Georgia congressional districts must be
arranged so that “one man’s vote in a congressional election is
to be worth as much as another’s.”3
The June 15 decisions held that one or both houses of the
legislatures in Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Maryland, New
York, and Virginia violated the equal protection guarantee of
the 14th Amendment. A week later memorandum decisions
citing the June 15 series invalidated legislative apportionments
in nine additional states—Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois,
Iowa, Michigan, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Washington. All fifteen
cases were sent back to lower courts for action appropriate to
secure equitable representation in both houses of the state
legislatures.
The constitutional obligation upon each state to make each
house of its legislature represent population “as nearly as may
be” is simply beyond argument, at least until such time as an
amendment to the national constitution is adopted which
would prevent application of the equal protection clause to
‘Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368, 381 (1963).
3Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1, 8 (1964).
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state legislative apportionment. Proposal and adoption of such
an amendment seems so unlikely (January 1965) that it cannot
stand as a pretext for failure of a state to proceed with re
apportionment.
The 14th Amendment makes it possible for any person who
can gain standing in a federal court to challenge a state action
which is alleged to deny that person “the equal protection of
the laws.” The Supreme Court has held that inequitable legis
lative representation does, in fact, deny equal protection of the
laws by dilution of the voting power of persons underrepre
sented. By judicial decision this application of the equal pro
tection clause is “the supreme law of the land . . . anything in
the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwith
standing.” Judges in every state, along with congressmen,
members of the several state legislatures, and all executive
and judicial officers, both state and national, are bound by oath
to its support. (United States Constitution, Article VI, clauses
2 and 3.)
Officers of the state governments are now under the same
kind of legal obligation to effectuate equitable legislative rep
resentation as they are to desegregate racially segregated pub
lic facilities.
The statistical measures of malapportionment which the
Supreme Court employed in the June 1964 cases were noted
earlier, and it seems clear that the Montana Legislative Assem
bly stands condemned both by these tests and by additional
features of the Supreme Court decisions in any suit properly
filed to raise the basic issues of malapportionment.
The opinions in the June cases warrant additional notice at
this point for several features which seem particularly relevant
for the Montana Legislative Assembly.
The principal opinion of the six member majority was ex
pressed in the decision of three cases which came up from
Alabama. Chief Justice Warren was the spokesman for this
majority in all of the cases which were accompanied by signed
opinions. In Reynolds v. Sims both houses of the Alabama
legislature were held to be malapportioned. Its House of Rep
resentatives was constructed quite similarly to the Montana
House of Representatives; but its Senate of 35 members was
supposed to be elected from districts comprising one or more
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counties “as nearly equal to each other in the number of in
habitants as may be.” Thus representation in both houses was
based upon population as a matter of state constitutional re
quirement. But the legislature had not reapportioned itself
since 1901 despite constitutional obligation upon it to do so
every ten years. Suits to compel reapportionment were com
menced in the federal district courts in Alabama in 1961; and
the Supreme Court eventually reviewed three of these actions.
It affirmed a judgment of a three-judge federal district court
which, pending development of a more satisfactory reappor
tionment, directed election of a legislature according to speci
fied parts of two reapportionment plans which had been pro
posed by a special legislative session in July 1962.
Rejecting an argument that one house of a state legislature
might represent political subdivisions regardless of population,
the Court declared that “the federal analogy £is] inapposite
and irrelevant to state legislative districting schemes” and
represents “little more than an after-the-fact rationalization
. . . of maladjusted state apportionment arrangements.”
Chief Justice Warren, speaking for six members of the Court,
held that “as a basic constitutional standard, the Equal Pro
tection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bi
cameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population
basis.”
“Mathematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable
constitutional requirement” the Chief Justice said, but the
equal protection clause “requires that a State make an honest
and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of
its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable.”
The Court avoided rigid guide lines, preferring to leave these
for development in the lower courts in relation to particular
problems of individual states. Commenting upon the practice
in Alabama to give a seat to each local subdivision, the Chief
Justice declared that:
Carried too far, [such] a scheme . . . could easily result, in many
States, in total subversion of the equal-population principle in
that legislative body. This would be especially true in a State
where the number of counties is large and many of them are
sparsely populated, and the number of seats in the legislative
body being apportioned does not significantly exceed the num
ber of counties. Such a result, we conclude, would be constitu-
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tionally impermissible. . . . But if, even as a result of a clearly
rational state policy of according some legislative representa
tion to political subdivisions, population is submerged as the
controlling consideration in the apportionment of seats in the
particular legislative body, then the right of all of the State’s
citizens to cast an effective and adequately weighted vote
would be unconstitutionally impaired.

Justices Clark and Stewart concurred in the decision; Clark
found “invidious discrimination in each house” and Stewart
thought that the scheme of representation was “completely
lacking in rationality.”4
In Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, the same six-judge
majority reversed a federal district court finding that the
equal protection clause did not require-“equality of population
within representation districts for each house.” The lower
court had accepted a recently adopted constitutional amend
ment which apportioned the Senate on a basis of population
and other factors including “geography, compactness and con
tiguity of territory, accessibility, observance of natural boun
daries £and] conformity to historical divisions such as county
lines and prior representation districts.”
Such considerations could not prevail against recognition of
equality of population nor could the recent adoption of a state
constitutional am endm ent deprive Colorado voters of their
federal right to equal protection of th a t vote.

Of particular interest for Montana was Justice Warren’s
notice that “divergencies from population based representation
in the Senate are growing continually wider, since the under
represented districts . . . are rapidly gaining in population,
while many of the overrepresented rural districts have tended
to decline in population continuously in recent years.” He also
expressed concern that “each Denver voter was required to
vote for eight senators and 17 representatives” in an appor
tionment plan which the voters had rejected despite the fact
that it represented population more equitably than the one
they adopted. Such a consideration had made the choice be
tween two proposed constitutional amendments difficult. The
multimember districts, according to Warren, meant that:
4Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506, 533, 531, 536, 538,
539, 542 and 543 (1964), emphasis added.
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No identifiable constituencies within the populous counties re
sulted, and the residents of those areas had no single member
of the Senate or House elected specifically to represent them.
Rather, each legislator elected from a multimember county
represented the county as a whole.

The majority regarded such a long ballot in a multimember
district as a “debatable feature,” but did not seem to rest the
decision squarely on this point. They left the validity of the
Colorado House of Representatives to be determined in rela
tion to the clearly invalid Senate.5
Justice Stewart dissented with Justice Clark’s concurrence.
He believed that the Colorado recognition of geography, acces
sibility, natural boundaries, and historical divisions such as
county lines comprised part of a “rational” apportionment
scheme which did not “permit the systematic frustration of the
will of a majority of the electorate of the State.” He noted
regional diversity and uneven distribution of population “in a
mountainous State like Colorado, where accessibility is af
fected by configuration as well as compactness of districts.”0
In Delaware the Court majority accepted a district court
finding that rigid constitutional provisions created “gross and
invidious discrimination . . . of a startling nature” which de
based the franchise without any “rational basis.” But the
Court withheld approval of the district court suggestion that
“population-variance ratios smaller than lVfe-to-1 would pre
sumably comport with minimal constitutional requisites, while
ratios in excess thereof would necessarily involve deviations
from population-based apportionment too extreme to be con
stitutionally sustainable.”
In our view the problem does not lend itself to any such uni
form formula and it is neither practicable nor desirable to
establish rigid mathematical standards for evaluating the con
stitutional validity of a state legislative apportionment scheme
under the Equal Protection Clause. Rather, the proper judicial
approach is to ascertain whether, under the particular circum
stances existing in the individual State whose legislative appor
tionment is at issue, there has been a faithful adherence to a
plan of population-based representation, with such minor devi-

°Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U. S. 713, 12 L. Ed. 2d 632,
638, 643,644 (1964).
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ations only as may occur in recognizing certain factors that are
free from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination.7

The Maryland case was relevant for Montana because the
Maryland Senate represented counties regardless of popula
tion, assigning equal representation to each county except for
an additional allocation to the county containing Baltimore.
The Maryland Court of Appeals had accepted the historic rec
ognition of counties, the bicameral differentiation between the
houses which recognized geography along with population, and
an analogy to the United States Senate. The Supreme Court
rejected these considerations as insufficient to sustain “the
gross disparities from population-based representation in the
apportionment of seats in the Maryland Senate.” Justice Clark
concurred and Justices Stewart and Harlan dissented.8
The New York case was interesting primarily for two points.
The Supreme Court found that rigid constitutional require
ments respecting apportionment deprived the New York State
Legislature of discretion to apportion equitably. Chief Justice
Warren also noted population trends which would mean that
“an increasingly smaller percentage of the State’s population
will, in all probability, reside in senatorial districts electing a
majority of the members of that body.”9
Alignments of the justices in the fifteen state apportionment
cases may be summarized. Chief Justice Warren led a firm
block of six justices (Black, Brennan, Douglas, Goldberg and
White were the other five) which furnished the majority in
all of the cases. Justices Clark and Stewart concurred singly
or together in some cases, so that the vote was 8-1 to affirm
federal district court decisions requiring reapportionment in
Alabama, Delaware, Connecticut, Iowa, Oklahoma and Vir
ginia. The smallest majority was five in the Illinois case, in
which Justice Goldberg took no part.
Justice Harlan dissented in all the cases, protesting that the
Court had denied “effective consideration to any of the follow
ing in establishing legislative districts:
■Roman v. Sincock, 377 U. S. 695, 12 L. Ed. 2d 620, 624, 625, 630 (1964).
8Maryland Committee v. Tawes, 377 U. S. 656, 12 L. Ed. 2d 595, 606
(1964).

'‘WMCA v. Lomenzo, 377 U. S. 633, 12 L. Ed. 2d 568, 581 (1964).
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(1) history;
(2) ‘economic or other sorts of group interests’;
(3) area;
(4) geographical considerations;
(5) a desire ‘to insure effective representation for sparsely
settled areas’;
(6) ‘availability of access of citizens to their representatives’;
(7) theories of bicameralism (except those approved by the
Court);
(8) occupation;
(9) ‘an attempt to balance urban and rural power’;
(10) the preference of a majority of voters in the State.”10
This brief review of the June 1964 decisions suggests several
points which are relevant to reapportionment in Montana:
(1) The “federal analogy” was expressly repudiated as a
justification for failure of a state legislative chamber to rep
resent population.
(2) None of the factors commonly considered to justify de
parture from a population basis for representation could now
prevail, as Justice Harlan properly noted in his dissent, if their
recognition would cause substantial departure from equitable
representation of population in either house of a state legis
lature.
(3) No specific boundary lines between fair and unfair rep
resentation of population were drawn by the Supreme Court.
The majority refused to be limited by a lower court holding
that disparity greater than 1.5 to 1 might occasion doubts about
equal representation. On the other hand, Georgia congres
sional districts in which one congressman represented “from
two to three times as many . . . voters as are represented by
each of the congressmen from the other Georgia congressional
districts” were held to violate the equal protection clause.
Mathematical limits of allowable differences in population
10Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 12 L. Ed 2d 506 at 562 (1964).
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between representation districts undoubtedly will emerge only
from a considerable series of decisions affirming or rejecting
apportionments in particular states.
Despite much comment criticizing the Court for rigorous in
sistence upon close mathematical equality, it appears to this
observer that the Court.has emphasized the importance of
seasonable efforts made in genuinely good faith to achieve
equalization within “practicable” limits. These considerations
may prove to be more important than precise mathematical
limits.
(4) Each state was regarded as a particular complex of
factors whose peculiarities could best be assessed by turning
the detail of equitable representation back to legislatures or to
courts or other apportioning authorities within the state.
The determination to implement equitable representation
was not to be diverted by sophisticated or contrived evasions.
Beyond the essential point of equitable representation, no
single rationale characterized the opinions of the majority;
varying weight was given to the effects of constitutional or
statutory strictures, and to the availability of popular checks
such as initiative, referendum and constitutional amendment.
(5) Indefinite postponement of equal representation will be
regarded with some impatience, once apportionment becomes
a judicial concern in a state.
The Court indicated some willingness to accept inequitable
representation as a temporary condition rather than to upset
imminent elections or legislative sessions. The season of legis
lative activity commencing in January 1965 may bring a lull
in the pace of adjudication, but courts in many states have
retained jurisdiction of cases awaiting the outcome of legis
lative action. If equitable reapportionment is not achieved in
these legislative sessions, it seems reasonable to suppose that
a substantial round of trial court determinations of apportion
ment will be forthcoming in the latter months of 1965 and 1966.
The Supreme Court has indicated in several cases that it ex
pects equitable apportionment to prevail for the legislatures
which will be elected in those states in November 1966; and
that if constituted agencies do not manage this, then the courts
will do so.
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(6) Once a state’s legislative apportionment comes under
judicial scrutiny, the Court may examine the system of repre
sentation as a whole in both houses, and upon its own initiative
if necessary, whether or not all relevant considerations have
been pleaded by the litigants.
(7) Judicial enforcement of the right to equitable representa
tion need not be deferred because political remedies are avail
able within the state for malapportionment; or because an
apportionment scheme is valid under a state constitution, if
those constitutional provisions conflict with the federal right
to equitable representation.
(8) Decennial reapportionment after federal censuses would
appear to be frequent enough to satisfy the Supreme Court;
but less frequent reapportionment would be constitutionally
suspect.

VI I.

What Kind of Legislature?

ELLIS L. WALDRON

Good politics make a virtue of necessity. The obligation to
reapportion the Montana Legislative Assembly affords a
unique opportunity to consider afresh what kind of legislature
will best serve the Treasure State.
A new legislature lies unperceived at the end of the reappor
tionment trek. Will it look like the present one, whatever its
differences in organization and function? Will it be the result
of hastily chosen expedients or will it in fair measure reflect
deliberate and considered choices made in genuine practice
of statecraft?
Quite properly on the eve of the legislative session which
must seek answers to such questions, legislators and interested
observers were drawing apportionment maps in what one
newspaper called a “new and fascinating game sweeping Mon
tana. Every such map implies judgments, usually unstated,
about what kind of legislature was desired. Every districting
proposal makes prior judgments about the kinds of districts
which are desired. Every apportionment ratio makes an initial
assumption about the size of the legislative houses to be
created.
Such prior judgments and assumptions need to be expressed
and to gain acceptance as basic policy decisions about the kind
of legislature sought, unless the matter is to be left to end-ofsession patchwork or to the courts which will be invited into
the act if the legislature defaults.
This and the concluding part of this study ask what the new
legislature may look like, and consider some procedural ap-
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proaches which may be open to accomplish reapportionment.
If nothing more, such a “program” or “model” of inquiry per
mits hard and real questions to be asked and discussed. This
study is neither a blueprint nor a road map; it is a report of a
scouting trip into reapportionment territory. The Legislative
Assembly will make the firm surveys, choose the route and
build the road—or leave it to the courts.
Many “practical” questions have not been raised; important
as implemental questions at a secondary level will be, they can
be explored with profit only after the main choices have been
marked out and agreed upon.

A Unicameral Legislature?
The most sweeping reorganization of the Montana Legisla
tive Assembly which has been mentioned would transform it
into a unicameral body.1 The advantages commonly imputed
to a unicameral legislature remain mostly unproven because
working models for comparison are lacking. Comparisons to
the Nebraska unicameral legislature are always open to ques
tion because that body is elected by nonpartisan ballot. More
over, since legislative institutions are not mass produced, the
effect of transfer of parts is never certain; no two states have
the same pattern of political forces and power structures.
It does appear, after three decades of operation, that the
Nebraska legislature functions effectively. It has realized nei
ther the fondest hopes of its friends, nor the worst fears of its
critics. It seems to have reduced certain costs of operation by
paying fewer salaries; its members seem to serve longer, there
by gaining in experience with public affairs; it does enact a
larger proportion of the smaller number of bills introduced;
'This proposal is a favorite among political scientists; these and other
advocates of the one-house legislature may take heart and renewed
hope from the reapportionment debate and the opportunity it affords
to restate their views. But it should be recognized that most American
legislatures have been based at least in part on representation of popu
lation in both houses. The two-house legislature persists for reasons
other than the supposed analogy to the United States Congress; and
Montana is one of a very small number of states whose Senate, like
the United States Senate, rests upon political subdivisions unqualified
by population factors.
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its sessions are somewhat longer; and the end-of-session log
jam has been reduced.2
There is little firm evidence to show that the Nebraska legis
lature has enacted more ill-advised legislation, in greater haste
or with less deliberation; or conversely, that a bicameral legis
lature enacts fewer such measures. A Kentucky review of the
matter concluded recently:
The conflict that is often posed in the debate over unicam
eralism between efficiency and full deliberation is, in a sense,
an artificial one. Unicameralism provides one, but not the only,
technique for making the legislature more efficient. The same
purpose might be served, at least in part, by several devices:
greater use of joint committees or joint hearings by committees,
more adequate staff facilities, longer sessions, a smaller number
of legislators in both houses. Bicameralism does not guarantee
careful deliberation, as anyone can discover by sitting in the
gallery during the closing hours of the legislative session in
most states. . . . A more realistic aspect of the debate is the
unquestioned fact that it is more difficult to pass laws in a
bicameral legislature than in a unicameral one.3

One point can be made for a unicameral legislature which
would have particular cogency for Montana: the elimination
of one round of committee hearings would reduce pressure
upon the archaic and miserably inadequate committee space
available in the attic quarters of the Capitol in Helena. This in
turn would improve the opportunity for orderly advanced
scheduling and announcement of public hearings of commit
tees.
A new argument has been added to the arsenal of the uni
cameralists. This is the certainty that a one-house legislature
must be apportioned to population. Such a chamber would be
unaffected in the unlikely event that an amendment to the
United States Constitution to allow malapportionment of one
house in a state legislature should be ratified.
"5e?.
Shumate, “The Nebraska Unicameral Legislature,” Western
Political Quarterly, Vol. V, pp. 504-512 (1952) for a fairly recent
evaluation.
E*
^°hn K Reeves> “The Kentucky Legislature:
2 P ^ ? r Sei0 QTW0* R*v)ew °f Government, Vol. 5, No. 2, Department
of Political Science, University of Kentucky (November 1964). A
+£ bllef Tevie™ of the debate over unicameralism, with referV hL m?dTiIl literature on the subject, appears in W. J. Keefe
if: ° 5 U1,
rican Legislative Process: Congress and the
States, Prentice-Hall (1964), pp. 53-55.
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A Bicameral Legislature?
The abiding reason for bicameralism is acceptance of the
notion that a two-house legislature furnishes important checks
against adoption of ill-considered or undesirable statutes. Bi
cameralism is a strongly “conservative” system. It adds delays
and obstacles to the passage of legislation; it increases oppor
tunities for application of leverage by special interests; lobby
ists favor it because it increases the market for their mediation
and services. But it also increases the amount of “pickling” or
exposure involved in the legislative process. It would seem
that a limited session of 60 days should be bicameral in order
to get this additional bicameral exposure, and that an impera
tive of unicameralism would be to extend the allowable term
of the session. This might be desirable anyway, for a bicameral
body.
“We’re really down here to prevent the passage of the bad
legislation,” a veteran member of the Montana Senate observed
wryly one morning after a particularly exacerbated and un
productive session.
It seems likely that Montanans will continue a two-house
Legislative Assembly, while seeking from time to time to
reduce some of its inefficiencies and to improve its working
conditions. Notable progress has been made in a few areas in
recent years, and some experienced legislators in both parties
remain committed to further improvements.
Bicameralism affords an important opportunity to establish
different patterns of representation in the two houses, with ad
vantages which are explored in the following discussion of
kinds of districts. Bicameralism also allows establishment of
terms of different lengths between the two houses. This affords
a check against sharp partisan shifts in elections, by having
some “carry-over” members who serve from a prior election.
But the same feature could be achieved by staggering elections
to longer-term service as in the present Montana Senate.

How Large Should the Houses Be?
The equitable apportionment standard seems to say nothing
about the size of the legislative houses to be apportioned. Yet
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decisions about size must be made, even if the decisions are to
perpetuate the present size as nearly as may be.
The original Montana Senate had 16 members, and by crea
tion of 40 more counties within 35 years it grew to 56 members;
the House of Representatives started with 55 members and
now has 94, although it once reached 110 in the late 1920’s.
There is no “ideal” size for a legislative body. National rep
resentative assemblies such as Congress and those of England,
France, and the Soviet Union tend to be quite large, ranging
in the hundreds and even to more than a thousand members.
The United States House of Representatives might function
more effectively if it had 300 members rather than 435, but
whether it would represent the American people more effec
tively is not so evident.
State legislative chambers vary greatly in size, but tend to
be smaller than national legislatures. There seems to be little
correlation between size of legislature and state population.
New Hampshire with a house of 400 has less population than
Montana, while New York represents its millions with a senate
of 58 and with 150 representatives. Forty senators sit beneath
the golden codfish in a handsome oval chamber of Bulfinch’s
State House in Massachusetts, which may have the best appor
tioned legislature among the states—whatever its other quali
ties.
State houses of representatives range from 35 (Delaware) to
400 (New Hampshire) and one-third of them cluster at mem
berships between 100 and 124. State senates range from 17
members (Delaware and Nevada) to 67 (Minnesota); Mon
tana s senate is fourth largest. Most senates have between 30
and 39 members.4 Limiting factors in Montana appear to in
clude the fact that a very small legislative chamber, appor
tioned to population, would require some of its members to
represent sparsely populated districts of quite large area. If a
small chamber established multimember districts “across the
board, some districts would reach truly unwarranted size.
For this reason, while multimember districts are recommended
for Senate representation of urban areas in the next section
r t h f f 1 f d i (?gu1, p: 46, Clted above note 3 , think “it is plain . . . that
w teS hav.e / Iven no more than casual attention to the relation
ship between state population and the size of the legislature.”
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of this study, allowance of some single member Senate districts
for the sparsely populated regions in the state seems impera
tive.
It may be expected that these factors will not be ignored in
the consideration of reapportionment by Montana’s Legislative
Assembly. Recent population studies of Montana and its region
by the Upper Midwest Economic Study are available in this
connection/’ Visual comparisons of the maps at pages 58 and
59 also will suggest aspects of this problem.
Without further exploration, it is assumed that the Montana
House of Representatives will retain approximately its present
size, or be a bit smaller—say, from 75 to 100 members. It is
further assumed that the Senate will he from one-third to
one-half the size of the House.

What Kind of Districts?
This may be the most important creative choice which the
39th Legislative Assembly can make regarding apportionment.
Decisions in this area will determine the nature and character
of the new legislature more fundamentally than any other
decisions which seem likely or even possible to make.
The Legislative Assembly might be able to decide this prob
lem by deliberation and choice, whether or not it settles the
details of districting and apportionment, or the establishment
of an interim agency for such detailed work. If the kinds of
districts to be established can be determined, the legislature
will have had its say in its most important area of creative
policy determination. Such a decision doubtless would inform
and guide a court which would reapportion if the legislature
fails to agree on the details. More is said on this problem in
Part VIII of this study.
5See in particular its Urban Reports, No. 2, ‘‘The Urbanization of the
Upper Midwest: 1930-1960” (February 1963); No. 3, “Trade Centers
and Trade Areas of the Upper Midwest” (September 1963); No. 7,
“Urban Dispersal in the Upper Midwest,” (June 1964); and No. 8,
“Projected Urban Growth in the Upper Midwest,” (August 1964)—all
by Dr. John R. Borchert and associates; and No. 6, “Population Mobility
in the Upper Midwest,” (May 1964) by Russell B. Adams; also, Study
Paper No. 4, “Migration and Population Growth in the Upper Midwest:
1930-1960” (July 1962) by Larry A. Sjaastad; University of Minnesota,
Minneapolis.
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Critics of the equitable apportionment standard complain
that it robs the states of creative choice in fashioning their
legislatures. This view overlooks the substantially different
consequences which follow from choices among kinds of repre
sentative districts—even when all of those districts are equita
bly apportioned to population. The makeup of these repre
sentative districts is a central issue in the whole reapportion
ment movement.6
The basic choice is between “single member” districts and
“multimember” or “multiple member” districts. Each kind of
district has advantages and disadvantages which will operate
in the new legislature, whether or not the implications of
choice are recognized when the decisions are made.
A single member district really should be called a “single
representative” district; it elects a single delegate to a legis
lative chamber. Winner takes all by plurality or majority,
minorities have no representative of their own choice, and such
districts discourage the rise of dissident or third-party candi
dates. Examples are Montana counties which serve as single
member districts for election of state senators; and Montana’s
two congressional districts for election of members for the
United States House of Representatives.
A multimember district probably should be called a “mul“The reader who thinks in spatial terms and who “sees” maps is refer
red to the map on the opposite page, with the warning that it seeks to
illustrate the problem of reapportionment, not to propose a solution.
On this map, area represents population. Each county was assigned
an area which would represent its share of the state’s total 1960 popu
lation.
Thus equal areas on this map indicate equal populations within such
areas. If this map were divided into 10 equal areas, each of the ten
areas would contain about one-tenth of the state’s population. As
egislative districts, ten such areas would meet the one-man, one vote
standard of fair apportionment to population.
The map suggests the limits within which counties of small population
must be combined at one end of a districting scale, while counties of
large population must receive multiple representation, or be divided
into subdistricts, at the other end of the scale, if legislative chambers
are to be kept within reasonable limits of size.
This is not an apportionment proposal. The reader may wish to imag.hls
30, or B50, or 100 equal areas on this map; this would
district the state into that number of equitably apportioned single
member legislative districts. This map may be compared with the one
at page 59 which shows counties by area.
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tiple representative” district; it elects more than one delegate
to a legislative chamber. Each of two or more representatives
is elected “at large” from the entire district, by a plurality or
majority of voters in the entire district, and serves alongside
other representatives similarly elected. The terms of these
representatives may be coterminous, as in the Montana House
of Representatives, or terms of equal length may be staggered
to overlap in time, as do the terms of United States Senators.
Each state is a multimember district for election and repre
sentation in the United States Senate.
A joint district is one which grants fractional shares of a
representative to each of several smaller districts which are
combined within the “joint” district; this gives representation
which is additional to any other representation each of the
smaller districts may have. A few instances of this kind of
districting existed in the earliest Montana state legislative
sessions and were discussed in Part II. Congressmen “at
large” in states which also elect United States representatives
from districts are elected from a statewide joint district.7
All three types of districts have existed in Montana, and
both single member districts and multimember districts now
exist in the 39th Legislative Assembly. It seems likely, if not
imperative, that both single member and multimember dis
tricts will be found in the new legislature; and joint districts
might be a more desirable occasional expedient than such un
tried and uncertain devices as weighted voting.
In what combinations should these types of districts be used,
to accomplish what objectives of representation?
If all members were elected from single member districts
in both houses of the new legislature each senator would rep
resent two to three times as many constituents as would each
representative. If two or more senators were to be elected
from multimember districts (at least in the more populous
See above, page 55, for discussion of the Montana precedents. In
Davis v. Mann, 377 U. S. 678 (1964) the Virginia state apportionment
case, the United States Supreme Court called such joint districts “floterial, defining them thus: “a legislative district which includes within
its boundaries several separate districts or political subdivisions which
independently would not be entitled to additional representation but
whose conglomerate population entitles the entire area to another seat
in the particular legislative body being apportioned.”
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counties) while representatives were elected from smaller
single member districts (perhaps parts of more populous coun
ties), still greater differences could be achieved between the
constituencies of senators and representatives. This would im
plement the notion that bicameralism implies such differences
to be desirable.
Under any circumstances it appears that several districts in
each house must combine two or more of the less populous
counties.8 It may also be assumed that within allowable limits
of population variance—tentatively something less than two
to one—districts comprising several counties will meet the
constitutional requirement of contiguity and compactness
(Montana Constitution, Article VI, section 3). Such districts
might be represented by one senator while the most populous
counties might have as many as five or six senators.
Populous counties will have multiple representation in both
houses in any event; and it is for these counties that the Legis
lative Assembly reaches the heart of creative choice in consti
tuting the new legislature.
The relevant considerations can be illustrated by relating
them to a particular proposal, whether that proposal proves to
be acceptable or not.

Single Member Districts in the House of Representa
tives?
Single member districts had an early and vigorous champion
in Wilbur Fisk Sanders, pioneer, attorney, and Montana’s first
United States Senator. His own words are best:
In a Democratic Government, the basic element . . . is
equality in opinion and action of all its electors. That equality
manifestly does not exist where one elector is permitted in one
locality to vote for one representative and across an imaginary
line, another is permitted to vote for thirteen. The inequality
of power resulting from this situation is not the main or only
mischief . . .

The esteemed pioneer cataloged a few: “unwise legislation,”
"As noted in Part II, nineteen smallest counties are entitled to but
six representatives according to present population ratios for the House
of Representatives.
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chicane,” “corrupt log rolling,” not to mention alienation be
tween voters and their representatives and the emancipation
of representatives from responsibility.
Nor, it seems, was the one man, one vote principle first
brought to Montana by the United States Supreme Court in
1964:
One man, one vote, one Representative, that is democracy,
that is republicanism, and none other is . . .

Sanders was convinced that single member districts would
be legal under the existing constitution. “It is not believed
that our Constitution forbids single Representative Districts,
and the correction of this flagitious example continued from
our earliest history is a crying need.”9
Appealing arguments can be made for systematic establishment of single member districts in one of the houses, and the
advantages would be most fully realized if this were to be the
larger House of Representatives.
1)
Small population, single member districts furnish maxi
mum representation of minorities. In a populous county which
has multimember representation, as in the present Montana
ouse of Representatives, a countywide partisan—or economic
—or cultural majority tends to capture the entire legislative
delegation while strong, persistent and well-recognized minori
ties may go unrepresented by legislators of their own choice.
Awareness of urban-rural cleavages is heightened in the
reapportionment process and this may diminish the chances,
3
1'one ^00 S°°d, that rural parts of populous counties
will be able to elect any representative of their interests in a
countywide multimember district.
Moreover it is reasonable to suppose that party discipline
will be heightened within the new legislature, and that party
oyalties will be more important in legislative elections. This
would tend to freeze out local party minorities within multi
member districts even more than at present.
Single member districts within populous counties would imContributions

to the H istorical Society o f M ontana, vol. 4, pages 144-
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prove the chance for either rural minorities or party minorities
to receive some representatives “of their own.”
2) Since single member districts would be smaller than
multimember districts, a candidate for election within a single
member district would have the advantage of substantial econ
omies in financial cost and other burdens of campaigning. To
this extent the single member district would tend to enlarge
the pool of possible recruits for service in the legislature.
3) Since single member districts would have smaller con
stituencies of voters, they should facilitate communication
between voters and their representatives. By the same token
single member districts might make accountability of the legis
lator to his constituents more clear and direct and personal.
Such a trend would fit modern notions that effective repre
sentative government depends upon sharpening the focus of
responsibility upon elected officials.
4) In a few instances it might be desirable to attach rural
portions of populous counties to adjoining counties of smaller
population. This would improve the chance for representation
of rural parts of urbanized counties; and it would also give
the apportioning authority maximum flexibility in putting to
gether districts of equitable population.
But single member districts are not a panacea for the prob
lems of representation, nor is their establishment lacking in
practical complexities. Opponents of the single member dis
trict will argue with some plausibility that it tends to accentu
ate peculiarly local interests at the expense of a larger view
of public policy. This same criticism can, of course, be directed
against any subdividing of an electorate. It is the purpose of
districting and apportionment to divide up the electorate so
that local and partial interests can be expressed, shifting alli
ances contrived, and minority views protected. Perhaps the
tendency of the single member district to accentuate the local
can be balanced in the pattern of Senate representation.
The suggestion that more persons might be attracted to legis
lative service by the economies of campaigning in small single
member districts may be countered by an argument that voter
choices will be unduly restricted if their representative must
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live within a district smaller than a county. The Montana
Constitution requires (Article V, section 3) that the represent
ative must live within the “district in which he shall be
elected.”
There is also a constitutional problem to be faced in estab
lishing single member districts within populous counties. The
Montana Constitution (Article VI, section 3) declares that “No
county shall be divided in the formation of representative dis
tricts.” It seems likely that an apportionment plan using whole
counties and combinations of whole counties could be contrived
which would be equitable as to the populations of such dis
tricts.
But in such a legislature voters of Yellowstone and Cascade
counties would immediately face ballots with as many as
twenty candidates for House seats, assuming the House to have
around 100 members. In five more years, after the 1970 census,
the ballots for at-large, multimember elections in the most
populous counties will be still longer; and there is no reason
to expect that this trend will stop in the foreseeable future, as
ever-increasing proportions of the state’s population live in
its cities.
Yet to reduce the size of the House very sharply to prevent
such long ballots would develop what might be considered as
irrationality at the other end of the scale, in districts of un
desirably large territorial spread for the least populous regions
of the state.
Thus division of the more populous counties into single
member districts for elections to the larger of the two houses
again seems persuasive; it meets the Supreme Court’s warning
that long ballot multimember district elections from Denver
were a debatable feature” of the Colorado apportionment
invalidated last June.10
The Supreme Court has not ruled out of consideration mat
ters of size, homogeneity of region, or convenience of internal
access, in making legislative districts; it has said, rather, that
such matters may not prevail to the prejudice of equitable
representation of people.
This study takes the considered position that the first and
See discussion of this case above, pages 100-101.
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overriding task of the 39th Legislative Assembly is its obliga
tion under the 14th Amendment equal protection clause to
make an equitable apportionment of the state for the Novem
ber 1966 legislative elections. This apportionment can and
should he “rational” as well as equitable.11
It may be that Article VI, section 3 prohibits only the attach
ment of parts of counties to other counties; it may not prohibit
the establishment of sub-districts within counties. But if it
does cover the latter case and is still valid law, it would stand
in the way of a legislative decision to create House districts
within counties. Amid possible doubts whether this particular
provision of Article VI, section 3 is applicable, it might be said
that the Montana Legislative Assembly is entitled to exercise
its judgment that the provision must be swept out along with
other state constitutional provisions whose incompatibility
with the one man, one vote standard is beyond doubt—and
that such presumption should be entitled to weight in a judicial
interpretation of the matter.
But should the Legislative Assembly, while choosing to
establish single member House districts, consider that this
provision of Article VI, section 3 persists as an operative con
stitutional restriction, the legislature could proceed initially
to district on the basis of whole counties and combinations of
whole counties, expressing the ultimate intention to sub
district the more populous counties when all legal barriers had
been removed.1- This intention could be stated in the proposed
general apportionment statute as a guideline for the appor
tioning agency, whatever immediate decisions might be made
to district using whole counties. Should the Legislative As
sembly desire to establish single member House districts
within the more populous counties, a practical problem of
secondary importance will be how best to partition the coun"The weight of this factor of “rationality” in the Supreme Court’s de
cisions deserves separate study. Justices Clark and Stewart seemed to
vote with the six-member majority in the June 1964 cases when the
state apportionment lacked not only equitability but rationality as well;
in some cases they dissented from the majority position when they
thought the apportionment to be rational by their standards although
not equitable by the majority’s standards.
“See further discussion of the approach to amendments below, pages
131-135.
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ties. No final answer is attempted here; it would seem that
precincts or combinations of precincts would be the most
obvious subdivisions for election purposes. But population data
are not available by precincts, so that apportionment would
be based upon numbers of registered voters, in partitioning
the county equitably. Given divergencies between voter regis
tration and population from precinct to precinct, would appor
tionment based on the voter registrations meet the one man,
one vote standard?
A kind of answer and a possible approach may lie in the
recent suggestion of a New York State Citizens’ Committee
on Reapportionment. It said that “an evaluation of the Su
preme Court opinions in the apportionment cases warrants the
conclusion that use of voters is the proper interpretation of
what the Court requires as the basis of apportionment.”13
Stopping short of the full rigors of that position, it might
be said that districting based upon voter registrations seems
to be fully consistent with the logic of the one man, one vote
standard. In the absence of evidence showing systematic dis
crimination in the voter registration system, or a showing that
more appropriate data were at hand for the job, such districting would seem reasonable, non-discriminatory, and a “goodfaith” approach.

Multimember Districts in the Senate?
Since single member districts in the House would tend to
accentuate the expression of local interests, balance could best
be achieved by using multimember districts quite systematic
ally to represent the more populous counties in the Senate.
Here an analogy to the United States Congress is both apt
and suggestive. Election of United States Senators from entire
states as multimember districts is balanced by election of Rep
resentatives from single member parts of states. Differences
between size and nature of constituencies is maximized. In
similar fashion, multimember districts for most Montana SenReport to Governor Nelson A . Rockefeller by the Citizens’ Committee
?? ^ ^ P P ° rt1(>nment, State of New York, December 1, 1964, Appendix
Use of Voters as a Base for Apportionment,” page 103; at 105:
e right to Equal Protection is the right of the individual voter and
not of a non-voting population or body of citizens.”
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ate seats would be appropriate to balance single member House
districts.
Yet to keep the Senate within modest size limits it will be
necessary for counties of smaller population to be grouped for
representation by a single senator, while the more populous
counties will be represented by as many as five or six senators.
The pattern would be rather like that in the present Montana
House of Representatives except that the smaller population
counties would be grouped into districts.
In such a legislature voters in the major cities would not
face an unduly long ballot of candidates for the Senate prob
ably not so long as the voters of Yellowstone and Cascade
counties now have for the House of Representatives.
But to reverse the proposed arrangement and elect senators
from single member districts and representatives in populous
multimember districts would create long ballots for election
of House members in urban counties, as we have just noted.
The fact that one-third of Montana’s counties have popula
tions too small to earn a representative under present popula
tion ratios establishes the probability that there will be some
single member districts for groups of such counties in both
houses of the new legislature, even if multimember districts
are the pattern for more populous counties in one house.
One federal district court has challenged a system in which
single member districts and multimember districts appeared
side by side for the same chamber but the facts of the case
appear to distinguish it from the situation proposed here for
Montana.14
It just happens that the 1960 populations of most of the
urban counties in Montana fall pretty close to multiples of
15,000. An apportionment ratio of one senator for each 15,500
population would give a Senate of about 45 members give or
“Drew v. Scranton, 229 Fed. Supp. 310 (U. S. Dist. Ct., Pennsylvania,
1964); at 326 the court declared: “The defendants have offered no
explanation. . . . In the absence of any legislative history or other
explanation justifying it, and we have found none, we can only con
clude that this districting is either the result of gerrymandering for
partisan advantage, as was suggested at the hearing, or that it is
wholly arbitrary and capricious.” Multimember districts for populous
areas and single-member districts for the least populous areas in Mon
tana would be neither arbitrary nor capricious.
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take one or two as particular apportionments might be decided.
But such an apportionment ratio might “fit” the 1970 popu
lations of these urban centers quite awkwardly; by the same
token, a small change in size of the chamber after a 1970 appor
tionment might facilitate application of a ratio with a more
appropriate “fit” to the districts which have been created.
To the extent that the Legislative Assembly can explore
these matters of size deliberately and thoughtfully, it might
be desirable to fix allowable ranges of size for each house in
a general apportionment statute. Such a statute could guide
the apportionment whether it is accomplished by legislature,
commission, or court. But to the extent that size limits are
chosen on a traditional or negotiated basis only, it would seem
advisable to leave the limits open to amendment by statute;
probably they should not be embedded in a new constitutional
provision.
A further consideration is that the functioning of a fairly
apportioned legislature cannot be predicted with any certainty.
Even if both of its houses are about the present size, the only
certainty is that they will behave somewhat differently from
the present chambers. Discretion suggests that size limits
should not be constitutionally fixed until judgment on such
matters can be founded on some experience with the new
legislature.
American state legislatures are a bountiful source of inter
esting devices for voting within multimember districts, and
the literature of political science abounds with further inter
esting possibilities of varying complexity. For example, a
minority party can be protected within a multimember district
by limiting nominations of each party to some fraction of the
entire list. Illinois in effect did this in legislative elections of
November 1964 when the two major parties limited themselves
to 118 nominations for the 177 seats to be filled.15 Such a
system gives no assurance of representation for minorities
other than party minorities.
Some proposals that have been made in Montana would
employ identical districts for Senate and House, merely appor
tioning different numbers of representatives to these districts.
Query. How would the proportions be determined, from county to
county?
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This, of course, is a valid way to meet the one man, one vote
standard; but it would seem to surrender whatever advantage
bicameralism might offer, in the form of different constituent
bases for the two houses. Such a legislature might as well be
unicameral, in this respect.
The crux of the policy problem in districting—assuming
desire to capitalize on bicameral differences between houses
is to strike the particular balance which is desired between
representation units which w ill express local, partial and
minority views on the one hand, and units which will be large
enough to focus upon larger or “public” interests on the other
hand. The fixing of district sizes and the manipulation of
apportionment ratios to achieve this balance within a bicam
eral legislature is the essence of the political function which
has reposed traditionally in the legislatures.
If the 39th Legislative Assembly can resolve the main prob
lems of kind of legislature for itself, or for an apportionment
commission, or for the courts, it will have discharged its prin
cipal responsibility.

VIII.

Getting the Job Done
ELLIS L. WALDRON

Some Political Considerations
It may not be optimistic beyond warrant to propose that
Montana can solve its reapportionment problems expeditiously
when other states have found the matter to be so vexatious.
It does not underrate the complexity of the problem in Mon
tana to point out that two major stumbling blocks encountered
in other states either do not exist or can be minimized:
1) In some states equitable apportionment delivers the bal
ance of legislative power irrevocably to a single great met
ropolis. This is not likely to happen in Montana where the
five most populous counties together have less than half of the
state’s population. And these centers are scattered about the
state, divided not so much by great mountain spines as by dif
ferences of economy and market orientations. They will com
prise no political steamroller in the new legislature.
2) In some states the balance between political parties occurs
sharply on an urban-rural, or upstate-downstate axis so that
equitable apportionment delivers a preponderance of legis
lative power to the party which prevails in the rural areas, or
in the metropolis. This is not the case in Montana, where each
major political party enjoys a broad and distributed base of
support in both city and country, and across several regions of
the state.
The statistical explorations of Professor Howard Reinhardt
of the Montana State University Mathematics Department
which comprise Part V of this study sustain the estimates of
this observer that neither political party will suffer major or
enduring displacement of legislative power in a fair apportion
ment of seats. Either party in a future election will be able to
capture control in one or both houses of a fairly apportioned
Legislative Assembly as the voters might desire.1
}s
indicate matter to assess; it is important to distinguish the
effects of apportionment as such from trends of party affiliation which
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Democratic Party members hold a majority of the votes in
both houses of the 39th Legislative Assembly as it convened in
Helena on January 4, 1965. It is not suggested that they can
not or will not find partisan advantage in one set of detailed
apportionment decisions as compared to another set. As be
tween acceptable choices they might be expected to choose the
ones which seem most congenial to their interest, as would
Republican legislative majorities in the same position.
But the grossest political gerrymandering would not entrench
either party beyond a point that the disadvantaged party could
unseat it in the next election. Moreover, the Republican mi
nority in each house will be vigilant against abuse of the ma
jority’s power in this whole matter.
So the Democratic majorities, perhaps making some virtue of
this particular balance of affairs, may be expected to seek
maximum gain by appealing to popular support for a fair and
responsible apportionment program. They will be not un
mindful that the Republican Governor would veto an unfair or
obviously gerrymandered reapportionment which would come
to his desk, thereby shifting responsibility to the Democratic
legislators for failure to reapportion. A veto on such a basis
would also shift the blame onto Democratic legislative leaders
for the judicial intervention which would certainly develop at
that juncture.
Yet the Governor will accept the burden of delay, and of
judicial intervention, if he vetoes any reasonable reapportion
ment plan offered by the Democratically controlled Legislative
Assembly.
Thus possibly and somewhat ironically, partisan political
balances of 1965 may favor development and acceptance of a
fair and reasonable apportionment plan.

Constitutional Obligations Further Explored
The constitutional obligation to reapportion both houses of
the Montana Legislative Assembly in time for the legislative
elections of November 1966 was stated in general terms in
may be developing in the electorate on grounds quite independent
from legislative apportionment.
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Part VI. This obligation now must be assigned more precisely
to the responsible agencies of Montana state government.
The obligation to reapportion was perfected as of June 1964,
for whatever agency was charged by state law with responsi
bility to initiate reapportionment. In Montana this initiative
lies with the Legislative .Assembly; and in a limited sense it
might be said to arise for other agencies only when they be
come a part of the process.
Thus in a sense the Governor has no obligation until an ap
portionment program comes to his desk from the Legislative
Assembly. And courts, as “passive” agencies, have to be in
vited into the act by a law suit. As of January 4, 1965, when
the Legislative Assembly convened, Montana was one of just
seven states in which no legal action had been initiated to com
pel reapportionment.2
But whatever the situation between June 1964 and January
4, 1965, constitutional obligation to reapportion awaited the
Montana Legislative Assembly when it convened and organ
ized for business. In express and precise terms its members
as “Members of £one of] the several State Legislatures” were
“bound by Oath or Affirmation to support this [^United States]
Constitution” including the 14th Amendment whose equal pro
tection clause now requires state legislatures in both their
houses to be apportioned equitably to population (United
States Constitution, Article VI, section 3 and 14th Amendment,
and June 1964 Supreme Court decisions discussed in Part VI
of this study).
Provisions of the Montana Constitution which conflict with
this obligation must be regarded as having ceased to “be” law
imposing any obligation, as of June 1964 when the United
States Supreme Court decided the state apportionment cases.
The Legislative Assembly is relieved of obligation to these
state constitutional provisions by the overriding supremacy
of the national constitution and its assurance of equal protec
tion of the laws against state deprivation. Nor can these state
constitutional provisions bind the Governor as against his own
oathbound obligation to sustain the relevant national law,
A convenient 50 state survey of developments appeared in The Christian
Science Monitor for Monday, January 4, 1965, under the heading “Re
apportionment Pace Speeded.”
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when he is confronted with legal obligations to sign or to veto
a reapportionment bill which comes to him from the legis
lature.
The Governor might veto a legislative reapportionment pro
gram on grounds of policy, or unreasonableness, or failure to
conform (in his judgment) to the one man, one vote standards
set by the Supreme Court; but veto on grounds of prior obli
gation to the Montana constitution in its conflict with the 14th
Amendment standard of equitable apportionment would be a
misconstruction of his responsibility to the United States Con
stitution.
When a provision of a state constitution is in conflict with
the United States Constitution on a point where the national
constitution prevails, as in the 14th Amendment, correction of
the state constitutional provisions becomes a kind of house
keeping chore to “tidy up” the state charter for future guidance
of state officials and citizens, and to remove any doubts about
the supremacy of the national law. This obligation exists in
relevant situations whether declared by a court or not; a court
action might clarify the obligation, but it would not create it.
Thus, on January 4, 1964, the 39th Legislative Assembly of
Montana faced a constitutional obligation to do two things:12
1) To reapportion the state by a statute which will permit
election of a fairly apportioned legislature in both of its houses
as soon as practicable—that is, not later than the election of
November 1966.
2) To bring the Montana Constitution into line with national
law, at least to the point that there is no barrier to conformity
with that law, in equitable apportionment of the Legislative
Assembly.
Of these two obligations, reapportionment has priority over
constitutional amendment in several respects. Reapportion
ment became a continuing legal obligation of the Legislative
Assembly until accomplished, no later than January 4, 1965;
and the obligation will continue until discharged by an ac
ceptable reapportionment, regardless of what the Montana
Constitution happens to say on the subject. Indeed, ratifica
tion or defeat by Montana voters in November 1966, of any
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state constitutional amendment the legislature might propose
would not alter this primary obligation to reapportion.

Developing the Reapportionment Plan
Several circumstances attach peculiar urgency to adoption
of a general apportionment statute which will answer ques
tions about kind of legislature, size of legislature and kinds of
districts—the inescapable questions explored in Part VII of this
study. The 39th Legislative Assembly will have discharged
the most important part of its reapportionment responsibility
if it enacts such a statute, whatever else may be accomplished
with respect to reapportionment during its regular session.
The reasons for such a statute include the following:
1) These general structural questions must be answered any
way. Logical imperatives and practical priorities run pretty
close together in this matter.
2) By answering the questions about kind of legislature, size
of legislature and kinds of districts, the Legislative Assembly
will have occupied the larger part of the field open to it in the
reapportionment process. Decisions on these matters pretty
well determine the nature and character of the new legislature,
whatever agency may ultimately work out the details.
3) Should it appear late in the regular session—say the 55th
day that agreement may not be reached on details of district
ing and apportionment, designation of an interim apportion
ment commission will increasingly appear to be inevitable. A
general apportionment statute would furnish such a commis
sion with the guidelines it would need; there would be little
room for questions about separation or improper delegation of
powers if the general framework for reapportionment had been
set by the Legislative Assembly.
4) At some point, judicial involvement seems inevitable. If
the courts have not been invited into the reapportionment act
long before, there can be no question that a three-judge fed-
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eral district court will review whatever reapportionment is
proposed, by whatever agency.
If general legislative standards for reapportionment have
been stated (and do not themselves conflict with the one man,
one vote standard), the task of a special legislative session, or
of an interim apportionment commission, or of a court to re
apportion, or to rework details of an apportionment found to
be invalid by a court, would be within proper and manageable
limits.
The only truly objectionable feature of judicial interven
tion in reapportionment develops when a court must establish
the standards and guidelines which should have been stated
by the legislature in a general apportionment statute. No grave
interruption of normal governmental relations is involved if
a court is asked to remind a legislature of its obligations; if in
vited into the matter a court may be expected to give the legis
lature reasonable time to perform its functions.
Should a court ultimately have to work out the detailed ap
plication of a general apportionment statute through failure of
other agencies to agree upon detail, no gross impropriety is in
volved. Some state courts long have had jurisdiction to re
view apportionments for conformity to general legislative or
constitutional standards. The problem of working out details
of district boundaries and apportionments of seats to these
boundaries need not be more political nor less justiciable than
some other matters administered by the courts—if the policy
guidelines have been established by the legislature in a general
apportionment statute.
5) Several reasons for proceeding under a general appor
tionment statute rather than by restrictive new constitutional
language at this juncture are considered below in the discus
sion of constitutional amendments.
One of these reasons is that experience could be gained with
the main outlines and workings of the new legislature before
“locking it up” in the Constitution. Some of the language of
the general apportionment statute might ultimately belong in
the basic charter of the state; but proposal of new constitu
tional language is best founded upon careful study of the sort
the 39th Legislative Assembly will not have time to make.
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An Apportionment Commission
The Legislative Assembly may wish to explore use of an ap
portionment commission to complete detailed application of a
general apportionment statute. By the 60th day of the ses
sion, such a commission to carry on the work ad interim may
be the only alternative to an expensive special session or to
reapportionment by a three-judge federal district court.
Such a commission might comprise legislators, in which case
it would be a special interim committee; its members might be
the members of the special apportionment committees which
served during the regular session; or its legislative membership
might be augmented with some elected executive officers or
some lay or citizen members. It would be able to employ staff
assistance, assemble and analyze data, and implement the gen
eral apportionment statute in an environment less harrassed
than a session of the entire Legislative Assembly. The com
mission probably should not include any state judges who
might later be called upon to review its handiwork in a legal
suit.
Fourteen states have made the considered decision to put the
lesser order of implemental or nonpolicy decisions about ap
portionment in the hands of commissions or boards, either in
itially or in default of legislative accomplishment of the task.3
It seems doubtful that the Montana Legislative Assembly
would establish a permanent reapportionment commission un
til it had experience with such an arrangement on a tempo
rary and experimental basis. But the special (ad hoc) interim
commission might be invited to make proposals for its own re
placement; or that problem might be referred to the Legisla
tive Council for study and recommendation.
Of course, the Legislative Council might be asked to func
tion as the apportioning commission, but this suggestion is
not made as a recommendation. Perhaps the Council is too
useful in its normal functions to be jeopardized by the “heat in
the kitchen” when reapportionment is in the broiler.
’Half of these states (Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Michigan,
Missouri and Ohio) put the initiative to reapportion in apportioning
agencies, the others vest reapportionment in some commission or
board California, Illinois, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota and
Texas) or in a state court (Maine) if the legislature fails to reapportion.

GETTING THE JOB DONE

131

The Legislative Assembly would expect to review the work
of the interim special apportionment commission before allow
ing application of its plan in the November 1966 election.
The joint resolution establishing the commission could spec
ify that its work must be reported back to the Legislative As
sembly after 90 days or six months, or on a certain date; this
report could be made to a special session whose call would be
pledged by the Governor through his approval of the joint reso
lution.
Several alternatives exist for implementation of reapportion
ment at this postulated juncture: acceptance of the commission
recommendation could depend upon specific legislative adop
tion as an apportionment statute; or it could be decided to al
low its application unless the Legislative Assembly and the
Governor could agree upon revisions. The latter alternative
might hold the greatest assurance that the Legislative Assem
bly would be reapportioned for November 1966.
If the 39th Legislative Assembly can enact a general appor
tionment statute and establish an interim apportionment com
mission to work out the detailed application of that statute for
November 1966, Montana will be farther along the road to ex
peditious reapportionment than most observers thought pos
sible on January 4,1965.

Amending the Montana Constitution
A secondary priority has been assigned to the task of revis
ing the Montana Constitution to make it accord with appor
tionment plans and decisions. Perhaps the regular standing
committees which deal with constitutional amendments and
federal relations in the 39th Legislative Assembly might pro
pose an amendment to delete invalid apportionment provisions,
while the special committees on apportionment develop a gen
eral apportionment statute, and later, create an interim appor
tionment commission to complete details of districting and ap
portionment.
The essence of the proposal made in this study is simply to
delete from the Montana Constitution those few words and
phrases which conflict with development of a fairly appor-
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tioned Legislative Assembly according to one man, one vote
standards.
It seems advisable at this juncture not to read new positive
provisions into the Constitution which would again freeze the
constitutional pattern of apportionment. Several consider
ations suggest a course of simple deletion and of minor modern
ization:
1) It is conceivable that the Supreme Court may modify the
imputed rigors of its one man, one vote interpretation of the
14th Amendment. Although the rule will not be abandoned,
it is entirely predictable that its limits will be worked out in
litigation to continue for a decade or more.4
2) However improbable, the possibility exists that an amend
ment to the United States Constitution might be adopted to
limit application of the 14th Amendment to state legislative ap
portionment. As of January 4, 1965, legislatures in at least
ten states appeared to conform to the one man, one vote
standard; and at least five other states seemed likely to meet
the standard during 1965. This list does not include a number
of other states where effective action seemed possible in con
sequence of legislative sessions now meeting. Thirteen states
can block adoption of any constitutional amendment by with
holding ratification, and states which have gotten their legis
latures fairly apportioned are not likely to move backwards
in this regard; thus adoption of such an amendment seems re
mote indeed.r*
4The New York Citizens’ Committee on Reapportionment advised Gov
ernor Rockefeller on December 1, 1964: “The Committee does not
recommend that any constitutional amendment be proposed at the next
legislative session or, indeed, until such time as the Supreme Court
delineates with greater clarity and precision the scope of the June 15,
1964 decisions. After the Court has passed upon some of the proposed
plans of apportionment of other state legislatures and has generally
filled some of the interstices of the apportionment formyla, the limits
of state action will be more discernible. It would be both premature
and ill-advised to submit proposals for amending the Constitution which,
during or shortly after the process of adoption, might well be nullified
or modified by Supreme Court decision.” Reference was made to ex
perience of Colorado, Connecticut, and Michigan in this matter. Re
port, p. 10, cited above, page 120, note 13.
See the survey of developments in Christian Science Monitor, January
4, 1965. Ohio is one of the states whose legislature is now fairly ap-
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3) The people of Montana may wish to modernize the struc
ture of their Legislative Assembly in other ways, once the
workings of a fairly apportioned legislature are experienced.
The suggestions for constitutional changes made here go
slightly beyond the bare required minimum to eliminate the
provision against division of counties, and to modernize certain
archaic details. (Language to be deleted is enclosed in paren
theses); new language is italicized. The affected provisions
might read as follows:
Article V, Legislative Department:
(1) Section 4, second paragraph:
It shall be the duty of the (first) legislative assembly to
divide the state into senatorial and representative districts
(, but there shall be no more than one senator from each
county). The senators shall be divided into two classes.
Those elected from odd-numbered districts shall constitute
one class, and those elected from even-numbered districts
shall constitute the other class (; and when any additional
senator shall be provided for by law, his class shall be de
termined by lot).
(2) Section 4, third paragraph:
One half of the senators elected to the (first) fortieth
legislative assembly shall hold office for one year, and the
other half for three years; and it shall be determined by
lot immediately after the organization of the senate,
whether the senators from the odd- or even-numbered dis
tricts shall hold for one or three years.
(3) Section 45:
When vacancies occur in either house they shall he filled
as provided by statute; in the absence oj a statute, writs of
election to fill vacancies shall be issued by the Governor
£or Secretary of State?]
portioned. In the fading hours of a special legislative session on re
apportionment problems December 29, 1964, its House Rules Com
mittee “held a brief pre-session hearing” on a resolution to call for
such an amendment but only one witness appeared and “no action was
taken.” The Columbus Citizen-Journal for December 30, reported that
“a similar resolution was also introduced in the Senate, but was killed
through the combined opposition of Democrats and Governor Rhodes’
(Republican) Administration.”
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Article VI, Apportionment and Representation:
(4) Section 2:
The legislative assembly (shall provide by law for an
enumeration of the inhabitants of the state in the year
1895, and every tenth year thereafter; and at the session
next following such enumeration, and also) at the session
next following an enumeration of the inhabitants of the
state made by the authority of the United States, shall re
vise and adjust the apportionment for senators and repre
sentatives on the basis of such enumeration (according to
ratios to be fixed by law) or upon the number of qualified
voters.
The phrase about ratios at the end of the present section
seems superfluous when apportionment must represent popula
tion equitably; but a decision in the general apportionment
statute to create single member districts within populous coun
ties, based upon precinct lines, might make addition of a phrase
about qualified or registered voters desirable.
(5) Section 3:
Senate and representative districts may be altered from
time to time as public convenience may require. When a
(representative) district shall be composed of two or more
counties or parts of counties they shall be contiguous, and
the districts as compact as may be. (No county shall be
divided in the formation of representative districts.)
Deletion of the last sentence from the present provision will
accommodate the establishment of single member districts for
the more populous counties in either house; disappearance of
this language along with addition of or parts of counties earlier
in the section would conform to a plan for attachment of por
tions of certain counties to adjoining counties if this should
prove to be desirable.8
In full caution, the committees on constitutional amendments should
explore the possible application of the words “or at all” which appear
in Article XVI, section 8, prohibiting combinations of counties without
a popular referendum.
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(6) Delete section 4:
(Whenever new counties are created, each of said coun
ties shall be entitled to one senator, but in no case shall a
senatorial district consist of more than one county.)
The first provision seems superfluous under any construction
of the one man, one vote standard since all parts of the state
must be equitably represented. The latter part of the section
is incompatible with a fairly apportioned senate of moderate
size.
These six changes accomplish a minimum program of con
stitutional revision while allowing considerable flexibility to
reapportion the state. They do not divest the legislature of its
apportionment function.
(7)
Sections 5 and 6 of Article VI are archaic and should be
deleted while the rest of that Article is being amended.
A further amendment, possibly desirable but not imperative,
would modernize section 1 of Article VI relating to congres
sional districts. It might be made to read:
(One) Representatives in the Congress of the United
States shall be elected from districts or the state at large
(, the first Tuesday in October, 1889, and thereafter) at
such times and places, and in such manner as may be pre
scribed by law. When a new apportionment shall be made
by Congress the legislative assembly shall divide the state
into congressional districts accordingly.
It appears that Montana’s congressional districts probably
are within allowable limits of variation in population, and are
again moving towards equality since the 1960 census; this prob
lem can be assigned a low priority, well behind reapportion
ment of the state Legislative Assembly.
These proposals for constitutional amendment are minimal
and tentative, even as the entire latter portion of this study
Parts VII and VIII—are nothing more than a reconnaissance
into the problem of reapportionment.
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Reapportionment, States Rights and the Federal
System
’

Equitable reapportionment of American state legislatures
will terminate two generations of increasing alienation be
tween voters and their legislators, bringing the assemblies of
the states once again to represent people equitably.
However the Supreme Court may be criticized for its wis
dom in accepting importunate invitations to enter the appor
tionment thicket, it must be realized that the response came
after a generation of public frustration with other approaches
to their supposedly representative institutions; talk about po
litical recourse at the polls begged more questions than it
solved.
Three coincident movements of the present century have
more than casual relevance to each other—urbanization of so
ciety, decay in the representativeness of state legislatures, and
assumption of increasing governmental responsibilities by the
national government.
A most distinguished observer of American state politics has
noted that political movements tend to follow channels of
easiest access among alternative paths to satisfaction.
Institutional gadgets that wear down, discourage, or defeat
ocal majorities can only drive them to the alternative route to
action through federal power. . . When the dominant mood of
an era encounters institutional blockages at the state level, the
0 effective political power is apt to result in accretions
to federal functions.

All too often, appeals to states’ rights are nothing more than
a calculation that “a decision against federal action coupled
with the politico-constitutional system of the states amounts
to a decision against action.”7 Or it may be a canny recogni
tion that the choice is between responsible public government
and unresponsible private decision, not between action and
no action.
In longer perspective, the Supreme Court’s reapportionment
decisions probably will appear as a kind of last-best offer to
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the states to assume the responsibilities which are theirs in
the federal system, or make way for a national government
which has proven that it can and will respond to public needs
and desires.
Those persons concerned in good faith about federal centrali
zation might well give their attention to the effectiveness of
state political systems as instruments of popular government.8

Postscript
HERWEG v. 39TH MONTANA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY
On January 13, 1965, a three-judge United States District
Court took jurisdiction in the complaint of Phoebe Herweg,
of Butte, Montana, against the 39th Legislative Assembly, Gov
ernor Tim Babcock and Secretary of State Frank Murray, filed
the previous week. The Court took judicial notice that un
constitutional discrimination [^existed] in both houses of the
Montana legislature, but stayed further process “until the pre
sent session of the legislature has had a fair and reasonable
opportunity to initiate and take steps in the direction of con
stitutional reapportionment.”
While it would leave the “particular method of apportion
ment” to the legislature, the Court could “perceive no impedi
ment which will prevent the current session . . . from ac
complishing” the task in time for legislative elections to be held
in November 1966. A “reasonable procedure” would submit
proposed amendments to the state constitution for ratification
at this same election.
Meanwhile Article VI, sections 4 and 5 of the Montana Con
stitution were specifically declared to be “void and of no ef
fect” and further:
[A]t least for the purpose of temporary apportionment and
until such time as a more permanent provision has been made,
the Legislature has the inherent power, unrestricted by an
valid constitutional limitation, to provide for its own apportion
ment.

The Court hoped the Legislative Assembly “will exercise the
function which properly belongs to it,” but parties were in
vited to submit reports “from time to time” as to developments
in the legislative session. Upon a showing of “reasonable prob
ability that the present Legislative Assembly either will fail to
act or will enact an unconstitutional method of apportionment
the Court would set a hearing and “make an order effectively
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operating upon the defendants and upon the present session
of the Legislature.”
Clearly the Court hoped to forestall the need for drastic ju
dicial intervention of the sort required in several other states
when legislatures failed either by inaction or by evasive action
to reapportion equitably.
Should this happen in Montana, the Court saw several al
ternatives to be open to it:
1) order a call of a special legislative session for reapportion
ment
2) develop its own temporary apportionment to operate until
the Legislative Assembly enacts a valid reapportionment
3) order legislative elections at large from the entire state
in November 1966.1
1Herweg v. Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assembly of the State of Montana,
Order No. 1214, passim; before Pope, Circuit Judge; and Murray and
Jameson, District Judges.
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